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In modern history, no event has more profoundly symbolized suffering 
than the Holocaust. This novel “Husserlian-realist” phenomenological dissertation 
elucidates the meaning of existential trauma through an interdisciplinary and 
psychologically integrative vantage point. I use the testimony of a select group of 
Holocaust witnesses who committed suicide decades after that event as a lens to 
examine what their despair may reveal about an unprecedented existential, moral, 
and spiritual crisis of humanity that threatens to undermine our faith in human 
history and reality itself. By distinguishing what they actually saw about our 
condition from what they merely believed about reality, I show there is a reliable 
hope that can fulfill the highest reaches of human nature in the worst conditions. 
This I call a Psychotherapy of Hope. To this end, I provide a broad overview of 
the four main forces of psychotherapy to evaluate the role each plays in healing 
this crisis. I then provide an elucidation of empathic understanding within an 
“I/Thou” altruistic relationship having power to transform human personality. The 
primary barrier to personal transformation is shown to be no mere value-neutral 
indifference, but “cold” indifference or opposition to an objective good. No one 
can avoid a faith commitment, and the only solution to this crisis is our love or 
reliance on a self-transcendent good or benevolent super-ego worthy of our trust. 




we are, better than we are, and even transform human life as we know it. By love 
we may heal our wounds. 
 Keywords: wounded healer, suffering, meaning in suffering, existential 
trauma, physical trauma, psychological trauma, moral trauma, spiritual trauma, 
Holocaust, collective moral crisis, collective existential crisis, collective spiritual 
crisis, blind faith, bad faith, good faith, moral power, empathy, empathic love, 
psychopathic empathy, altruism, law of love, I and Thou, four forces of 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
What is it about the power of altruistic love or goodness that arguably 
moves even the most ruthless individuals to speak in its name (Plato, 1875b; 
Rogers, 1961; Wyner, 1988)? Adolf Hitler (1943) said, “I can fight only for 
something that I love” (p. 34), and repeatedly referred to the need for meaningful 
purpose, social justice, and a strong philosophical and moral foundation. He spoke 
in the name of Christian faith, and of his unique role in its providential spiritual 
awakening or renaissance. He explicitly said that he was acting in accordance 
with God’s will, driven by an inner voice “to carry on the work of true 
Christianity” (p. 307). Like Maslow’s (1971) appeal to the Farther Reaches of 
Human Nature, Hitler speaks of the inherent nobility of his people. He is 
convinced that he is chosen to lead them as “the Prometheus of mankind from 
whose bright forehead the divine spark of genius has sprung up at all times, 
forever kindling anew that fire of knowledge which illumined the night of silent 
mysteries and thus caused man to climb the path to mastery . . .” (p. 290). What’s 
the difference between the genuine article and the counterfeits? 
Psychologists, too, speak in the name of altruistic love or goodness. Freud, 







cure “effected by love” (Freud & Jung, 1974). Sandor Ferenczi referred to the 
sense in which patients only respond to love, compassion, or “real sincere 
sympathy” (Ferenczi, 1955, p. 161; 1995). D. W. Winnicott (1994) referred to our 
common recognition of the reality and power of a mother’s love. Donna Orange 
(2011) refers to these and other leading analysts in terms of the patient’s need for 
a “hermeneutics of compassion and trust” (p. 147). R. D. Laing (1960) concluded, 
“The main agent in uniting the patient . . . is the physician’s love, a love that 
recognizes the patient’s total being, and accepts it, with no strings attached” (p. 
178). Viktor Frankl (1992), the founder of Logotherapy, said, “A thought 
transfixed me: for the first time in my life I saw the truth as it is set into song by 
so many poets, proclaimed as the final wisdom by so many thinkers. The truth–
that love is the ultimate and the highest goal to which man can aspire” (pp. 48–
49). The list is practically endless and not limited to psychotherapy. For example, 
Pitirim Sorokin (1954), the founder of modern Sociology, says, “Love is the most 
powerful antidote against criminal, morbid, and suicidal tendencies; against hate, 
fear, and psychoneuroses” (p. viii). Sorokin quotes Abraham Maslow, one of the 
founders of Humanistic-Existential Psychotherapy, as saying, “It is amazing how 
little the empirical sciences have to offer on the subject of love . . . Particularly 
strange is the silence of the psychologists” (p. viii). Even stranger is how we 







its relative absence. It is as if the child’s cry for love falls on deaf ears and 
something other than fidelity to one’s heart matters more to us. 
     In a world where over 75 million genocides and democides have been 
committed in the last century alone and traumatic suffering is almost exclusively 
due to human abuse and neglect, rather than natural causes, what kind of love can 
avail? How do we gain access to it? How might it be nourished or how may it 
evolve? How can we meaningfully understand the assertions of the psychologists 
above? For example, what precisely does Frankl (1966) mean when he speaks of 
fulfilling meaning in even the most hopeless situations? What does he mean when 
he says, “It is self-evident that belief in a super-meaning–whether as a 
metaphysical concept or in the religious sense of Providence–is of the foremost 
psychotherapeutic and psychohygienic importance” (p. 33)? 
Such!a!seemingly!religious!position!may!seem!naïve!to!avowed!
atheists.!It!seemed!so!to atheist survivors of the Holocaust like Primo Levi, Jean 
Amery, and Paul Celan, who committed suicide decades after their suffering in 
the camps (Amery, 1980; Langer, 1995; Levi, 1986a). But, survivors who were 
believers also echoed a similar cry that something was wrong with humanity–
ordinary, average, normal humanity–atheists no less than the religious; Jews as 
well as Christians. As Elie Wiesel, the survivor and Nobel Laureate put it, “If in 







century, that means something was wrong with the world . . . The violence from 
there and then is still here. The hatred from there and then is still here” (as cited in 
Wiesel & O'Connor, 1990, p. 69). As Jean Amery (1980) put it: “It is not Being 
that oppresses me, or Nothingness, or God, or the Absence of God, only society. 
For it and only it caused the disturbance in my existential balance . . .  It and only 
it robbed me of my trust in the world” (p. 100). Perhaps myopic fixation on 
Jewish victims, Nazi perpetrators, Germans, or even the history of Christian anti-
Semitism cannot solve such a problem. From the innermost depths of the hearts of 
such witnesses, they cry out as if the whole human project has proven itself a 
complete failure. The commonly heard lament, “how can anyone believe in a God 
after the Holocaust?” is not just a cry of atheists. In response to a fellow inmate 
asking, “Where is God now?” Wiesel (1958), the believer, responds, “I heard a 
voice within me answer him: “Where is He? Here He is–He is hanging here on 
the gallows . . .” (p. 76).  
Let us assume for the moment there is a God. Why does Wiesel blame 
God? How does he know God is culpable, whether in the form of a sin of 
omission or commission? Is it based on direct experience of God’s behavior? Or 
is it based on inherited assumptions or prejudices about what God can and cannot 
do? It may be commonplace to direct attention to human freedom, responsibility, 







the righteous. In other words, it mirrors the problem of the biblical prophet Job to 
whom so many Holocaust survivors appeal as their role model. One of my aims in 
this dissertation, therefore, will be to try to amplify and make sense of this form 
of suffering. In the process I will explore the possibility that the power of 
deception–the chameleon-like ability to profess a goodness or love one does not 
possess–is grounded in the power of truth. There is a reason why scientists and 
philosophers, psychologists and priests, no less than political leaders and car 
salesman, must speak in the name of truth: they must claim to be in a position of 
knowledge and authority, or we would not allow ourselves to be led by them. 
Evil is a form of deception. It is not necessary, but rather the product of an 
abuse of human moral freedom and our capacity to love or embrace what is good. 
And it has social–even systemic–consequences that can profoundly affect the 
innocent and the just. But, I will argue that suffering from evil through no fault of 
one’s own is not the same thing as suffering for evil that one has personally 
committed. The former implies no moral consequences; no indelible stain on 
one’s heart or conscience or life. And even the latter does not imply there is no 
possibility of reformation of character and life.  
In both cases I will argue that there is a Therapy of Hope, not only in spite 
of the unprecedented crisis we face, but because of it. For, just as deceit 







the good from which it turns, so too in back of a collective moral de-evolution lies 
the power and possibility of a renaissance of hope unlike any hope humanity 
could ever realize until now. In other words, I would have us consider the 
possibility that although there is good reason to indict humanity for the creation, 
maintenance, and evolution of an unprecedented collective existential, moral, or 
spiritual crisis, this does not imply any indictment of reality or existence itself. It 
does not imply any indictment of human nature, nor any indictment of a perfectly 
good God.  
Given the limits of this psychological dissertation, my aim is merely to 
provide a sketch of this problem with an emphasis on a Therapy of Hope. 
Specifically, similar to Buber’s I and Thou (his appeal to a form of interpersonal 
intimacy in contrast to an I/It relationship to a thing), I want to elucidate a form of 
authentic relational empathy that includes both feeling or compassion and 
experiential insight or understanding, despite tendencies to separate them and fix 
attention on one or the other.   
To this end, in Chapter Two I will explore in greater depth what I mean by 
existential trauma and a collective existential crisis by looking through the lens of 
a select group of Holocaust witnesses. Within the context of that discussion we 
shall see why I define a “witness” in terms of both sincerity and a fullness of 







rational and experiential good faith that transcends the current boundary 
separating atheists and believers. That is, even many professed atheists speak in 
the name of good faith or faith in goodness without feeling any necessity of 
identifying goodness with a particular type of god. And insofar as professed 
believers acknowledge such a faith in truth and goodness as a necessary (if not 
sufficient) condition for faith in a God of truth and goodness, this faith will be 
shared by them both. In keeping with a realist phenomenological method, my aim 
will be to elucidate not merely the psychic reality of these witnesses, in a sense 
separated from what they may rightly be said to know, but also distinguish what 
they claim to know and bear witness to from that which they merely believe. I 
realize that this appeal to “extra-psychic reality” may to some readers seem to be 
crossing over from psychology into the domains of philosophy and religion (or 
spirituality), but I argue that this is as unavoidable as the presupposition of a 
philosophical foundation for any psychology. In this case, I hope to show that 
although these Holocaust witnesses testify, like the scriptural prophets of old, to a 
contingent moral problem with humanity or “the world” in its present condition, 
they are merely tempted to believe there is something inherently wrong with 
humanity, reality, and any possible God at its core.  
In Chapter Three, I will turn to my critical review of the psychological 







between physical, psychological, and spiritual trauma, with an emphasis on the 
primacy of spiritual trauma, by examining Freud’s definition of trauma. Second, I 
will briefly and broadly summarize the orientations of the four main forces of 
modern Western psychology: Psychoanalysis, Behaviorism, 
Humanistic/Existential Therapy, and Transpersonal Psychotherapy, and show 
how they aid in a comprehensive understanding of this existential problem. Third, 
I will focus attention on psychoanalytic empathy to help explain how an 
integrated approach can provide a framework for healing existential trauma, in 
particular by emphasizing the core therapeutic values of authenticity, empathy, 
and compassion. I will rely primarily on intersubjectivity theory (Brandchaft, 
2002; Orange, 1995; Stolorow & Atwood, 1992) as a form of integrative position 
that includes humanistic and existential psychological approaches, as well as the 
need for a broader philosophical foundation for psychology as we explore the 
main barriers in the way of healing. Throughout this literature review I will 
attempt to rely on a solution to this problem by appeal to a realist epistemology 
(Willard, 1984; Wyner, 1988) oriented around “experience near” interpersonal 
relationships in a manner similar to Buber’s (1970) “I and Thou.”  
 In Chapter Four, my methods section, I argue from my literature review that 
there is a different way of understanding trauma than has generally been 







epistemological method that is consistent with the experiences of ordinary people. 
This is in contrast to “experience distant” theoretical appeals that are inherently 
skeptical with respect to our ability to know anything at all–especially a non-
sensuously apprehended moral reality–despite the fact that moral values are 
generally regarded as just as real to us as anything else we may be said to know. 
By appealing to concrete examples we shall see that experiential knowledge of 
such values brings with it a form of power over action and life in a way mere 
thought, belief, or logical reasoning cannot.  
In the process of providing this elucidation I intend to point out just how 
pervasive the epistemological and moral skepticism is that now dominates 
psychology and our broader philosophical and educational context today, and how 
profound this influence is on our clinical practice. Toward helping to resolve this 
conflict, I shall try to form a bridge between moderate postmodernist positions 
that claim (to know) we cannot know anything, and modernist positions that claim 
knowledge in cases where we have good reason to doubt such knowledge. I shall 
try to show that the assumption of objective knowledge in general and moral 
knowledge in particular is necessary, and that without it we cannot consistently 
claim to know the nature of one’s own psychic reality, much less presume to 
empathically understand the psychic reality of our patients. Specifically, I use 







individual, group, and collective scale. I will also outline a hypothetical process 
by which we may become more and better than we are. 
In Chapter Five, my discussion section, I summarize what empathic 
understanding is in its application to those suffering from existential trauma. In 
the process I emphasize the sense in which we are all wounded and all in need of 
what Stolorow calls a “relational home” (2011). I discuss the sense in which the 
solution to this existential problem or the cure of this malady is both complex and 
simple. It is complex in that I appeal Husserl’s (1970) rigorous epistemological 
elucidation of the experiential process of fulfillment involved in coming to know 
anything. It is simple in its appeal to a what I call a “law of love” by which I mean 
we become one with whom or what we most love or entrust ourselves to as we 
invite that which is other than ourselves into the core of our being. We integrate 
it, assimilate it, and allow it to reform our hearts and lives. It calls to mind what 
Hufeland (1811) called sympathy: “Just as the sick make healthy subjects into 
sick ones by means of sympathy . . . so we see . . . the way weak, old men living 
in the midst of strong young ones, by the same laws . . . become healthier and 
stronger” (as cited in Bolognini, 2004, pp. 28–29). As we embrace that which 
reveals itself to us as truly good, goodness itself brings power to integrate our 
lives, overcome our manifold psychological and substance addictions, and even 







community or “relational home” defined by goodness works to reconcile all of 
our broken interpersonal relationships by tangibly revealing a Good–possible 
even a God or “Inner Voice”–who cannot think or do evil and who can model for 
us how the mere suffering of evil has no power over us in that it cannot wound 
our conscience. The willingness to endure unjust suffering for the sake of 
goodness can make us more than we are, better than we are, and even transform 
human life as we know it. 
We are all called or all invited to become “wounded healers”–no matter 
what our natural talents and no matter what circumstances we find ourselves in. 
We can all take part in a noble reformation of humanity and our world. And in 
back of what some call “death anxiety” may be less a fear of physical death, 
psychical death, or even spiritual death than a fear of not having truly lived a life 
of love or goodness (Bugental, 1965; Frankl, 1969; May, 1953; Yalom, 2008). As 
Cicely Saunders (2006), one of the founders of the modern Hospice movement, 
put it, “We have seen many who were finally so stripped of all they counted as 
theirs that they seemed to be nothing more than a lamp for God to burn in. But 
they were not less but more themselves, with an intensity of love and a capacity 
for union that we can salute but only share in fitful moments as yet. In this we see 
glimpses of a way in which darkness is comprehended by light and death is 









CHAPTER II: EXISTENTIAL TRAUMA AND THE HOLOCAUST  
 
In this chapter, one of my primary aims is to examine the possibility of a 
form of moral or spiritual death that contrasts with the physical and psychical 
death typically appealed to by psychoanalysts and existential psychologists when 
addressing death anxiety (Wolson, 2005). Luciana Nissim (1996), a physician 
inmate in Auschwitz, refers to the peculiar guilt of the Nazi Jewish genocide as 
moral guilt aimed at the degradation of one’s humanity that was far more 
insidious than the numbers of those exterminated (as cited in Anissimov, 1996, p. 
149). In a similar vein, Primo Levi (1996), among the most authentic and 
insightful of Holocaust survivors, offers an empathic reflection on the inner 
thoughts of the Nazis aimed at degrading Jews in their own eyes (as cited in 
Anissimov, 1996). It is easily generalizable. We see it again and again in large–
scale atrocities, among gang members and rival members of racial, ethnic, and 
religious groups – even among opposing members of psychological orientations. 
In each case a hive mind influences its members to degrade the other to elevate 
one’s own impoverished sense of self. In other words, one must rely on moral 







casting the other in the role of evil. The perpetrator blames the victim to ease 
one’s own conscience (Hilberg, 1961; Peck, 1983; Staub, 1989; Zimbardo, 
Haney, Banks, & Jaffe, 1974). 
In describing this moral or spiritual decay or death, I also intend to focus 
attention on one of the marks or characteristics associated with it, vis á vis, two 
distinct forms of loneliness or estrangement from an objective moral reality. The 
first form of loneliness or estrangement is more suffered than willed and implies 
no moral complicity, culpability, or loss of conscientiousness. Indeed, it lies on 
the most sensitive end of a moral continuum. One may think in general of the 
suffering of the innocent and the righteous, or more specifically of the suffering of 
innocent children, the suffering of the prophet Job in the Jewish scriptures, or the 
suffering of Jesus on the Cross. One yearns for a good that one feels unwillingly 
separated from. The second type of loneliness is a form of isolation or turning 
inward that is more complicit and culpable. It lies on the opposite end of a moral 
continuum where one’s conscience increasingly becomes insensitive, hard, cold, 
or indifferent. One distances one’s self from a good that exposes the evil of one’s 
own life. 
My primary aim in this chapter is to focus on the former type of condition 
and the sense in which the cry of this select group of Holocaust witnesses – their 







are like abused children who feel constrained to blame themselves in a context 
where their parents refuse to acknowledge their own culpability. Yet, in this case, 
they are like children who cannot find what Robert Stolorow (2011) calls a 
“relational home” or what the authors of various scriptures refer to as places of 
sanctuary. The world appears to them like a prison in which one feels constrained 
to either choose a side (where no side is good) or to be victimized by all. 
Regardless of where they turn, these witnesses feel no one genuinely and 
empathically hears and understands them. As Jean Amery (1980), another 
Holocaust witness, points out, this includes psychotherapy.  
  For example, Amery refers to distortions of his and other witness 
testimonies by appeal to medically oriented concepts like “concentration camp 
syndrome” in a book entitled Delayed Psychic Effects After Political Persecution, 
which claims: 
All of us are not only physically but also mentally damaged. The character 
traits that make up our personality are distorted. It is said that we are 
“warped.” That causes me to recall fleetingly the way my arms were 
twisted behind my back when they tortured me. But it also sets me the task 
of defining anew our warped state, namely as a form of the human 
condition that morally as well as historically is of a higher order than that 







Unfortunately, even those one might think are in a position to empathically 
understand them may fall short. For example, Levi’s biographer, Anissimov 
(1996), responded to Levi’s claim that “the best were the first to die, and the 
worst went free and prospered,” by stating he was deluded:  
Finding no answer to explain why he had survived when others had died, 
he arrived at the deluded conclusion (to disprove it one has only to 
examine his own case, which is far from unique) that: “The worst 
survived–that is, the fittest; the best all died” (pp. 163–164).  
Regardless of Anissimov’s interpretation of Levi’s expression, “the best all died,” 
there is good reason to believe Levi did not intend it to be taken literally. Even in 
the very passage from which Anissimov (1996) takes her citation, Levi says:  
The “saved” of the lager were not the best, those predestined to do good, 
the bearers of a message: what I had seen and lived through proved the 
exact contrary. Preferably the worst survived, the selfish, the violent, the 
insensitive, the collaborators of the “gray zone,” the spies. It was not a 
certain rule (there were none, nor are there certain rules in human 
matters), but it was nevertheless a rule. I felt innocent, yes, but enrolled 
among the saved and therefore in permanent search of a justification in my 
own eyes and those of others. The worst survived, that is, the fittest; the 







Levi is not blind to his own relative innocence. He is not blind to a host of 
other exceptions to this rule. He is not contradicting himself. Indeed, Levi’s 
(1986b) Moments of Reprieve is dedicated to honoring such extreme good cases. 
And yet it is precisely because these good cases are exceptions to a pervasive 
morally compromised world that the problem of a collective moral de-evolution 
actively working to quench the last remnant of good in the human heart remains.  
Why did Primo Levi, Jean Amery, Paul Celan, and others like them fall 
into despair decades after they were liberated from the camps (Levi, 1986a, p. 
82)? In Levi’s case one might claim that his optimism crumbled not merely 
because of what he suffered 40 years earlier, but in conjunction with a confluence 
of other highly subjective events like the infirmity of his mother and mother-in-
law, his own physical illnesses and age, and the depression associated with 
translating Kafka (Langer, 1995). I suggest, however, that we might at least 
consider that his optimism crumbled because he, like Amery and others, observed 
our world becoming progressively worse decades after that event. I suggest that 
Anissimov did not recognize the connection between what Levi observed in the 
death camp and what he observed taking place in the world after that event.  
Their problem is not limited to isolated traumatic episodes. Nor is it 
merely a problem of what psychotherapists like Thomas Greening (1997) refer to 







some other existential philosophers call “existential anxiety” bound up with “the 
absolutisms of everyday life” that “cover up the finitude, contingency, and 
embeddedness of our existence and the indefiniteness of its certain extinction” (p. 
41), which Stolorow hopes to resolve by appeal to a “relational home” or 
interpersonal context within which we may find “existential kinship-in-the-same-
darkness” (p. 49). It goes far beyond Lear’s (2006) “collective trauma on a 
cultural scale” and current psychological fixation on the abuse of power by 
majority cultures, in a way that blinds us to the sense in which we may all be 
complicit in abusing in some measure the form of power we have. 
I think that Stolorow (2007) recognizes the social, if not broader systemic 
nature of the problem and, therefore, the radical insufficiency of 
psychotherapeutic appeals to “resilience” grounded in one’s genetics in his appeal 
to Heidegger’s “resoluteness” as a “call of conscience” that may open the 
doorway to hope (p. 43). Some of us, at least, gain a new perspective from our 
wounds: “Traumatized people sometimes feel they have gained “perspective,” a 
sense of what “really matters”  . . . [there remains] “the possibility of forming 
bonds of deep emotional attunement within which devastating emotional pain can 
be held, rendered more tolerable, and, hopefully, eventually integrated” (p. 49). 







existential problem we all face and to which our Holocaust witnesses succumbed, 
we may need to go deeper still. 
Let us assume that a child who suffers an episode of extreme abuse at his 
father’s hands may still retain hope. He may still transcend his suffering in the 
growing realization that there is, after all, something worth living for. Even the 
most extreme experience of degradation may be diminished in its relative 
influence on one’s life as a whole over the course of time. This, I believe, is 
Frankl’s main point in perhaps all his works (Frankl, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969, 
1992; Tweedie, 1961). But, it is not an issue of any mere passing of time–as if 
time in and of itself could heal anything–much less “heal all wounds.” Healing is 
not a matter of erasing those wounds as if the truth or reality of what one has 
suffered ever could be erased. As Stolorow (2011) puts it, ‘“Trauma recovery is 
an oxymoron’” (p. 61). As anyone who has suffered extreme trauma knows, the 
original traumatic experience indelibly stamps itself on one’s life and leaves with 
it a kind of pre-disposition for re-actualization or re-traumatization that was not 
present before.  
Stolorow (2003), refers to Harry Potter’s experiences with “Portkeys” that 
instantaneously transport him from one place to another to illustrate the sense in 
which new traumatic events can make the past episode(s) come alive with all the 







or meaning–affirming, experiences that have the power to lift us above existential 
trauma. As we shall see in a moment, time plays a key role in healing. But it can 
also be used to cause even greater pain. Perpetrators, for example, may use the 
passage of time as a means to place greater distance between their crimes and 
their awareness of them–both their own awareness and that of their victims. They 
may rely on what Bettelheim (1979) refers to as generalized denial or avoidance 
of anxiety-provoking situations especially if they involve our own complicity. 
Indeed, to avoid a convicted conscience the perpetrator must bend every effort to 
influence the victim to forgive and forget by using any form of deceit or 
rationalization possible.  
For the victim, time only plays a positive role when it is part of a broader 
moral context that allows her to find meaning in suffering from the sins of others 
rather than for her own crimes. This includes a context in which the victim can 
only be reconciled with the perpetrator on condition of the perpetrator undergoing 
a process involving sincere confession which opens the door to, but does not 
necessitate, the victim’s acceptance which may then lead to a form of 
reconciliation. It is this that underlies any genuine plea to “forgive and forget.” 
But this is only possible in direct proportion to the perpetrator’s willingness to 
empathically see the truth of what he has done as if it was done to him. Only then 







it, “The moral person demands annulment of time . . . by nailing the criminal to 
his deed. Thereby, and through a moral turning-back of the clock, the latter can 
join his victim as a fellow human being” (p.72). 
Controversial as this may be, I suggest that not even a moral God can 
grant forgiveness on any other terms, and only those seeking to justify themselves 
by appeal to cheap grace would condemn a victim for being unwilling to “forgive 
and forget.” As Amery says, “I am not inclined to forgive. I never forgave our 
enemies of that time . . . because I know no human act that can erase a crime” (as 
cited in Anissimov, 1996, pp. 354–355). How can they forgive if they see no 
evidence of real confession or acknowledgement by their perpetrators of their 
crimes? How can they forgive if they see no acknowledgement of our complicity? 
For, we demand of these victims not “to judge” the perpetrators so that we can be 
relieved of our own guilt. And, the victim’s refusal forces us into the dilemma of 
condemning them or ourselves. We then aggravate their wounds by treating them 
as if they are cold-hearted, full of resentment, stubbornly rebellious against 
mercy. We place them on trial instead of their perpetrators or ourselves. And it is 
our failure to respond to their cry–to wake up and heed their compassionate 
warning–that finally rips from their heart their last remnant of hope. 
In Levi’s last book (Levi, 1986a) before his real or alleged suicide 







neutral if not hopeful terms. In response to the question whether Auschwitz will 
return, he refers to a “skeptical generation . . . distrustful of the grand revealed 
truth: disposed instead to accept the small truths” (p. 199). He refers to the 
difficulty of speaking to the young; of the distance they imagine lies between 
them and what they conceive of as an isolated event in world history, remote from 
their own experience. Although he continues to bear witness to a problem far 
more pervasive than a Jewish genocide, he makes no explicit prophetic claims 
about it, and seems to keep a door of hope open. And yet, in that book he speaks 
of a vaster shame: “the shame of the world” (p. 85), not merely the world of the 
death camps, but our world as it has evolved up to the present day. A world that 
Levi believes has been undergoing a process of assimilation that is similar to the 
assimilation he experienced in the Auschwitz. A world in the process of losing its 
conscience, compassion, and heart. A world that drove him to despair as it does 
many of the most sensitive children among us. In a nutshell, Levi and his fellow 
witnesses bear witness to an unprecedented human crisis of and for human history 
itself. A threat far deeper than our mere physical survival. Since their testimony 









On the Difference Between Moral and Social Power 
  
Our Holocaust witnesses repeatedly refer to the tendency of nonbelievers 
to remain nonbelievers after their traumatic suffering, just as professed believers 
did. If we concede the possibility of a class of atheist witnesses of good faith, one 
reasonable implication we might draw from this is that there was nothing about 
the character of the religious faith they saw in the lives of believers around them 
that stood out in a specifically moral sense. They saw nothing that seemed likely 
to provide any more insight about reality and with it a greater infusion of moral 
power and hope. And yet the most influential religious witnesses in our history 
claim that the object of their faith provides just this light and power, and they call 
us to come and see this reality for ourselves rather than blindly taking their word 
for it. The whole spirit or tenor of the Judeo-Christian scriptures, for example, 
revolves around the concept of a true “believer” as one called out of darkness into 
light (1Pe.2:9; Ex.19:5) or to become an exception to a morally compromised, 
selfishly cold-indifferent world. It is precisely such a world as this that our 
Holocaust witnesses describe in the microcosm of the death camps and the 
macrocosm of a world that seemed indifferent to their plight. If we translate the 
mission of these religious witnesses into the vocation of the psychotherapist, both 







witnesses is to encourage us to turn or convert toward tangible incarnations or 
role-models of the most authentic and compassionate form of life, so too we 
might conceive of the deeper function of the positive transference to an authentic, 
empathic, compassionate analyst as providing an “auxiliary superego” (Strachey, 
1934) to help patients replace negative or self-degrading introjects, object-
relations, self-objects, or inner voices with more positive ones.  
But to appreciate the depth and pervasiveness of this existential problem 
we might consider the sense in which relatively isolated cases of good therapists 
might seem grossly inadequate to diagnose and treat this pervasive problem. 
Consider, for example, Levi’s and Amery’s claims about the difference between 
moral and social power in Auschwitz and by extension our world today. They 
concede that as a group, religious prisoners, like political prisoners, demonstrated 
a greater range of freedom and power to act in accordance with conventional 
moral standards of behavior than relatively isolated or unaffiliated individuals. 
But does this imply qualitative evidence of a group’s moral character, or merely a 
greater quantity of strength than one can typically exercise alone? After all, 
religious terrorists also manifest a façade of courage to endure a false form of 
martyrdom for their cause or in view of the prospect of a better life beyond the 
grave. Yet, this is hardly due to any connection, much less an intimate and 







religious prisoners manifested no greater moral power than non-religious political 
prisoners, and insofar as this is true of atheists and believers in our world today, 
what empirical evidence do modern-day believers provide to show that religion 
provides more intimate access to a moral reality bringing with it greater moral 
power to act in accordance with it than one can attain without religion? One might 
argue that there is such empirical evidence in the lives of an outcast Jesus or 
solitary Jewish prophet, as well as on a group level in the life of a relatively small 
and isolated “chosen” people or early Church. The point here is not whether Levi 
acknowledges moral differences between us. For example, he describes 
exemplary good cases in Moments of Reprieve (Gambetta, 1999; Sodi, 1987; 
Stille, 1987). Rather, the question revolves around whether religion provides 
progressively greater moral power that may, at least in principle, increasingly 
overcome the evil cold-indifference we see in human life. The question revolves 
around religious claims about a providential process of human redemption. But 
what if one cannot see this wheat, or the energy source that nourishes it, because 
of the sheer vastness and growing field of weeds? The collective existential 
problem our Holocaust witnesses bear witness to, therefore, is not just a moral 
problem that includes atheists and believers alike. It is more deeply a religious 
problem insofar as religion alone appeals to such a providential process of 







take the time to argue for this controversial claim here, the problem is a Jewish 
and Christian problem insofar as these religions lay claim to a unique revelation 
providing precisely a form and measure of moral power to transform humanity at 
its core. One thing, at least, is clear: these witnesses are not critiquing religion as a 
means of justifying a secular or atheistic hope. The question for psychotherapy, 









CHAPTER III: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Freud and Existential Trauma 
 
Existential trauma involves a moral or ethical dimension over and above 
the physical or psychological. Such a perspective is not only reflected in 
humanistic, existential, and transpersonal psychological approaches, but across 
orientations that are increasingly integrative. Donna Orange’s (2011) 
intersubjective psychoanalytic approach, for example, emphasizes the relevance 
of Levinasian ethics for clinical psychotherapy. Orange distinguishes what she 
calls a hermeneutics of trust from a hermeneutics of suspicion. The former 
emphasizes interpersonal factors while the latter emphasizes the intrapsychic. The 
former is exemplified by humanist oriented therapists and by analysts like 
Ferenczi, Winnicott, Fromm-Reichmann, Kohut, Brandchaft and others, while the 









Physical, psychological, and moral/existential trauma. 
 
In order to emphasize a type of causation, we distinguish different kinds of 
trauma, though they are not typically separate. For example, Traumatic Brain 
Injury (TBI) provides a good example of physically-caused trauma that has 
profound psychological effects. Freud’s experiments with hypnotically induced 
somatic symptoms illustrates psychologically-caused trauma. Parental neglect, 
even with the best intentions, is a form of social or interpersonal trauma that can 
result in a child’s unmet psychological need for attachment or a “good-enough 
maternal object” (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1965; Bowlby, 1969; Winnicott, 1965). 
As we have seen in our discussion of the Holocaust, moral and spiritual trauma 
influences how we conceive of human life itself and, more deeply, of any spiritual 
reality or God at the core of reality.  By collective existential trauma, then, I mean 
a form of moral and spiritual trauma that extends beyond the individual and forms 
of group complicity as in cases of gender prejudice and racism to include a 
collective violation of trust. Like Brandchaft’s (2010) “pathological 
accommodation” on a global scale, it tempts us to question the value of human 
life, reality, and any possible God at its core. In a word, it is a form of prejudice 
about existence itself that we all experience as we awaken to “the real world” and 







Holocaust witnesses. For example, Jones Very (1883) in his poem, The Dead, 
conveys an image of a world populated by zombies, while Kafka (1971) points to 
the feeling of being degraded to the level of a bug in Metamorphosis. They evoke 
images of a world in which children are tempted to believe they are worthless as a 
result of being treated as if they are worthless by a coldly indifferent world to the 
point that this belief becomes internalized as an inner voice or “superego” that 
remains with them even when they are alone.  
By existential trauma, then, I mean a form of suffering that includes a 
specifically ethical, moral, or spiritual dimension that is infused in our beliefs 
about existence and especially human existence. This suffering permeates our 
thoughts, feelings and behavior at our core, and affects us not only 
intrapsychically, but extends outward to infect all our interpersonal relationships 
and our relationship to our world. This is of the highest therapeutic significance. 
For, insofar as this root of suffering is moral, it is not unavoidable, but amenable 
to change. Hope for real, lasting, substantial personality and collective change is 
really possible. It is not genetically, socially or environmentally determined. It is 
not even morally determined in the sense of some religious orientations that claim 
“sin” may be necessary or pre-determined or “original” as opposed to acquired. It 
is a problem that speaks to each and every one of us in all the particularity of the 







to our ethical obligation to love one another. It appeals to our responsibility to use 
our freedom aright.  
This notion of existential or moral trauma is generally subsumed under 
psychological trauma, if it is discussed at all. But there are those who draw out the 
distinction. For example, Cicely Saunders (2006) refers to “total pain” that is 
“composed not only of physical elements but also psychological, social and 
spiritual factors” (p. 226). She speaks of spirit as that which most defines what 
life is and, above all, human life in view of “higher moral qualities” (p. 217) that 
can infuse in us a sense of genuine meaning via a sense of belonging “to 
something greater than our insecure and vulnerable selves” (p. 218). She quotes 
Seneca’s plea in Ancient Rome:  
Who is there in all the world who listens to us? Here I am–this is me in my 
nakedness, with my wounds, my secret grief, my despair, my betrayal, my 
pain which I can’t express, my terror, my abandonment. Oh, listen to me 
for a day, an hour, a moment, lest I expire in my terrible wilderness, my 
lonely silence. Oh God, is there no one to listen? (p. xx) 
By existential trauma, then, I am referring primarily to the spiritual 
element in such total pain that was once commonplace before the modern 
separation of all things moral or spiritual from the rational. Suffering or trauma 







his collaborators. The meaning of specifically human trauma or suffering has 
arguably been the primary concern of humanity and all its philosophical and 
spiritual traditions since the beginning of recorded time. It is the focus of the 
teaching of Gautama Buddha; of the Jewish-Christian-Islamic accounts of original 
sin and the need for a providential process of human redemption; and of the 
Socratic-Platonic-Aristotlean ethical focus on wisdom in relationship to a “Good” 
that can provide fulfillment for human life.   
And although we today may be prejudicially disinclined to use terms like 
“sin” or “evil,” preferring terms like abuse, violence, racism and so forth, the 
thing itself remains. And the same holds true for our preference for speaking of 
authenticity, true empathy, and compassion in relationship to a healthy superego, 
good object relations, a good enough maternal object rather than a God or 
Platonic “Good.” Even in Behavioral Therapy (BT) in its more evolved Cognitive 
Behavioral (CBT) and Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) forms, 
therapists seem increasingly constrained to adopt integrated therapies that include 
these moral qualities even if they do not provide any empirical elucidation of 
what they really are or consist in nor do they explain how we distinguish their 
genuine vs. counterfeit forms (Beck, 1967; Crane, 2009; Skinner, 1957). For 
example, in one randomized trial, Jeffrey Young’s (2003) Schema Therapy–a 







treatment for patients diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). Its 
distinguishing feature is the use of limiting re-parenting, or the patient’s need to 
develop a deep bond of trust with the therapist. But what else is this trust based on 
but the validation or confirmation of the patient’s sense of worth by the therapist? 
What else motivates or inspires positive change but the therapist’s function as a 
benevolent rather than harsh superego? 
Crane (2009) in her book on Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy 
(MBCT), for example, seems to assume some form of good faith orientation as 
the foundation of her appeal to  a process of good or healthy spiritual 
development–a process oriented toward increasing discovery of what it is to be 
human as something truly good and worth striving for (p. 156). Her appeal is not 
value neutral. Rather, she, along with the entire field of “acceptance-based 
behavioral therapies” (Giesen-Bloo et al., 2006), describes this attitude as “warm 
acceptance” (p. 156), “spiritual acceptance” (p. 54), a stance marked by 
tenderness, gentleness, kindness, compassion, respect toward ourselves and our 
experience (p. 19). She refers especially to “present acceptance” (p. 42) as the 
foundation from which we choose how best to respond to our condition in 
contrast to being unconsciously driven by automatic, habitually negative, 
prejudicial, or dysfunctional ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving. By 







denying what we are actually thinking, feeling and doing; not accepting in the 
sense of approving any willful intention, feeling, or behavior that is manifestly ill-
intended or contrary to our genuine best interests. One might acknowledge, for 
instance, sadistic thoughts and desires–even sadistic behaviors–without approving 
of or condoning them. She seems to implicitly concede the difference between 
having a judgmental attitude (which a therapist should never have) and the mere 
having of moral judgments (distinguishing between what is truly 
healthy/unhealthy, good/bad, or right/wrong, which everyone has, should have, 
and cannot avoid). Putting aside those on the most passive end of the spectrum 
concerning Freud’s rules on neutrality (Freud, 1958), patients often seek from 
their therapists a form of love that is willing not only to confirm (Buber, 1965) 
what is best in them, but to stand with their true self (Winnicott, 1960) against 
those critical inner voices or false selves that lack the ability for self empathy as 
well as compassionate empathy toward others. 
In their discussion of Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) for Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD), Linehan and Dexter-Mazza (2008) refer to the 
centrality of mindfulness skills in DBT as the “ability to experience and observe 
one’s thoughts, emotions and behaviors without evaluation, and without attempt 
to change or control them” (Italics mine, p. 383). Perhaps, therefore, Linehan and 







orientation or perspective in our relationship to our thoughts (p. 12) that 
essentially involves a more intimate and consciously aware engagement with 
them rather than an automatic or habitual morally pre-judicial and self-
condemning reaction to them. Crane also distinguishes between mere pain from 
suffering (p. 37) describing suffering (in keeping with Buddhist psychology) as 
including “possessiveness”–a form of relationship described by both eastern and 
western mystics as a need to be in control rather than a non-possessive acceptance 
of and actively-passive response to grace. Suffering, Crane seems to claim, has to 
do with a contraction of the mind to avoid pain–a form of denial or avoidance of 
the reality of pain. What Crane (2009) seems to be recommending therapeutically, 
therefore, is a response to suffering that does not deny the pain we suffer, or its 
cause, but instead, a way to transcend both. Rather than deny an innocent victim’s 
suffering (such as our Holocaust witnesses suffering real evil at the hands of real 
perpetrators), we show the victim that to deal with this suffering effectively we 
must first acknowledge it. The aim, in other words, is to respond consciously 
rather than react unconsciously (p. 40).  All of this, of course, is consistent with 
humanistic/existential and transpersonal orientations like Maslow’s, Frankl’s, and 
Assagioli’s appeals to finding meaning in even the worst conditions. But it is one 
thing to say it or even experience it. It is another to be able to elucidate a 







speak to a Levi or Amery. It is not enough to say you either see it or you don’t. 
We need to elucidate the process or the road that leads to such a vision. 
 




Freud defined hysteria as an unbearable emotional reaction to traumatic 
events (Goenjian, Stillwell, Fairbands, Galvin, & Karayan, 1999; Herman, 1992; 
Melhem, Moritz, Walker, Shear, & Brent, 2007). Freud and his collaborators, 
along with James, Janet and others of that time, documented somatic symptoms 
resembling neurological damage like motor paralysis, sensory losses, amnesias 
and so forth, which could be artificially induced and relieved through hypnosis, 
suggesting psychological rather than merely physical causes of hysteria as 
Charcot believed. According to the Freudian view (Strachey, 1934), “the function 
of the neurotic symptom was to defend the patient’s personality against an 
unconscious trend of thought that was unacceptable to it, while at the same time 
gratifying the trend up to a certain point” (p. 129). They discovered too that these 
symptoms could be alleviated when the relatively unconscious traumatic 







recovered and expressed. This then became the basis of modern psychotherapy, 
which Breuer and Freud initially referred to by abreaction, catharsis, 
psychoanalysis, or the talking cure. In a nutshell, analysis cures by making the 
unconscious conscious: “The whole raison d’etre of the symptom would cease 
and it must automatically disappear” (p. 129).  
Among the factors involved in the movement toward cure seem to include: 
a) some awareness of traumatization typically originating from the outside (e.g., 
abuse or neglect by primary caregivers); b) some role of the patient’s will 
motivating the patient to seek recovery; c) a constructive asymmetrical 
therapeutic relationship involving a positive transference with a therapist who 
functions as an auxiliary superego that is increasingly internalized so as to replace 
a harsh or tyrannical superego via the power of a “love” (p. 131) sufficient “to 
induce his [the patient’s] ego to give up its resistances” and increase the patient’s 
ability to see the truth for himself with increasingly clarity via the mediation of 
“mutative interpretations” (p. 142); and d) a process, evolution, or development 
over time that cannot be rushed, and which increasingly leads to a more 
comprehensive vision, understanding, or experiential awareness of reality and 
one’s self. 
As we shall see later, the emphasis by some therapists on feeling, affect, or 







classical philosophical appeal to experiential knowledge or “emotional 
understanding” (Breuer, Freud, & Strachey, 2000) that emphasizes the 
inseparability of thought, feeling, and the objects our experiences are directed on. 
For example, there is a type of real joy one can only experience in the 
contemplation of transcendent beauty or value. The core therapeutic aim, 
therefore, is to “effect the patient’s super-ego,” which results in “integral change 
in the nature of the patient’s super-ego itself” (Orange, 1995). Insofar as “a 
profound qualitative modification of the patient’s superego” can be achieved–
insofar as that core “inner voice” guiding all one thinks, feels, and does can be 
transformed from a harsh superego to a genuinely caring, loving, guiding one–the 
symptoms maintained by this relationship will be affected as well (Strachey, 
1934). 
 
 The influence of Freud’s social context on his view of psychoanalysis. 
 
 In the course of Freud’s clinical work, he was shocked to discover a 
pervasively exploitive social context characterized by sexual assault, abuse and 
incest perpetrated by men within a patriarchal society toward women and 
children. Publishing his results he was severely ostracized by the general public 







p. 135). One might argue, therefore, that psychoanalysis was founded on the 
denial of women and children’s experience of objective reality. It was dissociated 
from the reality of experience in favor of internal fantasy and desire. Like the 
Cartesian inward turn in philosophy, the fundamental problem for psychology 
became, and continues to be, how to unite thought or experience or the so-called 
internal world with reality in all its forms. I suggest that this patriarchal tendency 
to deny the experience of women and children may be generalized in view of the 
Holocaust’s indictment of us all.  
In contrast to Freud’s view of trauma, Ferenczi insisted that abreaction is 
not enough (as cited in Orange, 1995, p. 161). Putting aside, for the moment, the 
philosophical controversies around “psychologism”–the attempt to derive 
conclusions about extra-psychical reality on the basis of psychological laws–and 
Freud’s legitimate concern to place psychoanalysis on an objective scientific 
foundation, his “rules” reflecting a reserved or neutral attitude may not only be 
inappropriate or insufficient to heal most traumatized patients, but may actually 
add salt to their wounds. Such an attitude may re-traumatize the patient by 
denying the reality and legitimacy of their original suffering. It may lack a form 
of empathy marked by authenticity, compassion and genuine understanding of 
what these patients suffer and need to be healed. For Ferenczi, the genuine 







necessitates re-collection, re-experience, and re-living of the original trauma 
within the safe, loving or compassionate environment provided by the positive 
transference with a truly caring therapist. The truly healing analyst, then, provides 
something profoundly different from what the patient has experienced in the past. 
The analyst provides goodness or genuine compassion. As Ferenczi put it, “no 
analysis can succeed if we do not succeed in really loving the patient” (as cited in 
Orange, 1995, p. 161).  
 
 Combat neurosis or “Shell Shock”. 
 
During WWI and WWII, researchers discovered that soldiers manifested 
similar symptoms to hysteria in shocking numbers in direct proportion to their 
prolonged exposure to human violence and death. They screamed and wept 
uncontrollably. They froze and became mute and unresponsive. They suffered 
memory impairments and lost their general capacity to feel. One of these studies 
estimated 40% of British battle casualties were the result of such mental 
breakdowns (Masson, 1984; Salter, 2003). In response, the military suppressed 
such reports because of the potentially demoralizing effect on the public. 
Attempts were made to attribute a physical cause for these symptoms, as if 







shock.” The absurdity of this claim was immediately apparent to some, at least, in 
view of the fact that the symptoms in question were present in cases where 
soldiers were not exposed to shells or any other manifest form of physical trauma.  
Note the similarity in evaluation with respect to combat neurosis and 
hysteria. Note too the distinction between the cause of the trauma and the 
responses to it. It is not just physical pain that the soldiers suffered from but 
human violence, the arguably immoral quality of which was suppressed because 
of its demoralizing effect on the general population. The other side of the equation 
is the moral/immoral response to this suffering. And, in this case, the evaluation 
of a moral response might be just as unfounded. For example, Lewis Yealland 
(1918) claimed the suffering of these soldiers or their symptoms were primarily 
explained as a moral defect. Like the way some view suicide in general, including 
the suicide of Levi, Amery, and Celan, soldiers suffering these symptoms (like 
many soldiers suffering Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) today) were 
thought to be cowards, moral invalids, or effeminate in a pejorative sense. To 
“treat” this condition he advocated shaming, threats, and even punishment in the 
form of electric shock treatments. By contrast, W.H.R. Rivers (LaGreca & 
Silverman, 2009; Zurbriggen, 2010) and others like him claimed that such 







The refusal to “block out” one’s conscience (to allow one’s conscience to 
become cold, hard, insensitive) whether this involves killing others with the 
conviction that this may be required in some cases, or the refusal to kill others 
with the conviction that it is wrong, is just as arguably heroic as it was for a 
genuine conscientious objector like Gandhi, King, or entire groups like the early 
Friends or Quakers. Rivers’ “treatment,” then, included empathy, love, friendship, 
and guidance. He treated these soldiers with respect and dignity and encouraged 
them to talk freely about the terrors of war. In doing so he adopted two main 
principles: first, that individuals of unquestionable bravery could succumb to 
overwhelming fear; and second, that the most effective motivation to overcome 
fear is something stronger than patriotism or nationalism, abstract principles, or 
hatred of one’s enemy–namely–the love of soldiers for one another.  
One therapeutic implication resulting from these studies is that merely 
unburdening traumatic memories (catharsis) is generally insufficient to affect a 
lasting cure. Memories retrieved must be re-integrated into one’s conscious and 
personal life as a whole. Healing trauma is not like erasing words on a 
blackboard. As discussed earlier, severe trauma leaves a lasting and possibly 
indelible imprint, which may not only be re-activated by associated events in our 








 Sexual and domestic violence. 
 
As mentioned above, Freud’s initial courage in publishing “The Aetiology 
of Hysteria” in 1896 was met with professional silence and an increasing threat to 
his reputation. This motivated him to recant his claim of real abuse in favor of 
merely imagined abuse. Bearing in mind the context in which he worked, Freud’s 
“seduction hypothesis” went underground and it was not until the women’s 
movement in the 1970’s that real violence as a routine part of women’s sexual and 
domestic lives became more publicly acknowledged. Countless studies now show 
just how pervasive sexual and non-sexual abuse or violence is, and as clinicians 
we know how debilitating this history of trauma may be. Nor is it limited to, or 
even primarily prevalent in, Western culture: it is more akin to a pandemic or 
collective plague. It is not limited to male gender prejudice and abuse. For 
example, in cases of intimate partner violence (IPV), we may recognize the sense 
in which women may be as abusive or violent as men although the form in which 
this violence is manifested and its effects differ (Rivers, 1918). 
But if we restrict our attention for the moment to male gender prejudice, 
we may appreciate the impact such prejudices have on all of us. Both men’s and 
women’s sense of personal identity, and gender identity, may be profoundly 







conception of a tyrannical male god (Straus, 2009). We might easily appreciate 
the sense in which one’s conception of God may powerfully influence one’s 
conception of reality and what it means to be a person–as well as a man and a 
woman. Both atheists and believers acknowledge the unique power of religion 
over human life even if the former claims the power is rooted in blind, if not bad 
faith, while the latter claims the power is for good. In both cases, one may ask, 
“what kind of power is this and where does it come from?” As indicated earlier, it 
is at least therapeutically significant for a clinician to ask what motivates the 
despairing cry of our Holocaust witnesses, along with so many of the rest of us, 
“How can anyone believe in a God after the Holocaust or in view of so much 
innocent human suffering?” If the God of the great spiritual witnesses is, as they 
arguably claim, a God incapable of thinking, much less doing evil, where did this 




Numerous studies show that man-made traumas constitute more than 90% 
of the trauma we suffer as opposed to natural traumas (natural disasters, accidents, 
medically related diseases, many of which include human contributing factors). 







distinctions like: the quality or type of trauma at issue (e.g., physical, psycho-
social, moral, and spiritual); the severity or intensity of the trauma(s); single or 
multiple trauma(s), and whether they are of the same or different types, (e.g., 
multiple rapes by the same or different individuals); and the duration or extent of 
trauma(s) suffered over time. These considerations also must take into account the 
unique situation of the unique individual(s) we are called to help, rather than 
yielding to the temptation of categorizing one’s own suffering as we shall see in 
more detail in our discussion of empathy. The experience of a 20-something 
Jewish-American or Black-American in this country today, or the experience of 
this particular person who identifies as a Jewish and/or black man, raised in a safe 
and highly supportive and nurturing environment, may be vastly different from 
the experience of a German-Jew living in Germany during the Nazi era, or a 
Black-American or South African subjected to government sanctioned racism 100 
years ago. Few, if any, Jewish or Black Americans today can fathom the 
experience of a Jewish Sonderkommando (a Jewish inmate forced to work in the 
creamatoria) like Filip Muller (1979), or the slavery of Harriet Ann Jacobs (1987) 
in 1861.  
I recall one of my adolescent patients who identified as a white 
supremacist. Raised in a predominantly lower class Hispanic minority 







abused by Hispanics all his life. One might at least argue that with respect to his 
“psychic reality” or limited life experience his suffering was not limited to 
isolated traumatic episodes within a broader social environment that was safe or 
nurturing. Rather, he suffered repeated traumas on a daily basis within an unsafe 
and non-nurturing social context that included not only the racism of his parents 
toward Hispanics and Blacks, but also racial abuse/hatred toward him as a 
minority white by an Hispanic and Black majority where he lives. 
 
Review of Four Main Forces in Psychology in Response to Existential Need 
  
 First force: psychoanalysis and psychodynamic psychotherapy. 
 
 Psychoanalysis is founded on the conviction that psychopathology is 
rooted in traumatic early parent-child relationships and that these influences tend 
to be repressed (Muller, 1979). Insofar as these causes are acknowledged and their 
underlying meaning becomes transparent, they tend to lose their power (Strachey, 
1934). Analytic meaning is not just rational recognition, but a working through 
and a process of bringing unconscious content (including feelings) into 
consciousness (Rohde-Brown, personal correspondence). But what about 







discovery of a pervasively exploitive social context marked by sexual assault, 
abuse, and incest perpetrated by men on women and children? What if the 
repression and resistance in question has more to do with the therapist’s 
unwillingness or inability to acknowledge disturbing truths conveyed by their 
patients, as in Freud’s experience? 
Psychoanalysis assumes that there are two forms of human neurosis 
(anxiety/fear). One form of neurosis is allegedly primary, normal, inherent or 
essential and in this sense, existential. The other form is posited to be secondary, 
abnormal or pathological and circumstantial (Wilber, 1982, p. 77). The former is 
allegedly not susceptible to treatment whereas the latter is, although the prospects 
for real or substantial personality change in cases of so-called “borderlines, 
psychotics, extreme narcissists, psychopaths, and other broad classes of so-called 
resistant patients may be regarded as untreatable by the methods of classical 
psychoanalysis” (Wilber, 1982, p. 62). 
There is some evidence that one’s adult personality is formed and fixed in 
early development at about the age of 5 and, as such, it may suggest that adults 
are incapable of substantial change (Fromm-Reichmann, 1990; May, Angel, & 
Ellenberger, 1959; Pao, 1983). Although current research (Davidson & Begley, 
2012) points to plasticity within the context of psychotherapeutic attunement as 







precisely one means by “personality.” For example, the mere fact that personality 
disorders (as opposed to personality traits) are typically not diagnosed until 18 
years of age shows that our understanding of what personality is and when 
personality is fully developed is far from clear. This is of the highest clinical 
significance (Carver & Scheier, 2004). One need only imagine the implications 
for a teenager or young adult who is led to believe he cannot really or 
substantially change–especially if he is diagnosed from the outset with any one of 
several allegedly incurable Axis I mental disorders or Axis II personality 
disorders. It quite literally may drive such a person to suicidal despair.  
To claim that most of our patients have suffered from poor parent-child 
attachments is probably not especially controversial. And the same is true of 
broader systemic influences on both parents and children. This paper emphasizes, 
however, the sense in which these negatively prejudicial influences on how we 
conceive of ourselves, our self-worth and our prospects for real, substantial, 
higher-order development may extend beyond one’s immediate family, nation, 
culture, and religion, to include prejudices in how we conceive of reality and 
humanity itself. In much the same way a child may feel constrained to sacrifice 
his or her own true self for the sake of “pathological accommodation” to parental 
authority, so too one may feel this all the more so in relation to an entire world 







Second force: behaviorism (BT), cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), 
and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT). 
 
 Given the highly subjective interpretations of behavior in general and the 
tendency in Freud’s time to reduce all knowledge–even mathematical and logical 
laws–to psychological laws (what Husserl called, “psychologism”), it may not 
seem surprising that behaviorists initially rejected psychoanalytic introspection 
and focused instead on the mind as a mysterious “black box” and focused instead 
on predicting output by empirically measureable inputs and measuring outputs so 
that one can build a mathematical model to predict outcomes more generally. Nor 
is it surprising that they were tempted to evaluate human behavior via models of 
animal conditioning. Habits certainly play a part in human life, just as they do in 
animal life. Aristotle, for example, appealed to spontaneous, non-reflective habits 
of thought, feeling, and action formed by repetitive behavior as the foundation for 
virtuous and vicious action, traits, and states that constitute moral personality 
development. But, for Aristotle, virtue and vice were distinctly human attributes 
inseparably connected to a moral principle. For example, normal virtue was 
construed as a mean between extremes in much the same way as Eastern 







It is far from clear, however, what principle or criterion underlies the 
formation and reformation of “good” and “bad” habits according to Behavioral 
Therapy (BT), since moral qualities are not empirically knowable in their sense of 
“empirical.” Even in BT’s more evolved forms of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy 
(CBT) and Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT), it is unclear how we 
allegedly know what is “bad” and needs to be replaced by what is “good” in 
behavioral transformation (Linehan & Dexter–Mazza, 2008, p. 390). No mere 
symptom amelioration, behavioral reprogramming, or mere modification of ideas, 
or core schema transformation is sufficient to radically alter one’s vision or 
perception of reality itself as “good” or “bad.” Yet, without this there is no 
substantial change of life (Crane, 2009).  
 
 Third force: humanistic and existential. 
 
 Instead of treating persons as things or animals, humanistic psychotherapy 
fixes attention on human freedom and responsibility in relationship to core values 
which some clinicians such as Carl Rogers (1982) believed are inherent in human 
nature, while others like Rollo May (Wilber, 1995, p. 110) conceived of such in 
more dispositional terms. Study after study has demonstrated that the humanist 







compassion are the primary vehicles for healthy personality change, independent 
of therapeutic orientation. One of the key controversies, however, revolves around 
the character of such values (May, 1982). Carl Rogers’ warm and non-judgmental 
style especially provided a sanctuary in which clients felt safe, accepted and not 
judged in a way which freed them to acknowledge what they truly thought and 
felt (Koenig, McCullough, & Larson, 2001; Oman & Thoreson, 2005) (p.65). 
Some founders of the movement, like Abraham Maslow (Maslow, 1971) and 
Roberto Assagioli (Assagioli, 2007), went further still in pointing to the higher 
reaches or potentials of human nature.  
Yet, to some of those associated with the general orientation, the 
humanistic appeal to inherent human goodness seemed naïve (Wilber, 1982, p. 
65); and among existentialists there was a sharp and ever widening gulf forming 
between those like Sartre, speaking in the name of a being-for-self which seemed 
to exalt human selfishness, and more spiritual-minded existentialists who directed 
attention to being-for-others as the only possible foundation of a therapy of hope 
(Orange, 2011). As Viktor Frankl understood, and subsequently convinced 
Maslow, there can be no self-actualization without self-transcendence (May, 
1982). The cure for our pervasively ingrained but hardly necessary or essential 
selfishness requires a relationship to something greater than us. Because of this, 







to life, or even higher form of consciousness, it lacks the self-transcendent 
foundation upon which any and all positive human development subsists.  
Many existential psychotherapists like Irv Yalom  (Yalom, 1980, 2008) 
along with integrative, intersubjective analysts like Bob Stolorow (2007), assume 
with Heidegger not only a form of normal angst bound up with the actual and 
precarious nature of human existence, but interpret this as inherent to human 
nature itself, rather than merely contingent or acquired. The former implies it is 
incapable of change while the latter leaves this door open. Indeed, their 
conception appears to extend to the very nature of reality itself and any possible 
God at its core. Good faith, according to this subset of existentialists, amounts to 
the willingness to acknowledge vs. deny this reality and to make the best one can 
of it. As Rollo May (1981) said, “God needs the devil” (p.66). Evil is defined as 
necessary; not contingent, and the reality and proximity of death alone enables us 
to appreciate life (Daniels, 1982; Frankl, 1964; Maslow, 1966; Pytell, 2006). One 
might paraphrase Sartre as saying, “good faith may result in a form and measure 
of unhappiness as one sees the selfishness, injustice and suffering in the world, 
but at least in living authentically we will be capable of authentic pleasures as 
opposed to the shallow pleasures of those living an inauthentic life like believers 







Religious/spiritually-oriented existentialist therapists, however, that good 
faith is hardly limited to atheists, as evidenced by the testimony of the most 
sincere and insightful religious witnesses in our history (May, Rogers, & Maslow, 
1986, p. 88), many of whom were themselves  considered outsiders, outcasts, or 
heretics by the mainstream religious believers of their day. The problem is not 
with faith per se, (i.e., faith in real goodness) but with the way both atheists and 
believers may imitate the outward form of the real thing without its spirit. Like a 
psychopath, for example, one may mimic the words, actions, and emotions of the 
truly good person while being motivated by a spirit, heart, or character on the 
opposite end of the moral continuum. Indeed, it is because a truly good life 
constrains us to act in accordance with it that the only way to subvert that power 
is either to distort the way it appears or to mimic its outward form. But there are 
also distinctions to be drawn between those of good and bad faith in terms of the 
relative fullness of one’s relationship to the good object. Where else in human 
history do we see the greatest moral heroes but within religion? Remember that 
the despair of our Holocaust witnesses revolved around the lack of both a secular 
and religious hope, but what makes this collective moral problem more deeply a 
religious problem is that the only viable hope lies in distinguishing a true religion 







Not all religious claims are forms of dogmatism and one’s reaction to 
religious dogmatism may be equally dogmatic. For example, attempts to treat 
morality as if it were merely a matter of subjective opinion or culturally relative 
preference are merely the mirror-images of religious moral dogmatism. Recall 
that the testimony of our Holocaust witnesses is of no mere value–neutral world, 
but of a selfish cold indifferent world. That is, a world in which we are already 
immersed in negative values even if this is initially more suffered than willed. 
Even so, once thrown into a raging sea, we must still choose whether to sink or 
swim in search of a beacon of light. None of us can be indifferent to a faith 
commitment: such that our only choice is not whether we believe in a god, but 
what kind of god we will choose to place our faith in. Good faith or faith in 
goodness, therefore, whether in its atheistic or religious form, involves a 
volitional component in response to the form and measure of good or grace 
revealed to us and which we have chosen to receive.  
 
 Fourth force: transpersonal psychotherapy. 
 
 Transpersonal Psychotherapy (TP) appeals to what William James (James, 
1967) called “radical empiricism,” which Gardner Murphy (Murphy & Ballou, 







of thrusting oneself forward into the world of experience, to make the richest 
possible contact with the concrete, the immediate, the real” in view of James’ 
growing realization that the “abstractions which characterized German idealistic 
philosophy and British idealistic philosophy . . . could make no real contact with 
the tough, vital, throbbing, everyday realities with which our immediate life is 
concerned. Always give us realities, give us facts, give us concreteness” (p.13). 
This is what James said his pragmatism was about: the practical and the concrete. 
And, for James, this concept extended to religion and psychical research in 
general as well. For James, Gardner says, “religion is to be judged not in terms of 
the abstract representation of an invisible world, but in terms of the living fiber of 
its substance as we feel it moving through us: and even the mystic is to be 
understood in terms of the kinds of reality with which he makes contact,” or in the 
words of R.B. Perry, whom Gardner cites, James always “knew there was more” 
(p. 13).  
What is significant here is less how one elucidates this experience 
(including the possibility of direct experience of universals, which James would 
deny), and more the openness to a broader range of experiences that had been 
excluded by the narrow empiricism in James’ day. As I see it, the 
Transpersonalists took seriously the experiential testimony or the bearing witness 







of a self-transcendent good having power to resolve most of our psychological 
problems, including addictions (Wilber, 1989a, p. 467; Wyner, 2007b). Assagioli 
and Wilber, for example, claim this vision defines the testimony of all the great 
spiritual witnesses of all religious traditions (Grof & Grof, 1993a; Grof & Grof, 
1993b; Walsh & Vaughan, 1993c). Patients suffering from existential, spiritual, or 
transpersonal crises, therefore, are not regarded as pathological (Assagioli, 1965, 
1973, 2007; Wilber, 1989c) and the therapist plays a crucial role, like a teacher or 
guru, in not just supporting a patient’s self-reflection, but by providing options for 
discovery that the patient may never have even conceived of before. The 
comprehensiveness of the therapist’s own vision of reality, then, plays a 
significant role in helping the patient expand his vision (Grof & Grof, 1993b; 
Walsh & Vaughan, 1993c).  
The breadth of this appeal may help us appreciate why a Transpersonalist 
like Ken Wilber would conceive of this orientation as not only a uniquely 
integrative discipline within psychology but also across all disciplines, in view of 
its adoption of multi-culturalism, religious pluralism, and epistemological 
postmodernism which, Wilber claims, contrasts primarily, (although not 
exclusively), with Western Christian ethnocentrism. In keeping with my view 
about a collective existential, moral, and religious/spiritual crisis, Wilber (1993a) 







patriarchy, underlie the root of our contemporary global crisis. In the face of 
criticism of Transpersonal Psychology’s other-worldliness by secular 
humanist/existentialists (Wittine, 1993), Transpersonalists like Wilber (1989a) 
claim it is highly relevant for ordinary people as “the very mechanism of 
evolution, of growth and development in this world now” (p. 467).   
But, despite this appeal to a form of integration including the best of all 
four forces of psychotherapy, TP also has several limitations: First, although TP 
appeals to direct experience, its idealist phenomenology or epistemological theory 
seems to force experience into a subjectivist and culturally relative mold. For 
example, references to immediacy seem to ignore the requisite temporal processes 
involved in experiencing reality (Schneider, 1987, 1989). A patient doesn’t 
simply see that her therapist is trustworthy, but rather engages in a process of 
experiential discovery as she comes to know her therapist. At the same time, her 
therapist is discovering this patient’s unique “psychic reality.” Empathic 
understanding of the patient’s thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and knowledge are all 
objective facts that we (and the patient) come to know over the course of 
treatment in order to understand that patient. Along with intersubjective 
psychoanalysts like Stolorow and Orange (2011) I would argue that no therapist 
can empathically understand a patient immediately, but only within the context of 







Second, although at least some Transpersonalists acknowledge a form of 
systemic and even global problems bound up with an unhealthy “normal” world 
(Wyner, 1988), their diagnosis of the nature and origin of this problem–especially 
as a moral problem–seems as problematic for this orientation as for any other. 
Ken Wilber (1993c), for example, refers to a “pre-trans fallacy” or tendency to 
conflate a child’s pre-personal or pre-egoic state of ignorance with a supra or 
trans-personal state of enlightenment. Granted, but a state of innocent ignorance is 
also not a state of willful ignorance bound up with intentional wrong–doing or 
sin; and a re-turn to and re-conciliation with Truth and true goodness–that is, a 
return to a state of innocence or purity of intent defined by a wholehearted fidelity 
or devotion to the truth–shares something in common with a child’s innocence. In 
other words, a pre-egoic state, a state of childlike innocence, and a state of 
enlightenment, are not the same as a state in which one has inherited prejudices, 
accepted in blind and/or bad faith. The reality of sin, evil, and bad faith –  
regardless of how such terms are understood–is anathema in psychology. It is 
because of major distortion and misunderstanding of such core concepts within 
Judeo-Christianity that TPs like Wilber seem to contrast a mere cultural or 
relatively unsophisticated image of Judeo-Christian spirituality/psychology with a 
more sophisticated and spiritually elevated image of Eastern psychology, as if the 







Vaughan, 1993e, p. 112). The Christian theologian, Tillich, states that “Eastern 
mysticism is not the solution to Western problems” (as cited in Schneider, 1987, 
p. 205); whereas the Christian mystic, William Law (1893), appeals to a 
transcultural as well as transpersonal solution: “There is but one Salvation for all 
Mankind, and that is the Life of God in the Soul . . . there is but one possible Way 
for Man to attain this Life of God, not one for a Jew, another for a Christian, and 
a third for a Heathen. No, God is one, and the Way to it is one, and that is, the 
Desire of the Soul turned to God” (p. 133).  
Third, the Transpersonalist position in general does not appear to provide 
a clear or consistent description of an ideal state of health. In Wilber’s case, for 
example, the stress seems to be on a state defined more in terms of an absorption 
of self in something else, rather than on the realization of the most intimate union 
or relationship while retaining that which most uniquely defines the partners in 
the relationship. Self-realization, or the fulfillment of one’s truest and highest 
self-interest, is not a selfishness or ego-centrality that subordinates one’s 
knowledge of the good, but the ability to empathically see one’s self, as well as 
others, through the lens of goodness or the eyes of a good and loving God. It 
implies no loss or diminishment of self (Mack, 1993; Tart, 1993; Walsh & 
Vaughan, 1993a, 1993b, 1993e; Wilber, 1993b). It is unclear, for example, how 







necessary step toward a state in which “one” allegedly never had a self to begin 
with (Wilber, 1982, 1988, 1989b). As mentioned above, the primary root of the 
problem may be the lack of an adequate epistemological foundation for their 
discipline (Engler, 1993; Epstein, 1993; Feuerstein, 1993; Walsh & Vaughan, 
1993d; Wilber, 1993d). But even if the problem is less conceptual difference of 
opinion than misunderstanding associated with the meaning of terms, we may be 
unable to adequately help our patients distinguish healthy from unhealthy forms 
of religiosity and spirituality–especially hybrid cases having elements of both 
(Walsh & Vaughan, 1993a, 1993b).  
What may especially be missing in view of widespread and growing 
antagonism toward dogmatic mainstream forms of Christianity, is a clear 
elucidation of Jesus’ revelation of a wholeheartedly trusting relationship to a God 
incapable of evil, who is willing and able to suffer with us, in us, and for us, and 
who can enable us, thereby, to find meaning in our own suffering for others. Like 
a faithful marriage in which the partners don’t even desire to be unfaithful, it is 
only as we feel safe enough to let down our defensive barriers that we can truly be 
present to, and in, and for one another. Such a relationship may actually bear 
witness to a form of moral or spiritual perfection attainable in this life, which is 
nonetheless susceptible to epistemic imperfection or a potentially endless 







and measure of knowledge one has (Grof & Grof, 1993a; Grof & Grof, 1993b; 
Walsh & Vaughan, 1993c). 
 
Psychoanalytic Empathy: A More In-Depth Look at the Role of Empathic 
Love in Healing Existential Trauma 
 
In the next section of my literature review I intend to explore the meaning 
of empathy as a way to better understand what heals in psychotherapy and how 
such healing can or does occur. As a complete analysis of empathy is well beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, we will limit our attention to psychoanalytic 
empathy, in particular studies associated with Kohut’s positive psychology in the 
context of Self Psychology and intersubjectivity analysts like Stolorow, Orange, 
et.al.. The primary aim will be to bring to the surface some of the key qualities of 
an empathic loving understanding as it bears on healing existential trauma.  
 
Empathy and Buber’s I and Thou: A general statement. 
 
 Martin Buber (2002) refers to a conversion experience, which redirected 







true religion or spirituality. A man came to him in need and Buber was not truly 
present to him in a way psychotherapists refer to being experience “far” instead of 
experience “near.” Harry Stack Sullivan  (1940) had a similar type of experience, 
as did Heinz Kohut (1984) when he said he had not seen “that the patient had felt 
additionally traumatized by feeling that all these explanations on my part came 
only from the outside; that I did not fully feel what he felt, that I gave him words 
but not real understanding, and that I thereby repeated the essential trauma of his 
early life” (p. 182). My general aim in what follows is to try to paint a clearer 
picture of this I/Thou or heart to heart relationship and its practical bearing on 
clinical work.  
Part of the problem revolves around the general meaning of empathy as, 
according to Kohut, the distinctive and primary tool or instrument of knowing or 
perceiving in psychotherapeutic work. As discussed in my methodological section 
and in great detail in my Philosophy dissertation (Wyner, 1988) empathic 
perception seems quite similar to the classical philosophical distinction between 
experiential knowledge and descriptive or ratiocinative knowledge (the result of a 
process of logical reasoning). For example, we commonly recognize a difference 
between the kind of (descriptive or factual) knowledge Obama’s biographer may 







or remember) and the experiential knowledge his wife and children have of him 
given the intimacy of their relationships.  
We know, too, that this experience of near or empathic knowledge is a lot 
more powerful than mere descriptive or “experience far” knowledge. If one is 
close to one’s parents, spouse, children, or even a dear pet, their suffering 
typically affects us more powerfully than news of the suffering of a stranger. The 
same is true of real versus merely imagined suffering. We have all thought about 
our own death and the death of those we love, but the reality affects us in a way 
the mere thought does not. And the same is true of the therapeutic relationship. 
We may concede the value of Freud’s appeal to therapeutic neutrality if we think 
of neutrality as being objective as opposed to subjectively biased, but not if we 
think of neutrality as subordinating a real and intimately personal encounter to 
cult-like conformity to a theoretical position, or a blind application of technique, 
or a facile empathic posture. The later is akin to Buber’s (1970) warning of 
subordinating an I/Thou relationship to an I/It one. His point is not that there is 
anything inherently wrong with I/It relationships per se, just as there is nothing 
inherently wrong with relating to ourselves or others at times in “experientially 
far” or distant ways. When the cashier at the grocery store asks us how we are 
today, we are not likely to hold up the line to engage in an in-depth discussion of 







conventional way to say hello. But when a therapist asks one’s patient how she 
feels in this moment, we rightly sense to reply as we do to the cashier is out of 
place.   
Among the clinical implications of this distinction include the sense in 
which the power of therapeutic cure is primarily rooted an intimate interpersonal 
encounter that underlies any legitimate meaning we ascribe to a professional 
therapeutic relationship. For example, at least beginning therapists often find 
themselves in conflict with respect to responding to a patient in need according to 
this or that professional orientation versus as a human being. The therapist may 
ask oneself: Am I being too active, too passive, or too neutral? Am I providing an 
interpretation too soon or too late? What does my gut tell me? Ideally, however, 
reliance on one’s gut is not reliance on mere subjective impressions; nor on blind 
conformity to any psychological orientation, but on an increasingly fine–tuned 
ability of empathic perception and understanding. As Kohut (1984) puts it, “we 
must never confuse the deep human response called forth in us vis-à-vis another 
human being’s thoughts and emotions with sentimentality and companionship. 
Parents and analysts, respectively, will insist on the child’s and the analysand’s 
confronting unpleasant realities, including the limits that all of us have to 
recognize, but they will do so while simultaneously acknowledging the facts that 







that we are affirmed by others, including, and especially, by our parents and those 
who later come to have a parent self-object significance for us” (p. 190).  
That is, in contrast to the claim by some analysts like Strachey (1934) 
“that nothing except the process of psychoanalysis can alter [the super-ego or core 
of one’s personality]” (p. 136), numerous studies show that non-neutral, 
“experience near” attitudinal values like authenticity, empathy, and compassion 
are the primary agents for change within any interpersonal relationship and within 
all therapeutic orientations. As I pointed out in my introduction, authentic, 
empathic, insightful love (properly understood) is arguably the primary vehicle 
for change in relationships between parents and children, teachers and students, 
spiritual leaders or role models and those searching for answers to the enduring 
philosophical questions of life, no less than in the therapeutic relationship. Indeed, 
as I have been attempting to show, the living words of role-models–both at a 
distance or from our collective past–may exert the most profound and life-
changing influence even without Stolorow’s relational home insofar as this is 
understood as an immediately present therapeutic or cultural context. For 
example, our Holocaust witnesses recognized in the suffering of the prophet, Job, 
a shared experience of the suffering of the innocent and the righteous, just as 







Allegory of the Cave. In other words, Stolorow’s relational home either must 
allow for or be extended to include a far broader social context.  
 
Empathy and neutrality. 
 
 Kohut (1984) states: 
Empathy . . . defines the field of psychoanalysis . . . it is a value-neutral 
tool of observation which  . . . can be used in the service of either 
compassionate, inimical, or dispassionate-neutral purposes, and . . . can be 
employed rapidly and outside awareness or slowly and deliberately, with 
focused conscious attention. We define it as “vicarious introspection” or, 
more simply, as one person’s (attempt to) experience the inner life of 
another while simultaneously retaining the stance of an objective observer 
(pp. 174-175).   
Kohut’s characterization of empathy as “value-neutral” is a convenient 
starting point for our discussion of some of the key features of empathy and its 
role in the therapeutic relationship. The features discussed, however, are by no 
means intended to be comprehensive, nor to provide a rigorous elucidation of 
what empathy is. The relevant points include: a) whether or to what extent one 







the difference between unconscious (pre-conscious or peripherally conscious) and 
conscious empathy; c) the nature of true and false empathy (including 
authentic/inauthentic empathy and empathy as an attitude, orientation, posture, 
skill or tool; d) the difference between psychopathic empathy and benevolent 
empathy. 
 
To what extent one can experientially know another person’s mind.  
 
 As noted above, Kohut defined empathy as “vicarious introspection.” But 
what precisely does this mean? Michael Basch (1983) interprets it as a form of 
objective perception or  understanding of the patient’s psychic reality (p. 114) that 
includes affective resonance.  He wants to stress a process of rational 
understanding while de-emphasizing love, compassion, and sympathy: “[Empathy 
involves] complex cognitive processes by which we form certain hypotheses 
about another person’s inner experience . . . that are then open to further study so 
that the judgments that were made about that other person’s state of mind can be 
confirmed or proven false” (p. 111). He refers to Louis Agosta’s (1977, 
unpublished) conclusion, “that empathy can be viewed as a hermeneutic circle in 
which resonance, interpretation, and evaluation all play an essential part” (p. 111). 







in a way that “emphasizes affective resonance to the exclusion of inference, 
judgment, and other aspects of reasoning thought which are equally important to 
the concept of Einfühlung (empathy)” (p. 110). He prefers the notion of empathy 
as “feeling into,” that is, “‘finding’ or ‘searching’ one’s way into the experience 
of another” (p. 111).  
Basch’s intent is to “demonstrate that we come to know our and others’ 
mental life in the same way we come to know concrete reality. The seeming 
immediacy of self-knowledge or the knowledge of others’ mental states is an 
illusion” (p. 109). He says that empathy is not intuitive in the sense of being 
“immediate, unstudied, or effortless” but rather an “understanding…built up, 
amended, corrected, and otherwise refined in the process of immersing himself in 
the patient’s material hour after hour.” It is “never a matter of somehow getting a 
direct look at what goes on in another mind.” In support of his position he quotes 
Agosta (1977, unpublished dissertation) as saying, “vicarious feelings [are] part of 
being receptive toward another’s self-expression. But it is myself, not the other, 
who is the object of introspection . . . .  In vicarious introspection one is not 
introspecting the feelings, sensations, or experiences of the other at all. Rather, 
one is introspecting a vicarious feeling, sensation, or experience aroused by the 







In describing the process in question, Basch (1983) says, that “empathic 
thinking (italics mine), like syllogistic reasoning or mathematical computing, is a 
function that the human brain at a certain level of development is potentially 
capable of performing, no more and no less” (p. 119). He explicitly refers to 
empathy as a form of judgment acquired through a process of coming to know 
that, unlike logical reasoning, takes into account one’s affective responses (p. 
120). He says that “empathy leads to knowledge” (p. 123) or insight, but that this 
empathic knowledge or “understanding is not curative in the psychoanalytic 
sense; cure is the function of interpretation” (p. 123). Presumably, Basch means 
that empathic understanding is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
interpretation, which is the real cure in analysis. As Basch puts it, empathy is a 
tool used by therapists to realize “the goal of psychoanalytic treatment, i.e., the 
development, interpretation, and working through of the patient’s transferences” 
(p. 123).  
First, although my empathic perception of my patient may involve 
introspection and especially reflection on my countertransference reactions to my 
patient, the object of my empathy is not my own psychological states, ideas, 
feelings, processes of reasoning and so forth (unless I was feeling empathic 
toward myself). Rather, the object of my empathy is precisely the states, ideas, 







This confusion regarding the object of one’s thoughts shows up again and again in 
psychological discussions and does so because of the lack of a clearly elucidated 
epistemology.  Second, although empathic feeling is essential to empathy, it is so 
precisely because empathic feeling is not mere sensation, nor association, even if 
these constitute parts of the unity that constitutes empathy. In other words, 
empathic feeling is inseparably connected to or dependent upon the experiential 
knowledge I have of my patient’s state of mind. I empathize with the specific 
nature of this patient’s suffering from his parents’ emotional abuse–not any 
patient’s suffering; nor their suffering from mere pain or suffering in general. So, 
“feeling and emotion are of necessity and by definition always conscious” (p. 
118). Third, despite Basch’s recognition of some form of developmental process 
of empathic understanding that allegedly distinguishes it from mere logical 
reasoning, he nevertheless seems to regard this process as little more than logical 
reasoning plus affect. If so, what reason do we have to believe that the acquisition 
of empathic perception, knowledge, or understanding is a logical one?  
Consider the case of “Ben,” a patient grieving over the loss of his pet 
Maltese dog, “Madigan.” When Madigan died, Ben felt a greater loss than he did 
after the death of his own father. The loss felt even more acute due to the general 
lack of empathy for what he was experiencing. However, his wife, “Margaret,” 







relationship with Madigan. For example, they had both endured a history of 
caring for a dog sick from birth due to liver problems. Even so, their respective 
relationships to Madigan had qualities unique to each of them. Madigan slept on 
Ben’s pillow every night. She waited for him every morning outside the bathroom 
door. She sat on his lap while he worked at his computer during the day or 
watched TV at night. For both Ben and Margaret, but all the more for Ben, 
Madigan was a gift of endless hours of laughter and joy.  
Basch says, “The identification that takes place in an empathic encounter 
is not with the other person per se, but with what he is experiencing. It is a matter 
of concluding that one’s own affective state duplicates that of the other . . .” (p. 
105).  In Fliess’s (1942) words he refers to the “ability to put himself in the 
latter’s place, to step into his shoes, and to obtain in this way an inside knowledge 
that is almost firsthand” (p. 105)–a process Fliess calls “trial identification” (as 
cited in Basch, p. 105). But despite Fliess’s appeal to inside knowledge, Basch’s 
association or description of the empathic process as a logical one does not to my 
mind even remotely describe the empathic process of experiential fulfillment as I 
have elucidated in my methodological section and elsewhere. Margaret did not 
empathize with Ben by drawing logical inferences and conclusions. She 
empathized by reliance on both experiences and qualities unique to Ben’s 







set of qualities applicable to each of these specific relationships taken as a whole. 
The development of empathy, then, is a process of increasing fullness of 
experiential knowledge that includes increasingly coming to see the actual and 
specific qualities applicable to this object or this specific relationship. This is not 
the same as the more common act of merely assuming or attributing 
characteristics to persons, relationships, and situations that may not apply in that 
particular case (the typical way we tend to ignore the unique qualities in order to 
classify or categorize precisely to avoid being overwhelmed by attending to the 
details of particular cases). As we shall see later on, what is often called objective 
knowledge in science and psychology is precisely such a tendency to classify, but 
properly speaking, inherently there is no reason to believe we cannot really or 
objectively know–and know intimately or empathically–the unique psychic reality 
of another person or our own. 
Finally, Basch claims that “cure is the function of interpretation” (p. 123) 
rather than (as if separable from) empathy. Is Basch claiming that interpretation is 
the conclusion of a process of logical reasoning–abstract or descriptive 
knowledge–dispensed by the analyst from on high to the patient? Or is he 
claiming, insofar as empathy is merely construed as partial identification or 
sharing of some aspect of the other person’s psychic reality, that it may lack the 







If the latter, he may be closer to what Buber (1965) called “confirmation,” an 
essential element in the I/Thou relationship. In perhaps a similar vein, Strachey 
(1934) and Orange (1995) refer to a transformative or mutative interpretation at 
the root of therapeutic cure, which seems to me a lot like the universal religious, 
spiritual, and philosophical appeal to a comprehensive vision–a form of 
experiential knowledge, perception, awareness, or understanding–of who or what 
one really is, or one’s own true self. Indeed, this form of knowledge has been 
universally appealed to as the power of truth, light, enlightenment, or wisdom 
(Wyner, 1988).  
In more philosophical terms, it is referred to as “the thesis of the 
practicality or power of reason” where reason is to be understood as experiential 
knowledge (Wyner, 1988). It is an appeal to a comprehensive vision of the 
essential character of reality as good and manifested in various spiritual 
communities or what Stolorow (Stolorow, 2007) calls a “relational home”(p. 
382)–an interpersonal context in which one can find safety and understanding. In 
Strachey’s sense of a benign superego, it implies an interpersonal context of 
understanding that enables us, individually and collectively, to let go of the 
myriad forms of harsh superegos we have suffered under or inherited from a 
coldly indifferent world. In the language of the early Friends or Quakers, as we 







whether we yet realize it or not–embracing or cleaving to an inner voice that is 
transcendent to but immanently speaking in and to us all. In their words, they 
appealed to an eternal Word that existed before any words of a scripture were ever 
written (Burroughs, 1672; Dewsbery, 1689; Fox, 1831; Nayler, 1829; Whitehead, 
1725). 
Insofar as this vision or interpretation is incarnated in or mediated by the 
therapist (or anyone else for the matter, alive or dead) it is the power for core 
personality change and can speak to the existential trauma of our Holocaust 
witnesses and the rest of us. But it is nonetheless inseparable from the 
authenticity, empathy, and compassionate understanding that constitutes it. It 
reveals there is hope for humanity in spite of a suffering world or human context 
in which we find ourselves in today.  
 
Unconscious and conscious empathy.  
 
 With respect to “unconscious” empathy, I want to briefly explore the 
question of whether infants, dogs and other animals are capable of empathy 
without ignoring the fact that empathy has been, and has been increasingly, 
ascribed to a far broader population including rodents and insects. Even as early 







to the Pain of Others. On one end of this spectrum of belief, it is fair to say that 
infants and animals at least appear to “sense” feeling states of both people and 
other animals.  
 A Veterinarian Assistant named Lloyd, with whom I worked for several 
years, was certainly an “Animal Whisperer.” Whereas the rest of the assistants put 
on thick, heavy gloves to prevent us from being clawed by a frightened, angry cat, 
Lloyd simply opened the cage, reached in and grabbed the cat without gloves, and 
without hesitation. Animals seemed to sense his lack of fear of them. Similarly, 
parents and child psychologists observe the way infants and toddlers respond to 
the different feeling states of their various caregivers. As Basch (1983) seems to 
recognize, “Affective communication between child and parent is not a one-way 
street . . . . infants and children are unerringly attuned to the affective state of the 
mother, and are not deceived by the parent’s conscious or unconscious attempts at 
disguise or dissimulation of her true feelings” (p. 109).  
And yet Basch cites Burlingham (1967) in claiming that “infants and 
children who either have no sense of self as yet or cannot take distance from it, 
cannot be empathic; they are, nevertheless, clearly sensitive to the affect of others 
and guide their behavior accordingly. To be empathic an individual must be able 
to separate himself sufficiently from his feelings and emotions so that instead of 







have in the context in which they are experienced”(p. 119). Basch seems to hold 
the view that merely sensing the feeling states of other people or animals is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for the development of an empathic capacity 
into an actualized ability that requires consciousness. As he puts it, animals and 
small children may be “pre-rationally” (p. 111) affected by the states of others 
without being consciously aware of the other’s psychological state. As recent 
research suggests, it is because infants have an inborn capacity for empathy that it 
can be increasingly actualized (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Sloane, 
Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012). Looking into the eyes of many of my dogs that 
have passed away in my arms, I am convinced that they can in some sense fear 
death, but when I’ve looked into the eyes of people I have known in the process 
of their own dying I experience something more as they see their own dying 
through the eyes of those around them and they ask themselves questions like, 
“what was the meaning, purpose, and value of my life?”  
If we look at empathy in terms of such a continuum of developmental 
abilities that include characteristics we share with animals but involve a certain 
surplus, we may also appreciate Bolognini’s (2004) discussion of Greenson’s 
(1960) view of empathy as “essentially a preconscious phenomenon” involving 







. . . “The analyst allows part of himself to enter the patient and undergo his 
experiences as if he were the patient” (Bolognini, 2004, p. 46). 
A therapist may be so empathically attuned to one’s patient that one may 
not be explicitly aware of the elements in his experience that are his own and the 
elements that are his patient’s. That is, presumably, the point of therapists 
learning how to distinguish their own material from that of their patients in 
working through one’s own countertransference. For example, as I empathically 
listen to my patient tell me about the emotional abuse he suffered at the hands of 
his father it immediately calls to my mind my own suffering of abuse by my 
father. But the fact is that I have hardly even begun to penetrate the surface so as 
to be able to truly, deeply, and comprehensively see his world through his eyes. 
And if I impulsively act on my initial empathic feelings experienced in the 
countertransference by offering an “interpretation” based primarily on my own 
experience (assuming that it’s the same as his) then he will rightly feel I don’t 
understand him at all. My empathy will be shallow.   
To be clinically effective, therefore, our goal as therapists is to learn to 
make our unconscious or pre-conscious empathy increasingly more conscious in 
much the same way as we do with dreams. I am typically not conscious or 
unconscious of my dream states, but this does not make them any less states of 







attention on them. Similarly, the mind of my patients, in much the same way as 
my own mind, can be an object of thought or consciousness and by more 
intimately engaging with it, can become more or less experientially present or 
known as it really is. This is controversial–that psychologists often speak as if 
each person’s psychic reality or the state of mind of a person–what one actually 
believes, feels, wills and so forth–is not objectively accessible to others. But if so, 
how is it that therapists often have a clearer understanding of their patients’ 
thoughts than their patients may be capable of in the present moment? Is it not the 
point of psychotherapy precisely to facilitate the patient’s own capacity and 
increasing ability to become more conscious of themselves or more empathically 
attuned to their own subjective states? Is it not part of what we do to help them 
distinguish appearance from reality? How else can we collaboratively stand with 
them to figure out where they are now and what stands in the way of what they 
truly can become? 
 
True and false empathy and related distinctions.  
 
 The distinctly complex human and rational or intentional quality of 
empathy is evident not only by the fact that our empathic perceptions or 







fittingness or rectitude (rightness/wrongness; goodness/badness) for this or that 
individual in the specific context they are in. Primo Levi, we may recall, 
described the sense in which the death camp context profoundly impacted the 
individuals’ moral capacities. Therapists almost universally refer to some 
distinction between “authentic and inauthentic empathy” and between “accurate 
and inaccurate empathy.” As Stephen Mitchell (1997) says, “There is an 
enormous difference between false empathy, facile and postured, and authentic 
empathy, struggled toward through miscues, misunderstanding, and deeply 
personal work on the part of both analyst and patient” (p. 52). It seems especially 
important, however, to distinguish inaccurate empathy from inauthentic or false 
empathy in view of the fact that the former implies no ill intent whereas the latter 
does. As in legal proceedings, proving fraud or ill-intent may be very difficult in 
particular cases, but it assumes the very distinction in question. 
In way of illustration, a clinical psychology supervisor instructed her 
trainees to use empathy as a tool, means, or method to “help” patients and 
illustrated this by appeal to one of her cases of a female patient who had lost her 
brother. The supervisor “empathized” with the patient by saying she too had lost a 
brother and so could empathically understand how the patient felt. But the 
supervisor didn’t even have a brother. The lesson the supervisees were to take 







patient feel better or to help the patient deal with the immediate symptoms of their 
depression or despair. Bolognini (2004) refers to a “posture towards empathy 
involving intention or will; an empathic ‘attitude,’ ‘empathizing,’ listening, ‘use’ 
of empathy as an ‘instrument’ and so on” and sums by saying “true empathy is 
not a gear that can be engaged at will” (p. 126). Ferenczi (1955) says: 
I may remind you that patients do not react to theatrical phrases, but only 
to real sincere sympathy. Whether they recognize the truth by the 
intonation or colour of our voice or by the words we use or in some other 
way, I cannot tell. In any case, they show a remarkable, almost clairvoyant 
knowledge about the thoughts and emotions that go on in their analyst’s 
mind. To deceive a patient in this respect seems to be hardly possible and 
if one tries to do so, it leads only to bad consequences (p. 161).   
As I see it, the type of empathy role modeled by the supervisor above was 
false empathy, or “lying therapy,” as a colleague put it. Of course, one might 
argue she was merely governed by a utilitarian ethic that justifies the use of any 
means for an allegedly good end. It reminds me of a quote by Himmler to his SS 
and police generals in October, 1943: “Most of you know what it means when 
100 corpses lie there, or 500 lie there, or 1000 lie there. To have gone through this 
and–apart from exceptions caused by human weakness–to have remained decent, 







never to be written” (as cited in Hilberg, 1971, preface). Well-intended or not, one 
need only imagine how the patients in question may have felt if they had 
discovered the lie.  
Empathy may be neutral as Kohut (1984) claims, but as empathic 
understanding aimed at therapeutic cure it most certainly is not. Authentic 
empathy is essential. And so is accurate empathy. Authenticity, sincerity, or good 
intentions are clearly insufficient to provide the kind and degree of understanding 
or fullness of vision required to enable our patients to overcome the deep-rooted 
prejudices they have inherited about reality, human life, and the core sense of self 
that underlies normal as well as pathological anxiety, depression, and despair. The 
most sincere or well-meaning surgeon in the world may kill our child if he or she 
lacks the requisite knowledge and skill. Just so, a therapist’s ability to truly and 
profoundly help another has a lot to do with the extent to which he or she has 
come to understand both these core issues and the unique psychic reality of this 
patient.  
 
Psychopathic empathy and benevolent empathy.  
 
 Although empathy is most commonly associated with benevolence or 







(Basch, 1983, p. 119). For example, Basch (1983) claims, “much of the time we 
are empathically attuned to the affective state of others primarily to fulfill our 
own needs and to spare ourselves pain.” He calls this “healthy adaptation” and 
says that we ordinarily don’t call it empathy because it is “selfish” . . . “in the 
non-pejorative sense of that term” (p. 119). He says, “the world’s greatest 
scoundrels have been exquisitely and unerringly attuned to . . . the affective 
communications of others and have used that knowledge to achieve base aims” 
(pp. 119–120). Predators are often highly sensitive to the weakest, the least 
confident, the most vulnerable, in much the same way as animals often are. A 
sadistic psychopathic serial killer like Ted Bundy, for example, could hardly 
derive a form of pathological self-satisfaction or power from the degradation and 
suffering of his victims if he wasn’t acutely aware of their suffering. But to avoid 
the temptation of limiting our attention to extreme cases, we might think of the 
way so many of us compare ourselves with those worse off than us in some 
respect in order to elevate our sense of self-esteem. An emotionally abusive 
parent, for example, may justify his or her parenthood by insisting, “I didn’t 
sexually molest you. I wasn’t an alcoholic. I did the best I could.” Why do we 
tend to compare ourselves with the worst rather than the best? What are the 
clinical or practical implications of this? Can comparing ourselves to the worst 







Toward better understanding such cases one might well argue, with Plato 
(1875a), that all vice implies some form of ignorance. But this by no means 
prevents the most intellectually gifted among us from being psychopaths. Bundy, 
for example, was not only good-looking, charming and charismatic, he was also 
brilliant: he had a degree in psychology and was studying to be an attorney. His 
“gifts” all the more enabled him to be a master manipulator or chameleon. 
Murdering anywhere between 30+ and 130+ young women (Basch, 1983; Kohut, 
1984; Post, 1980), Bundy even had a fan club of young women who wanted to 
marry him, one of whom he did marry and had a daughter with.  
Once again, the character of the knowledge or ignorance is what it is at 
issue here. As indicated in the scriptures of every religious tradition, even angels 
can fall from grace, and no matter what our gifts–indeed, all the more so if our 
gifts are great–we are faced, as the Spider-man was faced, with the fact that with 
great power comes great responsibility. In the conflict between what one knows is 
right and what one most desires–even if it is only the self-exaltation that comes 
from spiritual pride–one is compelled to experientially distance oneself from the 
former in order to bring the latter more experientially near. For example, 
President Clinton would have found it a lot more difficult to have an affair with 







Indeed, if just the thought of them entered into the forefront of his mind it would 
work against the fulfillment of his illicit desire.  
In Bundy’s case, therefore, we may reasonably conjecture that he was 
necessarily and willfully ignorant of the humanity and welfare of both his victims 
and himself, for empathic attunement with these qualities would have evoked 
compassion and/or self-loathing. Instead, Bundy refers to the sense in which he 
conceived of his victims like ants whose life and death then appeared to him as 
holding little value or significance. But despite the value of extreme cases to make 
a point, we must bring such distinctions closer to home. Putting aside atrocities 
committed in a genocide or democide, or even gang warfare in and out of a 
prison, consider how we are all influenced by the desire for social acceptance to 
think of others in less generous ways than the way we think of ourselves and those 
on our own side. In the former, we cast others in the worst light; in the latter we 
cast ourselves and the groups we identify with in the best light. Indeed, we must 
do this because the power of truth insofar as it is seen would work to elevate the 
other and diminish our own grandiosity (Rule, 2000). 
This moral or ethical dimension of human life brings into focus not just a 
fundamental problem in psychology and clinical work in general, but arguably the 
core problem of human life–the sense of worthlessness–that underlies the vast 







in Freud’s rejection of real evil and real guilt, and in Jung’s view of an inherent 
moral dualism which acknowledges real evil but treats it as necessary, rather than 
contingent, and thus unavoidable (Jung, 1963). This has nothing to do with Jung’s 
acknowledgement of real evil as opposed to certain Christian views of evil as a 
mere privatio boni or absence of good. It has to do with his conception of evil as 
rooted in reality itself or any God at its core as opposed to a mere Aristotlean 
moral capacity that may or may not be actualized. As Jung put it, “Who is 
responsible for these sins? In the final analysis it is God who created the world 
and its sins . . . In Aion there are references to the bright and dark side of the 
divine image. . . God’s tragic contradictoriness . . . was the main theme of Answer 
to Job (p.216).” In Answer to Job, Jung (1954) refers to the central question of our 
time–the existential crisis that is the focal point of his book–“ We have 
experienced things so unheard of and so staggering that the question of whether 
such things are in any way reconcilable with the idea of a good God has become 
burningly topical (p.150).” But his answer here and elsewhere is to attribute evil 
to God and/or reality itself and to deny our initial innocence or capacity for a form 
of both initial moral perfection and a return to a sinless state where one can sin no 
more (p.120). For Jung, “to believe God is the Summum Bonum is impossible for 







Regardless of Jung’s position on the matter, such a view of God and/or 
reality as responsible for evil has considerable practical and clinical significance. 
It underlies the common belief echoed repeatedly in cases like the Holocaust that 
there is no real justice in reality or the universe. We see it, for example, in 
Wiesel’s crying out, as a child in Auschwitz, to a God he seems to think is 
capable of evil as well as good. But we do well to ask, where does this idea come 
from? It manifests itself in a form of systems theory that does not merely 
acknowledge circular as well as linear causality, but denies the latter altogether. In 
doing so, it goes beyond a mere concession to Aristotle’s claim that in most 
disputes both sides tend to contribute to the resulting problems to insist this is 
always true–even to the point of denying any real difference between perpetrators 
and innocent victims. As one patient put it, “Is there some rule in family therapy 
that you can’t point the finger at anybody? . . . Because sometimes . . . I think that 
therapist forgets who is the fucker and who is the fuckee” (Salter, 2003, p. 57).  
Such a therapeutic vantage point is not going to appear empathic to our 
Holocaust survivors; nor to an innocent child who has been sexually molested. As 
Salter puts in, “The history of psychology in the past one hundred years has been 
filled with theories that deny sexual abuse occurs, that discount the responsibility 
of the offender, that blame the mother and/or child when it does occur, and that 







we have seen in the accounts of our Holocaust survivors, it is not merely the 
innocence of the victims, but the extent of their real goodness that may move 
some perpetrators all the more to degrade or destroy them, precisely because the 
presence or existence of such goodness makes the perpetrator feel his own self-
degradation all the more intensely.  
These moral and ethical data are psychological facts that must be studied 
just like any other to empathically understand our patients and help them. And 
this is true despite the therapeutic tendency to deny the reality of evil given the 
felt mandate to be “non-judgmental.” In most therapeutic settings outside of 
mandatory therapy, the patients who come to us for help are not usually sadists, 
destructive narcissists, or “malignant aggressors” as Erich Fromm describes Hitler 
and Himmler (Salter, 2003, p. 57). But it might help somewhat alleviate this 
temptation if we consider that the aim here is not to convict or pass judgment. It is 
not to use the real or imagined “sins” of others to shift attention from one’s own 
sins or wrongdoing. Rather, the aim is to understand the source of our patients’ 
suffering, which often includes true as well as false guilt, and to help them come 
to terms with it in spite of their wounds.  
In the process of understanding such cases, understanding the particular 
context is crucial. Levi, as we observed earlier, claimed that the moral capacity 







capacity implies a necessity is akin to claiming that just because I can jump out of 
a plane without a parachute, I must. And even when our patients do bad things 
that harm themselves and others–whether ignorantly or intentionally–how are we 
to help them reconcile with such realities if we deny there are any realities or 
distinctions to be drawn in the first place?  
As we shall see shortly in our discussion of “pathological 
accommodation,” what makes this problem so difficult is both its form and 
magnitude. That is, the sense in which evil and wrongdoing are practically 
unlimited in the forms they may take; they may also become so pervasive, like 
smog, that we may have no experience of clean air to compare with what we 
breathe in day by day. The prejudices we suffer may not be limited to the most 
obvious ones, but hidden under the veil of the very modes of thinking and acting 
we consider best. This includes what we call “good education”–the philosophical, 
scientific, psychological prejudices–that affect and infect every one of us as 
children of our modern day world. As Babiak & Hare (2006) illustrate in their 
book, Snakes in Suits and Hare (1993) in his chapter on “White-Collar 
Psychopaths” in Without Conscience, psychopaths are all around us. The 
psychopathic “gift for camouflage, this chameleon-like ability to take on whatever 
form would best suit his purposes” is as familiar to us as the art of brown-nosing 







be especially well-illustrated by the case of Alcibiades, “the first recorded 
example of treatment failure of a psychopath” (Salter, 2003).  Its significance 
revolves around the fact that as Socrates’s lover and arguably his favorite pupil, 
he was able to deceive the founder of western philosophy and one of the wisest 
among us. 
What about benevolent empathy? Bolognini (2004) refers to “the analyst’s 
deep availability, whereby he can achieve an effective empathic understanding, . . 
. which depends on how capable he happens to be of making internal contact with 
himself, with his memories and affects and with mankind in general” (p. 128). He 
refers to how “an analyst who is intensely distressed, wounded or at any rate 
suffering without excessive defenses . . . has excellent prospects of entering into 
empathic resonance with the patient” (p. 129).  
This raises an especially significant clinical question: What kind of 
wounds are at issue here? For example, is it necessary for a clinician to have been 
an alcoholic, drug or sex addict, to “achieve an effective empathic understanding” 
with those who are? I don’t believe so. Of course, I am not suggesting one cannot 
use such experiences to facilitate empathic understanding. Rather, I am suggesting 
that what is most needed is our experiential or empathic connection to that truth 
and goodness that can alone fill the inner void that underlies all such surrogate 







connection to a world in which such goodness is so lacking. I am referring to the 
wounds of the pilgrim in Plato’s Cave who feels compelled to walk alone in his 
search for light and alone as he returns to help his brothers and sisters in darkness 
(Plato, 1875a). Putting aside Christian debates over the divinity of Jesus, even a 
Jew like Buber or a Hindu like Gandhi would concede the quality of a life marked 
by an exceptional, and possibly unique, capacity for empathic love which 
nonetheless was not based on experiences of having “sinned.” Similarly, in The 
Suffering Stranger, Donna Orange (2011) refers to non-conforming psychologists 
rejected by their colleagues for daring to be faithful to their consciences; for 
placing the needs of their patients above acceptance by their groups.  
But whether we are immersed in our sins or relatively free from them, how 
do we become more authentically and empathically loving? Shubert says, “an 
internal and loving interest in the suffering of one’s fellow man speeds up the 
healing process (as cited in Bolognini, 2004, p. 27), and Hufeland appeals to what 
I have been calling “the law of love.” In Hufeland’s words, “Just as the sick make 
healthy subjects into sick ones by means of sympathy and change their form of 
life into pathology, so we see, on the contrary, the way weak, old men living in 
the midst of strong young ones, by the same laws of the world described above, 







It is here that we come face-to-face with the power for real and substantial 
personality change on a group, individual, or even collective scale. For, 
controversial as it is, there is some distinction to be drawn between a truly healthy 
superego and an unhealthy or pathological one. Insofar as we can help our 
patients replace a “bad internal mother or father”–a cruel or tyrannical, critical, 
judgmental or fault-finding “inner-voice”–with a truly honest, caring, 
encouraging, insightfully guiding “inner-voice”–all the symptoms that flow out of 
the former will proportionally fade away. Consider, for example, Ping-Nie Pao’s 
(1983) comment that “I was told by an inner voice not to step beyond a certain 
threshold, and I obeyed” (p. 165). There’s some meaning in back of what we call 
this “inner voice” that speaks in and to and through a truly healthy or sensitively 
receptive conscience. There is some meaning we ascribe to a healthy superego 
that is worthy of our trust–not only a voice speaking to us through individuals and 
members of various cultures in our world today, but one reaching backward and 
forward in time with the authority of a voice that transcends time and all culture. 









Empathy as a relational quality. 
 
 I wish now to draw our attention not only to the growing acceptance 
across therapeutic orientations of the central role of the therapeutic relationship in 
core personality change, but also the extent to which cultural and even global 
relationships influence our perception of who or what we are and our unique 
worth as persons. Philip Bromberg (2003) says that, “Even among clinicians who 
treat posttraumatic stress disorder from more behaviorally oriented models, the 
therapeutic emphasis is shifting away from the simple elicitation and 
deconditioning of a recallable traumatic event toward making more clinical use in 
the patient-therapist relationship of the enacted reliving and reprocessing of 
unsymbolized interpersonal patterns that originated early in life” (p. 692). He 
refers to Schecter’s (1973) observation that the patient whose trust has been 
profoundly violated has been affected at the very core of her being or selfhood 
and as such “frequently experiences the analyst as “an unfathomable stranger 
whom he dare not trust” (p. 27). Bromberg (2003) refers to the sense in which the 
patient tends to dissociate what is “too shockingly strange to be held as “me” [so 
that it] becomes what Sullivan (1953) called “not-me” . . . a ghost that not only 
evokes fear; it also generates shame when it emerges in the patient-therapist 







“the entire system of psychotherapy . . . [has] overlooked the shame that we 
produced . . . in our therapeutic work . . . [the sense in which] post-Freudian 
society had been treated for almost everything but shame, and that the degree and 
severity of undiagnosed and untreated shame problems far exceeded anything we 
had ever imagined” (p. 693). In his case study of Dolores, he describes the 
lengthy relational process required to rebuild a sense of trust and a higher sense of 
self on a new foundation. He says, “she could feel another part that was louder, 
and that part could tell from how I was talking that I did care about her, and that 
part was real also” . . . [Dolores responds], “Maybe you do care about me and not 
simply about your analysis of me” (p. 702).  
This case illustrates the sense in which the power for therapeutic change is 
an emergent property that flows out of the increasingly intimate or loving 
interpersonal relationship between therapist and patient. It is not as if this power 
is a private possession of therapist or patient. It is not as if we, as therapists, can 
just be authentic, empathic, or loving toward our patients from the get-go, without 
discrimination and without regard to the role our patients play. Nor is it a matter 
of our patients just trusting us, or entrusting themselves to us, without regard to 
whether and to what extent they feel safe enough to trust us. There is a necessary 
and evolving process of co-working between therapist and patient–a collaborative 







obstacles in the way of the patient’s true and highest welfare. And it is my 
contention that this occurs within the context of a truly spiritual “relational 
home,”  or what Frankl and Maslow understood as the need for a self-
transcendent good for any possible individual and collective self-actualization. 
To help further elucidate empathy as a relational quality it will be helpful 
to recall the “law of love” and explore the sense in which intimate personal 
relationships may work to form, malform, reform, and transform us. In this way 
we may appreciate the sense in which even if one is thrown into a raging sea 
through no fault of one’s own we can chose–indeed, we cannot avoid choosing–
what we will do in response to the situation in which we find ourselves. We may 
choose to sink or hold on to others drowning with us; or we may search for a 
beacon of light. Another way of putting this is that we learn to become 
autonomous or independent, and we learn how to express our freedom in a 
manner consistent with our own true and highest self-interest, in contrast to 
selfish narcissism, in and by our interpersonal relationships. 
 
Toward a healthy superego.  
 
 Bolognini (2004) refers to the sense in which we all know that “the child 







beyond them, while recognizing a great deal of them in himself . . . he is also able 
to dialogue with them . . . he knows how to interrelate as a separate being. He is 
not a devotee, an initiate, a replicant, a uniformed tin soldier, an alter boy” (p.19). 
Later Bolognini says, “The analyst’s encounters are . . . above all with the masters 
of psychoanalytic thought, interlocutors who are constantly present somewhere 
deep in their inner world, albeit with alternating degrees of intensity and frequent 
rotations. In psychoanalytic thought, we always dialogue with someone” (p. 20). 
Bolognini’s description, then, varies according to relational context, and does not 
appeal to independence as an inherent virtue or dependence as a vice. For 
example, when we speak of independence or autonomy as a virtue we commonly 
mean one’s ability to rely or depend on one’s best light rather than blindly 
conforming to group prejudices. Personal or psychological independence, 
therefore, implies in its relationship to the good a form of moral/spiritual 
dependence, whereas in relationship to all other relationships, a form of 
moral/spiritual independence. 
The same dynamic is evident in religious appeals to universal disciplines 
for the realization of a spiritual life. These disciplines are of two main types: 
disciplines of disengagement (independence) and disciplines of engagement 
(dependence) (Bernoulli et al., 1960; Foster, 1978; Willard, 1988). Examples of 







from sex and other activities in which we may habitually engage) while examples 
of the latter include meditation and prayer. They are not separable from one 
another: one disengages from certain types of objects/behaviors on which one 
may be overly dependent in order to engage more fully with objects/behaviors 
that are more conducive to spiritual growth. And so, in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition Abraham is called to leave the social context in which he was raised–not 
forever–but in order to venture forth into a new way of living. In Ge: 2:24, we are 
called to leave our parents in order to cleave to a new life partner with whom we 
are to establish a new union of one flesh. This relationship, in turn, is to be 
subordinate to a still higher relationship–the call to love or be faithful to the good 
or, in religious language, the One God of truth and goodness who has revealed 
Herself to every person’s conscience since the foundation of the world. This is the 
one command underlying all Ten Commandments.  
The notion of a command to love might seem paradoxical if not an 
oxymoron, but we may more fully appreciate its significance if we consider: first, 
the sense in which this relationship provides the foundation for all other “good” or 
healthy relationships; and second, the sense in which this relationship can never 
be compelled although it can be constrained by the influence of what we see to be 







faith in one’s parents is initially grounded in blind faith rather in good or bad 
faith.   
Such cases may also illustrate in what sense the moral independence 
described involves a form of presence in absence–a form of interpersonal 
intimacy or connection with the good even when we are alone or do not sense the 
presence of such a good. For example, in Bolognini’s description above the nature 
or character of a good parent may be internalized, assimilated, or incarnated into 
the being of the child just as the masters of psychoanalysis may be internalized by 
the analyst. The individuals with whom one chooses to more intimately relate to 
or to have as role models, or the characteristics with which we most identify, are 
incorporated into our flesh or being so as to constitute who or what we are or 
become. Like Wittgenstein’s (1953) family resemblances, we easily recognize 
how adopted children or members of practically any group often look like each 
other as they assimilate common ways of thinking and acting which cannot be 
reduced to a single simple quality or attribute. Rather, the quality is far more 
complex–a “consequential attribute”–like a sum that is greater than its parts 
(Wyner, 1988). Similarly, the conscientious person is not defined by relatively 
isolated good intentions or actions but by one’s general orientation to the good 
that is manifested in all that one thinks and does on a level that is even deeper 







resemblance or consequential attribute in common just as unconscientious people 
do. One might even argue that atheists of good faith, a Hindu like Gandhi, a Jew 
like Buber, and a Christian like William Law may share more in common with 
one another than they do with the many or most of the members of the groups 
with which they also identify, insofar as these members are governed by blind 
and/or bad faith. 
So, what exactly does the ideal of “independence” or “autonomy” mean? 
What kind of independence is at issue here? Is it physical/financial, 
psychological, social, moral/spiritual independence? Does leaving our parents 
mean the same thing as “cutting off” or severing all ties? If so, how is this 
consistent with the scriptural command to honor one’s parents (Exod. 2:12)? How 
is it consistent with our clinical observation of the vital need for a strong social 
support network?  
From a clinical point of view, it seems relatively clear that psychological 
independence and physical independence are quite different. The psychological 
life of a patient may be so identified, fused, enmeshed, or inseparably connected 
to her parents that she cannot discern her own “inner voice” or true self. A 
psychologically healthy child, by contrast, may be born, raised, and live out his 
entire life in or near the home of his parents–with our without a marriage partner–







would regard Jesus as an independent thinker though he did not physically 
separate from his family.  
It may be more difficult, however, to draw a clear line between 
psychological and moral or spiritual independence, especially in view of the sense 
in which these may be distinct but inseparable. In the chapter on our Holocaust 
witnesses I attempted to describe this distinction. Putting aside the psychoanalytic 
ideal of “normal” vs. “pathological” neurosis, one might at least argue for a form 
of ethical, moral, or spiritual independence constituted by a healthy superego or 
inner voice that guides us to become “free to empathically love” by appeal to an 
intimately incarnated self-transcendent voice of compassion and truth rather than 
a harsh inner voice or superego that tyrannizes one’s conscience and life.  
The stress on an “inner voice,” is subject to perhaps a multiplicity of 
meanings. For example, there’s a sense in which the parent, the parent’s character, 
or the parent’s “voice” may be physically or empirically present to the child. It 
may also retain a kind of inner presence even when the parent is at a distance or 
even if the parent has died. In a similar way, even if one concedes the possibility 
of not just believing in a God or that there is a God, but actually experiencing the 
presence of God–by ordinary conscientious people as well as by prophets who 
described their experiences in various scriptures–we might equally distinguish the 







familiar with the history of Christian mysticism are familiar with appeals to 
“practicing the presence of God” as an attempt to be as intimately connected to 
God as with any other person in one’s life. But even in the case of Jesus, the 
Christian role model, his recorded life does not illustrate the constantly felt 
presence of God. For example, in order to hear God’s voice more clearly he refers 
to the need, time and time again, to go off by himself into solitude and silence in 
order to listen more attentively to that voice. And in his final days, he calls out to 
God in an experience of felt abandonment, “Father, why have you abandoned 
me?” followed by complete surrender to a God he whole-heartedly trusts and 
loves, “nevertheless, your will not mine be done.” 
The goal of therapy is to provide a place of safety and trust–an 
interpersonal sanctuary, spiritual community, or “relational home”–which fosters 
a voice that at one and the same time provides a foundation of truth and goodness 
consistent with the utmost freedom or diversity or uniqueness of each and all of 
us. Such a context–especially the parent-child bond that therapists recognize so 
initially and powerfully affects us all–is not independent of or separable from the 
broader social contexts within which we are raised. The prejudices of the social 
world in which we live permeate our world. In more traumatic cases, patients may 
find themselves in prison–like “worlds” where no side truly accepts them as they 







concerning what it means to be a man and a person may discover that such 
prejudices permeate every culture the boy encounters. And it may even distort his 
conception of a “male” God, which then distorts his conception of reality and 
humanity or personality itself (Salter, 2003; Wyner, 2007a). 
In more psychological terms, relational psychotherapists like Ping-Nie Pao 
(Pao, 1983) insist that empathy “is not a solo activity. It is a process in which the 
two participants–the one who wishes to understand and the other who desires to 
be understood–must both participate actively (pp.52–53).  As Mitchell (1997) 
described earlier, empathy may best be understood as a task, an achievement, a 
goal to realize within an evolving interpersonal relationship based on trust. It 
might be compared to a struggle like climbing a mountain or finding one’s way 
out of Plato’s Cave (1875a) And one of the quintessential defining marks of the 
trust inherent in this empathic process is respect for the patient’s freedom or 
autonomy–as Modell claimed, the sense in which empathy includes a volitional 
component (as cited in Bolognini, 2004, p. 126). The therapist must never intrude 
on the patient’s boundaries. The patient must choose to what extent she will invite 
the therapist into the deeper recesses of her mind and heart. To intrude on the 
patient’s inner life is rightly felt to be suffocating (p. 127), which means the 
therapist must tolerate a patient’s refusal to allow the therapist to empathically 







Empathy as identification, fusion, enmeshment, incorporation.  
 
 Although clinicians treat many patients who have histories of manifest 
parental abuse, we also have to deal with more subtle cases of “loving” parents 
who see themselves as supportive, encouraging, and wanting the best for their 
children; yet are so psychically and emotionally tied to them that the children lack 
a sense of autonomy. Their parents seem to live through them as extensions of 
themselves.  An 18-year-old female patient felt the influence of her parents to 
become a physician so intensely that she believed if she did not become a 
physician she would be worthless. She even believed this was true of people in 
general. And yet she was manifestly unsuited by disposition and educational 
ability for this kind of work. Another patient, “Samantha,” is a 19-year-old 
diagnosed with Bulimia. In a family session she cries out to her mother to simply 
love her or care for her as a unique person above her mother’s obsession with her 
daughter’s weight. Her mother is mystified. “I don’t know what you want me to 
do. I’ve been anorexic and I know how dangerous being overweight is and how 
much people judge you for being overweight. Honey, you simply must fix your 
weight problem.” The possibility that Samantha’s symptomatology is related to, 
or the manifestation of, a deeper void or sense of invalidation by her mother is not 







Christine Olden (1958) refers to such examples of mothers who do not 
understand their daughters because they identify their daughters with themselves 
as manifesting a form of “incorporation” or “fusion.” Olden says this fusion 
“enabled them [the parents] vicariously to gratify their own frustrated instinctual 
needs by virtue of projecting themselves into the child” (p. 512).  This fusion 
necessarily precludes true empathy. By contrast, true empathy is “a fruitful 
identification of oneself with the person who is growing, so as to better 
understand their evolving needs, but it is made possible only at the price of 
suffering a loss: that caused by the first, physiological phase of fusion. Without 
this renunciation, and without sublimation, there can be no real 
empathy”(Bolognini, 2004, p. 51). 
In more complex cases it may be extremely difficult to tease out the 
genuine article from a vast array of counterfeits. This is especially so of 
individuals whose primary value is the admiration of their social group. A father 
may invent a career he never had; a mother may falsely claim she’s the daughter 
of royalty. But even in cases where one has attained success in some endeavor the 
cost of this success may be the sacrifice of higher values like the genuine 
nourishment of the souls of their children. They may insist they have provided for 
the physical needs of their family while remaining oblivious to their neglect of 







manifest this neglect in failing to attain the same social reputation, the parents 
may insist it is solely the child’s fault. The child becomes the sacrificial lamb, the 
scapegoat, or as therapists call it, the identified patient. 
Unlike Tolstoy (1904), who introspectively awakened in middle age to the 
sense in which all his social attainments and possessions were neither necessary 
nor sufficient to bring genuine fulfillment, many would prefer to have their 
misery in Beverly Hills rather than in Watts. They may be oblivious, as Tolstoy 
apparently was before his conversion, to the possibility of a life of inner peace or 
true happiness regardless of where one lives and/or what possessions one may 
have attained. We may fail to see what Viktor Frankl (1992) called the “wisdom 
in the words of Nietzsche: ‘He who has a why to live for can bear almost any 
how”–“a motto which holds true for any psychotherapy”(p.109). In sum, our 
parents who initially function as role models, inner voices, or “Superegos”–
dictating a set of primary values–may be initially assimilated or incorporated into 
our lives so deeply that we may not yet have seriously questioned the validity of 
these values for our lives. As the philosopher Bertrand Russell (1927) pejoratively 
said of Immanuel Kant, we may simply imbibe them on our parental knees. The 
significance of this for our understanding of existential trauma lies not merely in 
the extent to which these inherited prejudices may initially enslave us on a level 







the extent to which the prejudices we inherit about reality and what defines us as 
persons and individuals determine the character of our hope. 
 
On the meaning of a non-judgmental therapeutic attitude.  
  
To what extent do we, as therapists, collude in cases like this? Although 
we talk as if we can avoid moral judgments, how is this any different from the 
attempt of many professed postmodernists to claim to know no one knows 
anything? For example, again and again psychology interns are told not to be 
judgmental toward their patients. But what exactly does that mean? Carl Rogers, 
for example, repeatedly appealed to self-acceptance, and that notion has 
considerably influenced the field, but what exactly does “acceptance” mean? One 
patient says that it seemed to him naïve:  “Accept myself? This selfishness? The 
real harm I’ve caused others? This filth that I am?” Maslow’s appeal to becoming 
more than he was and better than he was spoke to him and encouraged him in a 
way Rogers’ acceptance did not, precisely because it took for granted a certain 
truth or fact about his current condition. Being “positive” or “non-judgmental” in 
the sense of denying real impediments to growth or “blowing smoke” like Stuart 
Smalley’s daily affirmations on the old Saturday Night Live, may not promote a 







Bolognini (2004) refers to R. Schafer’s observation that “sentimentality 
may limit our understanding of empathy solely to emotional experiences which 
we consider ‘good’. . . In this way, we avoid empathizing . . . with our patients’ 
boundless pride, sociopathic tendencies, sadism, parasitical attitudes, etc.” (p. 
111). I thought of “Isaac,” a former male patient of mine in his mid-30’s, who was 
suffering from depression and despair after his wife left him for another man. 
Although she insisted the affair was over and that it was a “trial separation,” he 
was all the more overwhelmed when he discovered she was still having the affair.  
Fixated as he was on his wife’s infidelity, he seemed almost oblivious to 
his own history of sexual liaisons and affairs during his marriage, as well as at 
least four affairs occurring simultaneously during the separation. He insisted he 
was “honest” with each of these lovers in that he told them he was going through 
a separation initiated by his wife who had cheated on him, which resulted in him 
being separated from his young children through no fault of his own. The 
impression Isaac intended to convey and the impression each partner was clearly 
convinced of, was that Isaac was a bright, sensitive, caring, faithful or trustworthy 
potential mate who could not yet commit to this new partner because of the depth 
of his pain. In describing these relationships he would periodically look at me and 
smile, as one man might share his stories of conquests to other men in a locker 







react negatively, disapprovingly, or “judgmentally,” I will probably lose him as a 
patient. If I ignore his response or say nothing, will he interpret it as if it had no 
significance whatsoever? But even if I ask him to say more about his smile and 
about his feelings and thoughts associated with it–if I attempt to understand the 
roots of that smile and the seeming discrepancy or conflict between it and his 
stated desire to reconcile with his wife–there seems to be no escaping moral 
judgments on some level.  
In Bolognini’s (2004) discussion of Winnicott’s (1994) Hate in the 
Countertransference, he refers to the sense in which it is “essential for the analyst 
to be aware of his internal reactions” (p. 109). Presumably, the emphasis here is 
not on empathy, whether construed as an intellectual or emotional process 
(Bolognini, 2004, p. 43), but on countertransference as “ a necessary [but 
insufficient] condition for [empathy]  entering the patient’s inner world” (Pigman, 
1995, p. 248). Countertransference, then, is an essential therapeutic tool, which 
we may use (insofar as we are aware of it) to evaluate whether or to what extent 
our own feelings and correlated thoughts are the product of our own history 
and/or the history and mental life of our patients. Instead of just impulsively or 
spontaneously reacting or responding to our patients’ material, we learn to sift out 
our material from our patient’s in pursuit of what is in our patient’s best interest 







reactions as an instrument to facilitate our developing capacity for empathy and 
understanding of our patient which facilitates our patient’s understanding of 
herself and reality as a whole. In common-sense therapeutic terms we rely on our 
increasingly developed therapeutic gut, or as Aristotle put it, on our practical 
wisdom or insight. In time the developing bond of trust enables our patient to 
receive “constructive criticism” or as Bolognini (2004) interprets Winnicott, “in 
certain cases the patient actually insists on the analyst’s hatred: if the patient seeks 
hatred which is objective and justified, he must be able to obtain it. Otherwise, he 
will not feel able to receive an objective expression of love” (pp. 109–110). 
Winnicott’s use of the word, ‘hate,’ seems to me at odds with the common 
meaning of the term in much the same way as the analytic use of a word like 
‘narcissism.’ In any case, I will assume that Winnicott is referring to some form 
of value judgment and essentially claiming that no one –including therapists–can 
or should avoid moral judgments. How else can we help our patients distinguish 
what is truly in their best interests or in accordance with their “true self” versus 
“false self?” How else could we help them distinguish a harsh or tyrannical 
superego from a loving and guiding or reliable inner voice? Without such a 
distinction, how could we distinguish a positive from a negative transference, or 








Having judgments is not the same thing as being judgmental or having a 
judgmental attitude in the sense of finding fault, or looking for fault. Rather, as 
wounded healers acutely aware of our own suffering and compassionately 
oriented toward helping our patients, our empathic perception is not limited to our 
patient’s overt behavior. We can look at destructive behaviors as symptoms of 
deeper unmet needs and thereby help our patients experientially understand their 
origin. Our aim is not to save the symptoms at the loss of our patient. What we 
can and should accept is the seed of our patient’s real capacity for growth in 
goodness even when they do not yet see it for themselves. Our aim is to nourish 
that seed in the measure we can.  
If all goes well, as in Bromberg’s case of Dolores mentioned earlier, there 
comes a point in the evolution of this therapeutic relationship when our patient is 
more receptive to “constructive criticism” precisely because it emerges out of an 
increasingly evolving context of genuine trust and love. As Bolognini (2004) 
points out, “It is one thing to have faith in a person’s possibility to evolve on the 
basis of psychoanalytic experience and insights to postulate the existence of a 
warm, relational and germinative nucleus in every human being beneath his 
protective armour and callused skin, and to trust in the possibility of developing a 







good–natured optimism and perceive one’s patients as nothing but abandoned 
kittens in search of a long-lost mother” (p.112). 
 
 Main barriers to empathic love and psychotherapeutic cure. 
 
 Having provided a general overview of how the four main orientations of 
psychotherapy may conceptualize and respond to existential trauma, and having 
provided a more in-depth look at the role of empathic love in healing this form of 
suffering, my intention will now be to focus on the literature from 
intersubjectivity theory in hope of providing both a clearer conception of the 
problem and the way to a cure. 
 
 Brandchaft’s pathological accommodation.  
 
 In Donna Orange’s (2011), The Suffering Stranger, she includes Bernard 
Brandchaft with other psychoanalytic “dissidents” and wounded healers like 
Ferenczi, Fromm-Reichmann, Winnicott, and Kohut. The experience of being an 
“outsider” may not be completely foreign to any of us: nearly every one of us has 
experienced the social compulsion or demand to blindly conform to the beliefs, 







rules may violate one’s own conscience. Brandchaft calls this “pathological 
accommodation.” Winnicott refers to a social demand, which if yielded to results 
in the formation of a “false self” (as cited in Orange, 2011, p. 222). Leonard 
Shengold (1989) refers to “soul murder.” Existential philosophers and 
psychotherapists refer to “bad faith.” Orange (2011) refers to the sense in which 
Ferenczi, Groddeck, Fromm-Reichmann and others have been treated as heretics 
and become exiles from the psychoanalytic establishment for “placing the care of 
the patient before loyalty to any dogma” (p. 116).  
Brandchaft refers to his own clinical experience of this phenomenon: “I 
encountered whole families of dispossessed and solitary souls all lost in a culture 
in which alienation had become institutionalized . . . a culture increasingly torn 
apart by a succession of traumatic events . . . [in a] society  . . . in which no one 
was answerable” (as cited in Orange, 2011, p. 208). For Brandchaft, pathological 
accommodation means, in Orange’s words, “that, at the deepest levels of our 
being, we may have been co-opted into a choice between the bond we need or 
needed to the parent or parental system and our own personal existence. We then 
live, or half-live, reactively but not creatively, caged in patterns of rebellion or 
compliance” (Orange, 2011, p. 219). In Brandchaft’s (2002) words: 
“Pre-emptory adhesion” to the dictates of caretakers gets internalized in a 







automatically outside awareness to maintain archaic bonds. That is the 
route by which so many individuals in our culture have become isolated 
from an innermost essence of their own. Their subjective world is 
substantially constituted by a reality originally imposed from without. 
Awareness of inner experience does not occupy, and is not allowed to 
occupy, a central role in defining and consolidating the sense of self and in 
generating behavior. Alien constructs define and appraise the self, their 
origins buried in antiquity and impervious to new information. What 
emerges is an automatic, invariant, unexamined and unquestioned 
patterning which constitutes a major impediment to learning from 
experience and source of resistance to change in analysis (p. 729).   
Psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic systems, for Brandchaft, are 
included in what he calls “structures of pathological accommodation.”  “The 
young analyst must comply without question with whatever standard of analysis 
the institute requires or be branded defensive and “resistant” (as cited in Orange, 
2011, p. 211). He refers to Freud’s interpretation of “resistance” as a form of 
cowardice or evasion “and cover up of base motivations and crimes” and of “the 
patient’s refusal to accept the analyst’s perception of [the patient’s] reality . . . as 
the most tenacious of resistances” (as cited in Orange, 2011, p. 210). In contrast, 







survival yet repeatedly collapsing when we analysts seemed to require that they 
comply and collude with us in their own destruction or imprisonment . . . No 
wonder the discouraged and defeated patient, feeling relentlessly misunderstood, 
finally wandered away from analysis” (as cited in Orange, 2011, p. 210). It calls 
to mind Amery’s response to the psychological diagnoses of him and others like 
him as being “warped” by their traumatic experiences. It calls to mind the 
response of so many parents to their children’s feelings of spiritual or emotional 
neglect or abuse: “We provided our children with a home, shelter, food. We didn’t 
sexually or physically abuse them. What more do they want?” It calls to mind 
Kafka’s (1971) cry, in his Metamorphosis, for a kind of food that could feed his 
soul that his caregivers seemed oblivious to. 
 
 Branchaft’s emancipatory psychoanalysis & Stolorow’s relational home. 
 
 What is needed to meet this need, Brandchaft claims, is an “emancipatory 
psychoanalysis” (Bolognini, 2004, p. 84)–a phrase Orange (2011) attributes to 
Robert Stolorow (p. 215). One might wonder at this juncture how far Brandchaft, 
Stolorow, Orange, Atwood and others who identify with the intersubjective and 
broader humanistic and existential orientation in psychotherapy, would extend 







problem. When Stolorow (2007), for example, focuses his attention on 
Heidegger’s view of death anxiety as if this lay at the core of the human 
existential condition, or when Freud and Jung, Fromm and Frankl (to name just a 
few), appeal to a form of necessary or inherent moral dualism, my impression is 
that they do not fully appreciate what Levi refers to by a moral de-evolution. 
How, then, can they empathically understand, much less treat, the radical 
character of this type of despair? It seems clear to me such a diagnosis would 
have a major impact on the nature of the “relational home” or “emancipatory 
psychoanalysis” that can alone meet this need.    
 
 On the relationship between a moral evolution and de-evolution. 
 
 Although this paper does not discuss in detail the relationship between a 
moral evolution and moral de-evolution, it’s at least worth drawing attention to 
universal images of salvation like Plato’s (Plato, 1875a) Allegory of the Cave. 
These images reveal a form of collective prejudice about reality and human life at 
the core of existential trauma which, insofar as it is a form of ignorance, may be 
overcome by simply opening our eyes. What makes this problem so difficult and 
complex revolves around the sheer pervasiveness of the social/collective 







What is needed is an increasingly evolving experiential awakening leading 
to a more comprehensive vision of reality and the value of life that brings with it a 
form of power that can overcome this darkness. It is an experiential appeal to the 
power of a form of knowledge: what Gautama Buddha had in mind by 
enlightenment, what Saint John of the Gospels meant by a relationship to a Light 
of truth that can alone set us free, what Socrates had in mind by his daemon or 
voice of conscience, and, one might hope, what therapists mean by a healthy 
superego. As I have repeatedly pointed out in this paper this is not an appeal to 
abstract, descriptive, or theoretical knowledge, but to knowledge in the sense of 
experiential insight or, perhaps, what Donna Orange (1995) means by “emotional 
understanding.” 
Toward realizing such a vision, therapists from all four forces of 
psychotherapy seem to be increasingly acknowledging the role of the core 
therapeutic values of authenticity, empathy, and compassion within the 
therapeutic relationship. Orange refers to psychotherapists governed more by a 
“hermeneutics of trust” than by a “hermeneutics of suspicion.” She refers to 
Ferenczi as one of the first analysts to emphasize this attitude of love, which 
seems also to mark what Stolorow calls a “relational home.” As Brandchaft 







as the primary goal and essential foundation for continuing therapeutic 
interaction and transformation” (p.735).   
It is crucial, however, for us to appreciate that the power for therapeutic 
change includes but is more than the patient, the therapist, and the highly unique 
and evolving relationship between them. For example, healing is not simply an 
appeal to mere good dispositions on the part of the therapist toward the patient. It 
has a lot to do with where the therapist and patient are within a continuum of 
experiential awareness of reality and the real possibilities for human life in 
general and this patient’s life in particular. It has a lot to do with the wounds we 
have suffered and the extent to which we have been able to discover what they 
can teach us. In this sense, the solution is by no means simple. As Orange (2011)  
puts it:  
There is no . . . simple or solitary exit from the prison . . . of pathological 
accommodation. Only with the help of another who seeks to understand 
the terms of the incarceration, and probably another who has known this 
prison from the inside, can it come unlocked. But the analyst too may 
become tangled up in the accommodative prison, not even recognizing 
that she or he may be keeping the patient inside (p. 222).  
What type of wounds or suffering? What precisely lies at the root of this 







understanding has the potential to meet this core need? How can such a love be 
realized on an individual and collective scale? Can it be realized in time or have 
we fallen so far from grace that hope really is unrealizable, as Levi, Amery, Celan 
and so many others seem to believe? These are some of the questions we may 
keep in back of our minds in the following pages. 
 
 Empathy, Existential Trauma and Loneliness. 
 
 One of the primary distinguishing features of the radical despair of our 
Holocaust witnesses was their profound loneliness. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann 
(1990) discusses a form of loneliness that although intended to elucidate 
psychotic loneliness may help us understand existential loneliness as well. 
Psychotic loneliness, Fromm-Reichmann, claims, is non-constructive, 
disintegrative, and ultimately leads to psychotic states. It renders those suffering 
from it emotionally paralyzed and helpless. In many, if not most cases, it implies 
a form of desolation: a state beyond feeling sorry for oneself in which “the fact 
that there were people in one’s past life is more or less forgotten, and the 
possibility that there may be interpersonal relationships in one’s future life is out 







form, is of such a nature that it is incommunicable by one who suffers it . . . it 
cannot even be shared empathically” (p. 312).   
 Fromm-Reichmann says that philosophers like Nietzche, Kierkegaard, and 
Buber say more about loneliness than psychiatrists to date, and that the books of 
the Old Testament, like the Book of Job and the sermon of Ecclesiastes, “provide 
the most final and profound literature of human loneliness that the world has ever 
known” (p. 317). This is especially significant in view of the way Holocaust 
survivors repeatedly refer to the suffering of Job as exemplifying their own 
experiences of loneliness. She refers to Binswanger’s description of the naked 
horror of real loneliness and says that people are more frightened of being lonely 
than of being hungry, deprived of sleep, and not having their sexual needs 
fulfilled. It is characterized by paralyzing hopelessness and unutterable futility; a 
naked horror that is beyond anxiety and tension, where defense and remedy seem 
out of reach.  
Like Brandchaft’s description of healthy resistance, Fromm-Reichmann 
says that those suffering from this form of loneliness are not cowards. At least 
some of those undergoing this suffering are marked by a sensitivity, perception, or 
power of observation far more acute than those who have adapted to a 
pathological norm that has denied the significance of events like the Holocaust for 







devices, false analogies, and forms of outright denial, so as not to have to come to 
terms with a grim reality” (p. 84). Fromm-Reichmann refers to the way these 
perceptive individuals tend to be shunned by their fellows reminiscent of Maslow 
(1999): “There are certainly good . . . men in the world. . . . But it also remains 
true that there are so few of them even though there could be many more, and that 
they are often treated badly by their fellows” (p. xl). I believe this is Donna 
Orange’s point in focusing on these wounded healers in the history of 
psychotherapy: that there is something about innocent and unjust suffering, and 
perhaps even the lessons we may learn from the consequences of our own willful 
wrong-doing, that may make us better than we are. I think it is the lesson that lies 
behind Jung’s appeal to the Wounded Healer and to Rollo May’s paper by the 
same name. I think it’s what draws so many to the suffering of the prophet Job, 
the suffering of Jesus, or the mark in the flesh of Paul the Apostle that allegedly 
kept him humble. And, as I have discussed in detail elsewhere (Wyner, 1988), the 
suicidal despair of our Holocaust witnesses may be less (if at all) an indictment of 
them and more an indictment of a humanity running from its own inward call to 
become better than we are. Perhaps our Holocaust witnesses believed that 
physical death was preferable to the loss of that moral and spiritual integrity that 







Perhaps the great danger of pathological accommodation, then, revolves 
around this fear of loneliness as we dare to leave the Cave behind to venture down 
the road leading to authenticity and love with a pure conscience. Perhaps the 
ability to empathically love is not as easy as it first appears. Perhaps that is what 
Fromm-Reichmann was alluding to when she refers to Thomas Wolf’s claim that 
the movement from Judaism to Christianity is a movement from loneliness to 
love. That is, if we assume with Buber, that Jesus plays a vital role in the history 
of Judaism independent of any commitment to the Christian Trinity, perhaps the 
cry of loneliness or abandonment of Jesus on the Cross may refer simultaneously 
to the nature of our existential suffering and the way free of it. Perhaps the kind of 
knowledge we, or Adam and Eve, were forbidden to eat was merely “the fruit” of 
intentional wrongdoing–a distancing of ourselves from the light guiding our own 
conscience–resulting in the most profound loneliness any human being is capable 
of. And perhaps the only way to reconcile and be restored to a pure conscience is 
a love willing to endure this loneliness in the faith that we are not alone. 
“Father/Mother, why have you abandoned me? [nevertheless] into your hands I 










Beyond empathy: Buber’s inclusion and confirmation. 
 
 In Thinking for Clinicians, Donna Orange (2010) discusses the 
significance of Martin Buber’s “Dialogic We” or “I and Thou” for clinicians. She 
mentions that Buber’s work has gone largely unnoticed by psychoanalysts but is 
embraced by Humanist psychologists like Carl Rogers. She refers to Buber’s 
criticism of Carl Jung who claimed that all statements about God have their origin 
in the psyche (Buber, 1999). Buber points out that given Jung’s limited expertise 
(and, far more importantly, his profound lack of spiritual knowledge and 
experience), this is a presumptuous claim in that Jung is hardly in a position to 
make pronouncements about extra-psychical reality. She refers to Buber’s critique 
of Freud’s reductionism, especially with regard to his wholesale dismissal of 
religious experience. He cannot, therefore, distinguish between veridical and non-
veridical religious experience. The same is true with respect to moral or ethical 
values. Here too, Freud reduces all guilt to neurosis, which effectively renders 
psychoanalysis impotent with respect to helping patients distinguish true from 
false guilt. This applies all the more so to core therapeutic values like Buber’s 
appeal to love or compassion as bearing witness to and affirming the unique and 







In providing a brief elucidation of Buber’s “I and Thou” for clinical work, 
Orange (2010) distinguishes the I/Thou relationship from the I/It relationship as a 
distinction involving an intimate I/Thou encounter that acknowledges the real 
worth of a person/object versus a more distant, object-centered, I/It way of 
relating to a person/object. To treat a person as a thing is a way of devaluing her. 
Buber is not saying, however, that the I/It relationship implies devaluation. Like 
Kohut’s view of empathy, Buber is claiming that the I/It relationship is neutral, 
but can be used in a way to avoid the sense of responsibility to another (and even 
one’s responsibility toward one’s self) that is inseparably connected to the I/Thou 
relationship. Orange quotes Buber’s view of the therapist’s true task in the light of 
“I and Thou:”  
The regeneration of a stunted personal center . . . can be brought off only 
by a man who grasps with the profound eye of a physician the buried, 
latent unity of the suffering soul, which can be done only if he enters as a 
partner in a person-to-person relationship, but never through the 
observation and investigation of an object . . . the therapist, like the 
educator, must stand not only at his own pole of the bipolar relationship 








Orange goes on to point out the sense in which Buber’s “I and Thou” goes 
beyond traditional psychotherapeutic views of empathy. She focuses attention on 
Buber’s view of “inclusion” and “confirmation” as the two primary qualities that 




According to Orange (2010), Buber thought of empathy as a form of 
empathic immersion or absorption in the other. Buber apparently conceived of 
empathy as a form of fusion, enmeshment, or mystical pantheism–the felt loss of 
one’s self, autonomy, and individuality as one merges with someone or something 
other than one’s self (Buber, 2002, pp. 114–115).  
Buber’s (2002) own sense of inclusion, by contrast, appears to him as the 
opposite of empathy. It emphasizes both the clinician’s and the patient’s 
independence or autonomy while allowing for the most intimate relationship 
between them that allows the members of the dyad to be “with” or share common 
events and experiences–even a form of sharing of “one another’s lives in very 
fact, not psychically, but ontically” (p. 170). For Buber, “things neither exist in 
rigid separation nor melt into one another, but reciprocally condition one another” 







experience of the therapist comes to include the unique standpoint or psychic 
reality of the patient in a way that is not true of the patient’s experience in 
relationship to the therapist. The therapist experiences “the specific pain of 
another in such a way that I feel what is specific in it, not, therefore, a general 
discomfort or state of suffering, but this particular pain as the pain of the 
other”(Wyner, 2007b). Orange (2010) compares Buber’s view to the 
intersubjective position in general and to her own perspectival realism in 
particular as an understanding that is more than what would be possible from a 
single perspective, but does not involve abandoning one’s own situated point of 
view. 
In the previously discussed case of Ben and Margaret’s loss of their dog, 
Madigan, Ben experienced Margaret’s specific pain as she did his in such a way 
that each felt what was specific as well as shared in their experiences with 
Madigan. It was not just a general state of “empathic” suffering one might feel, 
for example, for another person who has lost “a” pet (or parent, or sibling, or job) 
without regard to the specific meaning applicable to this individual in this case. 
Ben felt Margaret’s particular pain as included in his own with all the distinctive 
qualities that marked the uniqueness of her relationship, as she did his. Madigan 
was not replaceable by another dog as one might replace a window of one’s house 







one dying as being immersed in some spiritual ocean, the conception this conveys 
feels very different from the conception of a form of survival after death in which 
the loved one retains all that uniquely defines this person. Of course, the two are 
not necessarily inconsistent with each other, just as each color of the spectrum 
may be distinct yet inseparable from the light as a whole. 
 
 A closer look at mysticism and its bearing on clinical work. 
  
 First, certain experiences in Buber’s life provide a foundation for an 
apparent anti-mystical or anti-ascetic attitude, which, though understandable, may 
still be inaccurate.  Orange (2010) mentions Buber’s experience of mismeeting in 
relationship to his mother at an early age. Later in Buber’s life he describes a 
pivotal “conversion” experience of mismeeting when a young man came to him in 
despair and Buber was not fully present because he was still under the influence 
of deep religious contemplation a short time before. As Buber says, it “served to 
remove (italics mine) Buber into an ecstasy in which he no longer heard the call 
of the immediate hour” (Buber, 1999, pp. 14-15).  In Buber’s words, “from my 
own unforgettable experience I know well that there is a state in which the bonds 
of the personal nature of life seem to have fallen away from us and we experience 







the primal being or the godhead” (as cited in Friedman, 1988, p. 92). As Friedman 
(1988) points out, “Buber’s “conversion” did not mean, as some have thought, a 
rejection of mysticism in toto” (p. 93). He is not denying the possibility in his 
own experience of such a mystical union with God. Rather, his concern is with a 
form of separation or “duality that rips life asunder into the everyday creaturely 
life and the “deified” exalted hours” (p. 92), which Buber calls an “exalted form 
of being untrue.” As I see it, Buber is referring to one among a host of distinctions 
between true and false religious experience that correspond to moral distinctions 
in general. For example, one can draw a distinction between behaviors, practices, 
or disciplines used for the realization of a spiritual life, and so-called moral or 
religious behaviors, practices, or disciplines used to appear moral or religious 
when one is no such thing. The latter represent forms of moral and religious 
legalism, formalism, or that chameleon-like quality discussed earlier in reference 
to psychopathy. This shift of emphasis–of both will and the object of reference–
makes all the difference in the character or quality of the act. To use Brentano’s or 
Husserl’s expression, it implies a shift of “intentionality,” which literally 
determines what we mean or what we are referring to.  
In Buber’s case, however, the difficulty seems to lie far more in a gray 
area between these two extremes. For it is one thing to actually be engaged in an 







we respond to it or interpret it. And it would seem that what Buber discovered 
was the sense in which one’s relationship with God, like one’s relationship to 
truth and goodness in general, is inseparably connected to all one’s relationships 
in one’s day to day life. The attempt to separate our “religious” duties from our 
“secular” ones is just another form of bad faith: the purpose of all true disciplines 
for a spiritual life is precisely to help disengage from the automatic, habitual, and 
unconscious in order to more fully engage with that transcendent spirit of truth 
and goodness incarnated in and through us all. Just as our early engagement with 
primary caregivers tends to form an inner parental voice or superego, so too does 
our choice of what we align ourselves with reforms our personalities. 
The clinical significance of this, then, is that in contrast to the 
psychoanalytic and broader therapeutic prejudice (as Strachey pointed out earlier) 
that the therapeutic relationship is the only relationship that can modify the 
patient’s superego and thus result in profound personality change, the I/Thou 
relationship may extend to a host of other relationships, e.g., teacher-student, 
spiritual leader-follower, surrogate parental figures-children as well as the 
possibility of direct or unmediated, real and profoundly experiential, access to a 
trans-cultural “Good,” Superego, God or Living Word via the words of a scripture 
or book. The early Friends or Quakers, for example, repeatedly draw a distinction 







our obligation to the former above the latter. Without denying the instrumentality 
of any religious culture and its practices, they emphasize the one necessity of 
moment-by-moment fidelity to “The Word” of truth and goodness as the sole 
foundation of any true religion of the heart. I must emphasize my point here is not 
to deny or degrade the value of any religious culture or tradition, but to emphasize 
the danger of elevating any mere religious culture above the trans-cultural spirit it 
claims to serve. My point is to “raise the bar” by focusing our attention on the 
best that any religion or so-called non-religious moral teaching has to offer us.  
The power for deep and lasting personality change, then, does not lie in 
the therapist alone. It does not lie in the patient alone. It does not even lie in the 
relationship between them insofar as this is divorced from that spirit of truth and 
goodness that we all appeal to in professing our good faith. The power for change 
lies precisely in our authentic, empathic, and compassionate union with this spirit 
of truth even if we don’t yet know it as that transcendent God who alone can 
provide the requisite moral power to counteract the moral devolution we face 
today. Only such an intimate, experiential relationship with this trustworthy 
“Superego,” authentic “inner voice,” or eternal “Word” that existed before any 
scriptural words were written,  can fill the deep void of meaning, purpose and 
value for our lives that underlies the vast majority of psychological disorders from 







by a “Believing Humanism:” a religion grounded in being authentic so that it 
would include all people of good faith–believers and non-believers alike, just as it 




 As a description of the psychotherapist’s task, Orange (2011) quotes 
Buber as saying, “Confirming means accepting the whole potentiality of the other 
and making even a decisive difference in his potentiality” (p. 30). She refers to the 
case of a terminally ill patient who cannot see the future but seeks confirmation of 
the value and dignity of her life and of human life. Buber distinguishes his view 
of confirmation from Rogers’ view of acceptance in that confirmation may even 
assume wrongdoing as opposed to a stand of moral neutrality or naïve acceptance 
or approval. Buber seems to not only assume that all of us have sinned or fallen 
short of our responsibility, but that any wrongdoing necessarily impacts, affects, 
or has consequences for us all. It is inflicted on and indelibly marks our common 
humanity, It implies a human vocation to bear the guilt of us all in order to 
redeem our common humanity. It is a call to find meaning in our suffering, which 







inflicted on us by others is not the same thing as suffering for sin that we 
ourselves have caused. 
By enduring this suffering as wounded healers with an eye on creating a 
better world, the world can be redeemed.  In confirmation, then, one focuses on 
the real potential of both humanity in general and the unique individual standing 
before us, even if that individual is not yet able to see what she really can become. 
Through confirmation this patient may be able to temporarily rely on the greater 
faith, insight, or vision of the therapist in regard to her real ability to change 
without implying any intrusion on her freedom. In the process of her own self-
exploration she may then come to see with increasing clarity that her faith in my 
faith, or rather the reality mediated by my faith, is not in vain. It is not positive 
thinking. It is not saying nice things that I may not even believe myself. It is a real 
vision of who or what she can become. In Buber’s (1965) words: 
There are cases when I must help him against himself. He wants my help 
against himself. You see, the first thing of all is that he trusts me. Yes, life has 
become baseless for him. He cannot tread on firm soil, on firm earth. He is, so 
to speak, suspended in the air. And what does he want? What he wants is a 
being not only whom he can trust as a man trusts another, but a being that 
gives him now the certitude that ‘there is a soul, there is an existence. The 







can be redeemed. I can be redeemed because there is this trust.’ And if this is 
reached, now I can help this man even in his struggle against himself. And this 









CHAPTER IV: METHODOLOGY 
 
My first aim in this section is to emphasize the foundational importance of 
an attitude/approach to method, research and clinical practice similar to what 
underlies Donna Orange’s appeal to “fallibilism,” but which I prefer to call “good 
faith” (faith in a transcendent good greater than ourselves). I believe no one can 
avoid a faith commitment in response to known truth, and good faith manifests 
itself in everything we think, say, and do on a level deeper than conscious will. It 
underlies the core therapeutic values of authenticity, empathy, and compassion 
and thereby exerts the primary curative influence on our patients via a tangible 
manifestation of the reality and reliability of such a good. In the measure that we 
can, we function as positive role models (benevolent auxiliary superegos) in a 
way that can help our patients diminish the power of those harsh inner voices 
governing their negatively prejudicial thoughts and harmful behaviors.  
In more philosophical terms, I assume the truth of the thesis of “the 
practicality of reason” (Wyner, 1988), that insofar as we attain a more 
comprehensive vision of Goodness as the core principle governing reality, we 
enable that Good to tangibly manifest itself in our patients through us. As 







humanist/existential and transpersonal approaches, but it has been increasingly 
adopted by all orientations due to the widespread recognition of the efficacy of 
the core therapeutic values in psychological cure. It underlies, for example, Donna 
Orange’s (2011) appeal to a Hermeneutics of Trust as opposed to a Hermeneutics 
of Suspicion–especially in light of her appeal to Levinasian ethics. 
My second aim is to briefly describe what I mean by a “realist 
epistemology” in contrast to more narrowly circumscribed “empirical” and 
“idealist” epistemologies generally assumed as the only options for psychological 
research and practice today. My brief critique of these two methodologies 
includes a critique of “mixed methodologies” and theoretical approaches insofar 
as these are mere extensions of the former. The “empirical” gives rise to 
“quantitative” research typically associated with the medical model of 
psychotherapy while “idealism” gives rise to a type of “qualitative” research 
typically associated with “idealist phenomenological” and postmodernist 
psychological approaches. I will suggest, although I can hardly argue for it in any 
depth here, that these methodologies are compromised by dogmatic apriori 
Cartesian assumptions about the separation of the mind and its ideas from its 








This realist epistemology interprets Husserl, the father of phenomenology, 
as a realist rather than idealist, as described in great detail in (Wyner, 1988). My 
limited aim here will be to provide a more intuitive or experiential sense of such 
an approach and how it differs from the other approaches in the context of this 
paper. In fact, I have been implicitly relying on such an epistemology throughout 
this dissertation. I hope to convey an initial impression of how both empiricist and 
idealist epistemologies may profoundly limit our understanding of understanding 
itself, especially when applied to the diagnosis and treatment of a collective 
existential moral crisis.  
In general terms, a realist epistemology appeals to our capacity to actually 
know things as they really are rather than the way they may appear to be. This 
includes especially, but not exclusively, those things we know in the most 
intimate or “experience near” manner. Its aim is not to prove that we know, but to 
provide a clearer elucidation of knowledge so that we can more clearly distinguish 
cases of knowledge from mere belief, thought, superstition, and fantasy. It relies 
on our capacity to know as the means to elucidate the nature of knowledge itself.  
In more clinical terms, it enables clinicians along with their patients to 
more clearly and collaboratively distinguish what they know from what they 
merely believe. It enables us to evolve beyond what we now know on a common 







what we actually do not know, as well as postmodern dogmatic tendencies to 
(claim to know) we cannot know anything at all. It may provide a collaborative 
foundation for erecting an edifice worthy of the trust of all people of good faith, 
despite our differences in opinion. I am reminded of Buber’s response to 
Rosenzweig (1955) over their different views of the spirit or revelation and the 
law:  
Since faith must always be able to bind together, all separations and 
everything hard to understand is so only temporarily and cannot call for 
lasting respect. I deeply respect your different way of life; but you must 
not respect my different faith: that would stand in the way of the ultimate 
goal, which must be: the union of all minds in spite of the existent 
difference in the way of life (p. 113). 
Clearly, to hold such a position makes it difficult to classify this 
dissertation according to prevailing standards. It is certainly not a quantitative 
dissertation, but in its appeal to an experiential basis for all knowledge claims 
including what we call empirical knowledge, it is far more empirical than what we 
typically mean by that term. It is qualitative in that its aim is to describe the 
qualities of all objects including the qualities that apply to knowledge and our 
ideas. But unlike epistemological idealisms it does not limit our knowledge to 







substantiated explanation . . . of the natural world,” (Sciences, 1998) not the 
colloquial interpretation of theory as a mere collection of ideas or propositions.   
 
Fallabilism or an Attitude of Good Faith vs. Blind or Bad Faith 
 
Throughout this dissertation I have referred to “good faith” in contrast to 
both bad faith and blind faith. This realist appeal to experiential development can 
now allow us to flesh out this distinction further, especially with regard to 
increased clarity as to what properties things actually have. For example, we 
commonly distinguish between the properties of a house and the properties of 
one’s conception of a house. A typical house has a concrete foundation, a framed 
structure, a waterproof roof and so forth. My conception of a house is not made 
out of concrete, wood and so forth. Indeed, in my conception I can imagine a 
house suspended in midair or made out of cloud formations in a way no house can 
be or typically is. That is one of the defining characteristics of thought in general: 
it is referential. It can be of or about anything–even objects that do not exist.  
With regard to good, bad, and blind faith, let us consider the following 
example. Imagine a child (we’ll call him Sigmund) raised by Anti-Semitic parents 
to believe that all Jews worship the devil and at least some murder gentile 







no one could possibly believe, the blood libel legend goes back at least nine 
centuries and continues to be believed by many Anti-Semitic individuals and 
subcultures up to the present day (Dundes, 1991). Sigmund is walking home alone 
from kindergarten one day and sees an Hasidic Jew approaching him on the street 
wearing a skull cap or yarmulke, a fur hat or streimel, sidecurls or payot, with a 
dark suit and long top coat. What does Sigmund do? What should he do from the 
standpoint of his internal or intentional moral beliefs (as opposed to an external 
moral reality)? He runs, of course! Despite his good intentions, his moral 
knowledge about Jews is defective: Jews do not murder gentile children for their 
Passover rituals. Sigmund is governed by blind faith in falsely prejudicial beliefs 
about Jews that he has inherited from his parents and a broader Anti-Semitic 
social context.  
Now let’s imagine Sigmund goes away to public school some years later 
where he is exposed to broader social influences. He discovers that one of his 
teachers–the most authentic, empathic, compassionate, and insightful person he 
has ever known–is Jewish. What does he do now? To continue to open his mind 
and heart to the influence of his teacher might cost him rejection or worse by his 
parents and the culture he primarily identifies with. To reject his teacher for 
parental and social approval will violate his conscience in both its internal and 







experiential knowledge influences or constrains–it does not compel or determine–
a free response that consists precisely in the decision of whether to engage more 
intimately with the truth that he has seen or to disengage/distance himself from it. 
If he chooses the former, he evolves from “faith to faith” by experiential insight. 
That is, he evolves from a state of relative vagueness or darkness in the epistemic 
content of his faith toward a more experientially filled knowledge of the truth, 
which in turn provides a foundation for a more rational faith. And insofar as he 
does this with respect to his relationship to the truth and to true goodness in all 
cases, this relationship allows goodness itself to become the governing principle 
of action in and over his life. As Sigmund is motivated by this faith in goodness, 
he is motivated not merely to embrace his teacher but also that spirit, principle of 
life, or form of Judaism that defines the character of his teacher. He allows this 
universal or trans-cultural spirit of goodness to infuse itself into his mind and 
heart. He assimilates it, incorporates it by volition rather than blindly (as he 
initially did the Anti-Semitic beliefs of his parents and culture). His identification 
with it works to redefine or transform who he is and it brings with it a form of 
moral power he did not have before.  
Here is the distinction between faith and knowledge in its experiential vs. 
merely descriptive sense: for even though faith and knowledge can be 







faith is inherently irrational or anti-rational. There is such a thing as a rational 
faith in this experiential sense. Nevertheless, faith is not knowledge: it involves a 
certain lack of certainty that can lead to arrogance and false pride. For, despite the 
common emphasis on the value of self-confidence, self-reliance, autonomy, 
independence, or  self-actualization, we may distinguish these either as 
manifestations of genuine self-interest or as expressions of selfishness, self-
centeredness, or a reliance on the self without regard for one’s personal or social 
wellbeing. And while it is at least arguable that genuine self-interest is consistent 
with the best interests of others, this certainly does not extend to mere wants and 
desires. As Frankl and the later Maslow realized, the pursuit of self-actualization–
including the pursuit of knowledge when elevated above good faith–is self-
defeating. According to Maslow (1966) “self-actualizing people . . . in all cases 
are devoted to a cause or calling beyond themselves” (p.111). A good faith 
attitude or orientation of life toward a transcendent good necessarily results in 
positive consequences for ourselves and others. In doing good, we become good 
and we help others do the same. We appeal to what I have called a law of love or 
what Buddhists call, Karma. In this sense of a humble acknowledgement of the 
actual limits of our knowledge I agree with Donna Orange’s (2011) appeal to 








On Two Ways of Knowing a Thing 
 
In the history of philosophy as well as ordinary life we distinguish 
between two ways of knowing a thing. As Henri Bergson (1912) describes it:  
Philosophers, in spite of their apparent divergencies, agree in 
distinguishing two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The first 
implies that we move round the object; the second that we enter into it. 
The first depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the 
symbols by which we express ourselves. The second neither depends on a 
point of view nor relies on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may 
be said to stop at the relative; the second, in those cases where it is 
possible, to attain the absolute (p.1).  
Not everyone will agree with Bergson’s description of this difference, but 
that there is some such difference shows up again and again. Bertrand Russell, for 
example, refers to a distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and 
knowledge by description, just as Kohut  and the self-psychologists refer to 
greater clarity and power associated with relationships that are “experience near” 
rather than “experience distant” (Strozier, 2001).  
We also commonly recognize a distinction between the power associated 







conclusion of a logical argument is far less powerful than the experiential 
knowledge of existing objects or states of affairs. Many undoubtedly “knew” that 
little children were tortured, mutilated, and murdered in Nazi concentration 
camps–even during the time it was happening–but that belief, even supported by 
good argument–indeed, even grounded in experience itself!–is qualitatively 
different from the clear and vivid experience of seeing one’s own child butchered 
before one’s eyes. Such cases, of course, can be multiplied without end. The 
emphasis by Kohut and Self-Psychologists on empathy as such an experience-
near form of knowledge points to its crucial clinical significance. And yet, as we 
shall see, without an adequate epistemological elucidation of such knowledge, we 
may have reason to doubt whether it is near at all.  
 
On the Unavoidability of a Philosophy, Philosophical Psychology, 
Epistemology and Ontology and its Clinical Implications 
 
Whether one is conscious of it or not, all of us–therapists and non-
therapists alike–rely on a philosophy that profoundly impacts us both theoretically 
and practically/clinically. As we have seen, it is because Levi, Amery, Celan and 
other Holocaust witnesses like them believed there was no hope for humanity 







modern atrocities) that motivated their suicidal despair. The experience of these 
Holocaust witnesses may not seem as removed from ours when we consider, for 
example, an 18 year-old “borderline” patient who is suicidal in the belief he 
cannot change after taking psychology courses suggesting his personality is 
formed and neuro-anatomically fixed in his first few years life. Donna Orange 
(1995) addresses this point in her re-evaluation of Freud’s interpretation of 
Schreber in a way that may especially bear on our analysis of a collective 
existential problem. She initially responds to Schreber’s feeling that people were 
not real, by saying that “we can only speculate on the origins of this prominent 
feature of Schreber’s experience of the human world” (p.196). However, she 
seems quite insightful in her “speculations” about Schreber’s experience of the 
total unreliability (and in this sense, the unreality) of Schreber’s parents, 
physicians, wife, and friends who should have been there for him in his Job-like 
hour of need. We may not fully appreciate how we, along with those around us, 
may be like Schreber’s parents, physicians, wife, and friends in that we have not 
yet put to the test of experience our own fundamental assumptions about reality 
and humanity. Why wonder that Schreber and our Holocaust witnesses might 
project this experience of humanity onto their conception of a God? This much 
may now be relatively clear: we have good experiential reasons to believe that a 







the etiology of our behavior the role of broader systemic or interpersonal 
influences. And at least some of our theories more than others (e.g., behaviorist, 
biological, neurological, and systems theories) may excessively emphasize 
circular causality to the point of de-emphasizing or denying wholesale the reality 
of moral knowledge, freedom and responsibility on both a group and individual 
scale.  
As a result of such beliefs and experiences, Orange (1995) says patients 
may lose faith in themselves, in their therapists, and all who would presume to be 
their guides when authority figures undermine their own experiences in the name 
of truth. The problem here is not knowledge but rather the presumption of 
knowledge one does not actually have: the felt necessity to speak in its name 
because of its perceived power over our lives. In reality, as evidenced in Socrates’ 
profession of ignorance, when we acknowledge what we are ignorant of (rather 
than professing a knowledge we do not have) we are actually relying more 
wholeheartedly on the truth as our guide. So when Levi or Amery express their 
felt loneliness in response to their testimony falling on deaf ears–when their 
biographers, friends and family–even therapists!–treat them as “warped” by their 
Holocaust experiences–shouldn’t we at least consider the possibility that their 
despair is rooted in a problem with us rather than them? Perhaps one of the 







vision of a hope that can sustain both them and us may be the extent to which 
therapists themselves may not know how to find this vision for themselves. We 
may be resistant, given our position as “experts,” to acknowledge this to our 
patients, colleagues, or even to ourselves. 
 
On the Psychological Assumption of Only Two Psychological Methods or 
Epistemologies 
 
Orange (1995) refers to the generally held position that there are only two 
epistemological methods appealed to in psychological research and that they tend 
to be in opposition. One refers to an empirical methodology originating in Hume, 
which we generally refer to as quantitative; the other refers to an idealist 
methodology originating in Kant, which we generally refer to as qualitative. The 
former gave rise to positivism; while the latter gave rise to phenomenological 
methods via idealist interpretations of Husserl, Heideggerian idealism, and 
hermeneutic methods via the work of Gadamer. The former emphasizes the role 
of sensa, sense-data, or sensation in the acquisition of knowledge; the latter 
emphasizes the derivation of knowledge via the mediation of subjective ideas or 







As I have argued elsewhere (Wyner, 1988), both these methods rely on 
Cartesian assumptions about the nature and origin of ideas or the separation of the 
mind from its objects. Both are governed by dogmatic apriori physicalist or 
nominalist assumptions about ideas, which restrict experiential knowledge either 
to subjective sensations or subjective conceptions. In either case, it is inexplicable 
how one can ever transcend those limits to objectively know anything at all. But 
they are not consistent. Both concede the centrality of some form of experiential 
knowledge, insight, or intuition for rational justification of their claims of 
knowledge, but give no adequate account if it. On the basis of these 
epistemologies, reality itself, along with all the realities humanity has always 
assumed to know: ideas, minds and selves, moral and aesthetic values, laws 
whether causal, logical, or mathematical, God–even the substance of material 
objects–must be placed on a par with superstition or fantasy.  
I will return to these two methods in a moment, but before continuing I 
want to briefly mention “mixed method” and theoretical approaches to place this 
dissertation in context. “Mixed methods” essentially refers to relatively recent 
attempts at integrating these two methods. I realize this is overly simplistic and I 
appreciate the danger of too easily classifying any theoretician as a member of a 
particular camp, but this does not change the fact that we do identify with some 







that defines itself by its love for the truth alone. I am reminded of the Holocaust 
historian, Raul Hilberg (1996) when he told his teacher/sponsor Franz Neumann 
that his research bore witness that the Jews had cooperated in their own 
destruction.  
Neumann did not say that this finding was contradicted by any facts; he 
did not say that it was under-researched. He said, “This is too much to 
take–cut it out.”  . . . he knew that at this moment I was separating myself 
from the mainstream of academic research to tread in territory that had 
been avoided by the academic world and the public alike. What he said to 
me in three words was, “It’s your funeral” (p. 66).  
Cases like this manifest the essence of our collective existential moral 
problem: we find ourselves in a world like a prison, where one feels compelled to 
choose sides or else be placed outside the protection of all–a world in which no 
side defines itself by its love for the truth alone.  
I realize that to identify with a realist epistemology is not in vogue, but I 
also realize that what’s not in vogue is not necessarily antiquated. And in this case 
it seems to me that insofar as our mixed methods or integrative approaches rely on 
empirical and/or idealist epistemologies, which in turn rest on a Cartesian 
separation of our experience from the reality they apprehend, they may all be 







should also draw a distinction between “integrative” approaches that attempt to 
provide a reliable epistemic foundation and “eclectic” approaches that may be 
inconsistent with themselves and make no such attempt at all. Granted some may 
use these terms interchangeably, but the issue I’m concerned with here is not with 
the name but with the foundation of our beliefs.  
We also refer to “theoretical dissertations.” But insofar as this is merely an 
appeal to theoretical consistency or validity rather than soundness, it may provide 
as much value for research and clinical practice as a theory about possible worlds 
where moons are made out of green eggs and ham and people are living as brains 
in vats or a Matrix. This is not a theoretical dissertation in that sense. 
I should also make it clear that all these various methods: empirical and 
idealist, mixed or integrative, and theoretical rely on some form of realist 
epistemology or ability to distinguish what we know from what we merely 
believe, without which no one would take what one claims seriously. As Orange 
(1995) put it in describing her own moderate realist epistemology or perspectival 
realism, “We can learn little about human potentials or about what relational 
conditions support their flourishing if we believe we can know nothing, that all 
truth is construction or fiction” (p. 29).  Such a view differs from more extreme 
postmodernist views that claim we can literally know nothing and in making such 







views on the further, logical positivist end of that spectrum, is that a grounding of 
knowledge on what Orange (1995) calls “bare, unorganized, reason-free, 
atomistic experience” (p. 83) lacks the unity to constitute even an idea or 
conception much less anything we might call experiential knowledge.  
 
A Brief Discussion of Empiricist, Idealist, and Realist Epistemologies: What 




Toward providing a more accessible appreciation of the significance of 
epistemology for clinical practice, I have been relying on a traditional assumption 
about a goodness inherent in reality and our ability to gain access to it. 
Philosophers have referred to it as the thesis of the practicality of reason–the 
claim that experiential knowledge of that supreme good or summum bonum that 
defines reality itself has power to transform our individual and collective life. The 
philosopher, David Hume, and/or many of his contemporary followers have called 
this thesis into question. Indeed, Hume may be considered the father of the 
impracticality of reason–the view that what motivates action is desire, feeling, or 







feels good enough, we are compelled to do it.” To suggest that reason in any 
sense has constraining, much less compelling, power seems to most of us absurd. 
And this simply by virtue of the common awareness that we can know what’s 
right and still feel powerless to do much of anything about it. In Hume’s (1964) 
words: 
Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to 
talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, 
and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves 
to its dictates . . . . On this method of thinking the greatest part of moral 
philosophy, ancient and modern, seems to be founded;  . . . In order to 
show the fallacy of all this philosophy, I shall endeavor to prove first, that 
reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, 
that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will . . . Reason is, 
and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to 
any other office than to serve and obey them (p. 413). 
It is not as if this denial of reason’s power is based on an elucidation by 
Hume or his followers of reason’s inherent weakness; nor on any alleged 
superiority of feeling, affect, or the passions. Rather, given Hume’s exclusion of 
experiential knowledge, he is forced to conclude that passion alone is the power 







behavior, Hume ascribes to his passions highly complex intentional states having 
features ordinarily attributed to thought/reason in its objective experiential sense. 
For example, his passions are referential and capable of being about a vast variety 
of objects: Joe is not just angry, but angry at this specific driver for cutting him 
off. These passions are also not essentially private or subjective, but objective and 
even universal: they are capable of being communicated and shared by others. I 
can know how you feel and I can feel the same emotion you feel at the same time. 
Ordinary subjective sensations cannot do this. Finally, these passions can be true 
or false, which is nonsensical if they are merely subjective. Hume’s appeal to 
natural sentiment, feeling, or passion, therefore, is not an appeal to any mere 
subjective state of feeling, but to a highly complex selective and intentional state 
ordinarily attributed to belief or reason.  
To more fully appreciate this point, recall Donna Orange’s (1995) 
reference to modern day assumptions about what is allegedly “given” to us in 
empirical experience: “bare, unorganized, reason-free, atomistic experience” (p. 
83) or temporally isolated sense-data. How do I move from this to anything given 
to us in any subsequent point in time? The mere recognition that some underlying 
sense elements are necessary for the emergence of thought does not elucidate the 
nature of these sense elements themselves. Nor does it imply that all our ideas are 







derived from ideas that are. But this is Hume’s empirical foundation for 
knowledge. It is not surprising, therefore, that subsequent attempts, like those of 
the logical positivists, to ground an adequate epistemology on sense data have 
failed. As Kant recognized, sense data are inadequate to provide the relations 
necessary to constitute the unity that is objective thought and knowledge. We 
seem forced into subjectivity. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Hume 
himself was no subjectivist, relativist, or skeptic regardless of the implications of 
his epistemology. Skepticism, according to Hume (1902), “is entirely subversive 
of all speculation, and even action;” “more rash, precipitate, and dogmatical, than 
even the boldest and most affirmative philosophy, that has ever attempted to 




For Kant, the Cartesian separation of thought from its objects reaches its 
obvious conclusion: reality is essentially unknown to us. Or, rather, all we know 
are phenomena or our own ideas and it is through these ideas alone that we gain 
access to a reality “out there.” But, as we shall see, Kant fails to provide an 







According to Kant, what is “given” to us are sensible intuitions which 
contain visual, audio, tactile, or other sense impressions which the mind receives 
at the end of a causal process involving material objects impinging on our bodily 
surfaces. We do not know these material objects or even the sense impressions 
themselves. Rather, these sense impressions are necessary but insufficient 
elements in the evolution of our conceptions of phenomena. By means of them we 
know that there is an external world, but it’s specific nature is unknown to us.  
This sense knowledge, however, is insufficient to account for the 
phenomenal unity that we actually experience. That is, the unity of our ideas of 
those objects and the objects themselves–the fact that the properties of the objects 
a sensed appear related to the properties of our ideas themselves. But Kant claims 
there are no intellectual intuitions or non-mediated direct apprehensions of things-
in-themselves or universals (since these cannot be empirically sensed). Hence, he 
has to account for this unity by allowing reason itself to impose its own 
categorical classification and unification of sense impressions. In more familiar 
terms, our so-called “knowledge” of reality is conditioned or altered by our own 
ideas. “Reality” is essentially a theoretical construct. We don’t discover it. We 
create it or construct it. Yet, nevertheless, material or sensible objects take 
precedence over non-sensible objects like numbers, logical propositions, identity, 







strictly known because they are not sensibly intuited or experienced. In other 
words, since Kant is a nominalist he cannot acknowledge a form of experiential 
knowledge of non-material objects so he is forced to look for some alternative 
form of justification for our knowledge. This he finds in what he calls 
transcendental arguments, the function of which is to allegedly transcend or 
bridge the gap between our subjective sense experience and objective reality.  
 
A critique of Kant’s transcendental arguments.  
 
But, the properties of an object that make it possible to know it are distinct 
from the properties of the mind that make it capable of knowing an object. If, 
therefore, the only objects we can know are our own subjective ideas without 
access to a reality distinct from them, how can Kant deduce anything about an 
external reality? Even if we could know a reality independent of our concepts, this 
would still be insufficient to elucidate the characteristics of the actual knowing 
act. For example, the fact that a star is millions of miles away imposes necessary 
conditions on how it is to be known (e.g., we will need a telescope to see it). But a 
description of the necessary conditions for this knowledge would require a 
description of the knowing act itself (in this case, the role of our sense 







clearly not properties of the star itself. In this way we may better appreciate the 
sense in which Kant, along with a host of other forms of modern-day idealists, 
constantly conflate and thereby confuse our ideas with their objects. Kohut, for 
example, refers to empathy as vicarious introspection as if our empathic 
experiential awareness of what the other is experiencing was allegedly an 
inference from our an introspective awareness directed on ourselves and/or our 
own ideas.  
Like Hume, Kant is also inconsistent in his appeal to sensible intuitions in 
that he relies on non-sensible intuitions of non-material realities when it comes to 
our knowledge of our own ideas. In this case there is a direct knowing relation 
between our ideas and their objects. The objects in this case–our ideas–are given 
as they are (without the mediation of other ideas). In other words, in this case we 
have experiential knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance, perceptual knowledge, 
or non-sensible intuitive apprehension as compared with inferential, propositional, 
or judgmental knowledge. Indeed unless Kant concedes this he would be forced 
into complete skepticism. For, how do we know our ideas of our own ideas are 
true or false? How do we know our sense impressions are connected to the 
properties of external existing objects? In more philosophical terms, Kant’s 
appeal to the privileged epistemological status of conceptions, phenomena, or a 







subjective ideas in the acquisition of objective knowledge, but in doing so he 
assumes the necessity of experiential knowledge of non-sensuous objects like 
relations. What justification, therefore, is there to restrict experiential knowledge 
to sensible objects and/or ideas? Why can’t we experientially know on the same 
foundation logical relationships, numbers and numerical relationships, things-in-
themselves of a host of types including natural kinds, moral and aesthetical values 
and so forth? To avoid the difficulty or complexity of elucidating knowledge, 
Kant merely shifts attention to another domain of reality. Metaphysical issues do 
not disappear by shifting reference from an outer to an inner world. 
What Kant’s transcendental arguments actually are is controversial. 
Sometimes they appear less as arguments and more like an appeal to experience. 
But what is especially significant for our understanding and treatment of a 
collective existential moral crisis revolves around the way Kant attempts to use 
such arguments to support his moral claims. But, sensible intuitions are restricted 
to the categories of space and time. They cannot, therefore, provide veridical 
support for sound inferences to true conclusions about non-sensible or noumenal 
objects like the moral law, freedom, self, and God. One cannot derive a moral 
ought from a non-moral empirically sensuous is. Commonly used appeals to 
consistency prove nothing. Nor does any argument have the same clarity and 







rational support for his moral claims or account for the moral power associated 
with this experiential knowledge. For example, one might construct a perfect 
proof of the existence of God and, thereby, believe that God exists. But such a 
belief would hardly be as vivid or powerful as experiencing God before one’s face 
as exemplified in case after case in the biblical scriptures. Such cases are also 
distinguishable from cases in which one is certain–even knows–that God exists, 
but his or her presence is not before one’s face. And so we see men and women 
shaking in awe of God’s power, although they had no doubt about God’s 
existence previously.  
 
Some clinical implications of these two positions. 
 
These issues certainly bear on the problem of a collective existential moral 
crisis. For, as argued earlier, what our Holocaust witnesses experientially testify 
to is a contingent or non-necessary moral condition of humanity today. This is 
something all of us can experientially confirm for ourselves if we are willing to 
undertake the requisite process of actually looking. But when it comes to their 
beliefs about God and a moral reality, no such experiential knowledge is appealed 
to. Rather, they rely on beliefs or assumptions–indeed prejudices–about the nature 







religious cultures in which they and we are raised. At the core of these prejudices 
is the belief that God is capable of evil and/or that evil is a necessary and 
unavoidable fact of human existence. And this despite the fact that this is 
inconsistent with the whole tenor of the Biblical scriptures and the testimony of 
the most enlightened spiritual witnesses in our history. It is inconsistent with the 
biblical appeal to a progressive process of human moral redemption in which 
one’s feels the freedom to sin no more. One lives in a state of inner peace in 
which even the fear of death is overcome by a new found sense of spiritual life.  
But, how are we as clinicians to help our patients attain greater clarity 
about their own experiences of reality if we are so fundamentally confused about 
our own such experiences? How can an empirical psychologist speak to Amery’s 
problem of moral weakness insofar as he or she assumes there is no objective 
moral reality and/or no way to know if there was? How is an idealist psychologist 
to speak to this need given the restriction of knowledge to our ideas?  
A closer look at Kant’s (1963) transcendental arguments suggests that he, 
like Hume with respect to his “belief passions,” ascribes to these “arguments” the 
same features traditionally ascribed to experiential knowledge. For example, Kant 
appeals to a unique form of non-sensible moral feeling inseparably connected to 
the apprehension of moral values. It is not, therefore, because we have a natural 







to perceive objective moral realities applicable to all rational creatures, even if 
these include aliens, angels, and a God. And the unique quality of Kant’s rational 
feelings is that they are not restricted to time and place or culture. The experience 
of the pilgrim in Plato’s Cave or the biblical prophet, Job, can as powerfully affect 
Levi and the rest of us today as they affected those living millennia ago. In this 
regard Kant and Hume are very different from many of their modern day 
followers in that the former have no doubt about a moral reality and the power 
that comes from a more intimate acquaintance with it. Their problem is merely 
with providing a clear elucidation of it.  
 
 Husserlian realism. 
 
 I have claimed above that some form of realism is implicitly relied on by 
both empirical and idealist epistemologies. In fact, as I have also shown, 
postmodernist positions claiming we literally can know nothing are self-refuting. 
But they also distinguish between two ways of knowing a thing and emphasize 
the primacy of experiential knowledge of at least some class of existing objects. 
What distinguishes the type of realism appealed to here, then, is not the claim that 
we can actually know things as they really are. Nor even its extension of this 







Husserlian form, it aims to provide a clear elucidation of the parts, properties, and 
relationships involved in the knowing act so that we may distinguish what we 
know from what we merely believe or imagine. A mere appeal to a realist 
epistemology, therefore, does not imply that it is any more rigorous or capable of 
helping us draw such distinctions than any other epistemology. The main 
shortcoming of naïve or common-sense forms of realism is precisely the lack of a 
sufficiently rigorous elucidation of  knowledge that constrains those who hold this 
view to say “either you see it or you don’t” (Wyner, 1988). 
From the standpoint of such a realist epistemology we can perceive and 
know things as they really are, not merely the kinds of things that are. Even 
reality itself. “Reality is prior to epistemology,” that is, reality does not depend for 
its existence on our beliefs about it or our knowledge of it. Instead, the a priori 
existence of things themselves, combined with minds having the requisite 
capacities to know them, allows for “Knowing.” Thus, if one knows X, then X 
exists. A descriptive elucidation of this Knowing would include empirical appeals 
to sense impressions along with idealist appeals to ideas, but it would also aim to 
distinguish sense data, thought, belief, and knowledge as well as thought from its 
correlative objects. Of particular significance is the elucidation of a non-
inferential process of experiential fulfillment that leads from relatively unfulfilled, 







which objects are grasped as they really are. For example, we might describe the 
process leading from my vague, partial impressions of what initially appears as a 
rag on the side of the road toward increasingly clearer perceptions of the actual 
qualities of the object for me until there is no longer reasonable doubt about what 
it is: in this case, a dead cat. My cat. And the perception brings with it a measure 
of power that the mere thought could not. What distinguishes such a realist 
epistemology from the empiricist and idealist is its appeal to non–sensuous or 
intellectual intuition in a way that enables us to perceive unities, wholes, or 
essences together with their parts and properties in relation. In this way we can 
Know not only material objects, but also our own ideas, abstract entities like 
numbers, logical propositions, and objective moral realities.  
To illustrate: every legal system distinguishes between intentional and 
unintentional right and wrong–doing or action. With reference to such “moral 
objects,” a realist epistemology can enable us to distinguish between moral 
knowledge, moral action, and the power or constraint of our beliefs and 
knowledge on action. It can elucidate the nature of moral values as the objects of 
our knowledge, which in turn can enable us to distinguish between rational and 
irrational moral motivations as well as good and evil irrational moral motivations. 
It identifies hidden or unconscious intentional-motivational complexes or 







replacing such prejudices with experientially verified insights. I believe this is 
what Husserl had in mind when he spoke of a presuppositionless philosophy. Not 
a philosophy without assumptions, presuppositions or “prejudices” in the broad 
sense of the word, but a stress on putting at least our most fundamental 
assumptions about reality and human life to the test of a rigorously experiential 
critique. This is practical philosophy or the Socratic appeal to an unexamined life 
not being worth living. It appeals to the sense in which no one can avoid a faith 
commitment in response to what we most fundamentally believe about reality and 
our lives in relation to it.  
To briefly illustrate how this approach may differ from empiricist and 
idealist approaches to moral problems, let us consider some cases. Earlier I 
described the case of Sigmund who ran from the Jew with the best of intentions 
because of inherited anti-Semitic prejudicial beliefs. Now let us consider the 
following case: I once found a baby bird that had prematurely fallen from its nest 
and could not yet fly. I believed that the parent(s) would abandon the baby bird, 
so I put the bird in a shoebox, took it home, and called an animal rescue 
organization for advice on how to feed it. In a knowing, almost parental type of 
voice, the person I spoke with told me that my belief was mistaken: that I should 
take the bird back to where I found it and the parent(s) would feed it on the 







30 feet away and watched as a bird flew down and fed the baby only minutes 
later. As in the case of Sigmund, my externally wrong action was based on a false 
belief (albeit one held with the best intentions). It was only by virtue of having 
reason to question that belief and by putting it to the test by more vivid 
experiential intuitions that I was enabled to discover the truth.  
This assumption that there is a class of externally right actions is universal 
and conceded by virtually every legal system in the distinction between voluntary 
and involuntary forms of wrong–doing. Intent is a mitigating factor in such cases. 
A consequence of this mitigation, though, is that practically everyone claims 
innocence. And this reflexive claim for innocence may become so pervasive that 
we are tempted to deny that intentional conscious evil even exists. We may then 
restrict cases of intentional evil to those who do evil for evil’s sake (which is 
arguably not possible) or state that evil applies to practically no one. But as Levi 
and our other witnesses pointed out, even if the more extreme cases of good as 
well as evil do not define a morally gray norm, what makes the gray area so 
insidious and so dangerous is precisely the sense and extent to which it is by no 
means value neutral or merely indifferent. It is marked by a progressive cold 
indifference, which is increasingly affecting and infecting us all. This would not 







A realist epistemology, therefore, unlike an empirical one that restricts 
knowledge to sensible objects or an idealist one that restricts knowledge to 
conceptions, can better help us understand the meaning and significance of the 
statue of the blind lady of justice. The assumption is that in a just society there is a 
real connection between a legal code and a moral law and that this is independent 
of our beliefs or conceptions about it. Indeed, our awareness of bad laws in 
corrupt societies presupposes the reality of just laws. The reason for legal 
sanctions, therefore, revolves around the awareness that the majority of those 
governed by such laws may not have evolved sufficiently (like those living in the 
darkness of the Platonic Cave or the adult still governed by primitive coping 
mechanisms) to appreciate the character of the moral law. For those who do see it, 
as Plato understood, they become a law unto themselves. 
By contrast, Kant concedes the power of such an apprehension of the 
moral law, but since his epistemology is limited to the conceptual realm he is 
forced to limit his attention to moral intentions, which cannot provide an 
elucidation of how one comes to know and act in accordance with the moral law 
itself. Indeed, he cannot even provide an adequate elucidation of intentionally 
right actions since this would require an elucidation of one’s intent (the object of 
moral apprehension) distinct from one’s conception of it. It would require placing 







appropriately clarified experiential knowing relationship. This is no less necessary 
when we shift our focus from the rightness of an external action to the rightness 
of one’s intention.  
The problem of both helping individuals suffering from a sick conscience 
as well as the broader problem of a collective sick conscience, therefore, revolves 
around two senses of conscience: one bearing on an inability to discern the nature 
and character of the moral law and the second bearing on one’s intentions toward 
it (an attitude or orientation of good, bad or blind faith). Insofar as we are truly 
governed by good faith as an orientation of life (as opposed to mere isolated acts 
of good faith), we enter into a process of moral development inseparably 
connected to the process of experiential fulfillment discussed above. A realist 
epistemology that can elucidate such distinctions can help us appreciate the sense 
in which we may collectively find ourselves in a condition of relative moral 
blindness in spite of our good intentions.  However, much like in Plato’s Cave, 
merely being brothers and sisters in darkness is not sufficient to empower us to 
take the requisite steps leading into the full light of day–especially given 
prejudices about the reality or attainability of such a vision. In sum, if knowledge 
of rectitude is limited to the conceptual as Kant is forced by his epistemology to 
concede, how can he distinguish between moral subjectivity/intersubjectivity and 







Transcendence in Husserlian realism. 
 
 Philosophical transcendence as applied to this realist epistemology is 
essentially a relation between a complex act of knowledge and its corresponding 
existing object. An elucidation of our ideas is insufficient to determine whether or 
not what our ideas refer to actually exists. Without an elucidation of 
transcendence we are forced back into the Cartesian separation of thought and 
reality. Such an account is also essential for my claim about the curative element 
in psychotherapy–that the power for real and substantial personality change is not 
rooted in the patient or patient’s ideas alone, nor in the therapist or therapist’s 
ideas or interpretations alone, nor even in their relationship. Rather, the power for 
substantial personality and collective change is rooted in our experiential or 
dialogical I/Thou relationship to an objective moral reality. In other words, 
insofar as both therapist and patient are oriented by an attitude of good faith, they 
both allow that transcendent good to become incarnate through their personalities. 
A synergistic union thereby emerges which I would call a spiritual community or 
to use Stolorow’s expression, a “relational home.” From a more religious or 
spiritual orientation one may say that a transcendent good or God becomes 







some objections to a realist epistemology will further provide a context to better 
understand transcendence and its clinical significance. 
A realist epistemology elucidates how we apprehend objects, which are 
not dependent on our knowledge or apprehensions of them. These objects, 
therefore, retain a form of independence in relation to the mental acts that know 
them. My computer, for example, presents itself to me as something that was here 
before, and remains after, I see it. It does not present itself as created, destroyed or 
modified in any way by my mere apprehension of it. This relationship, then, is of 
a specific kind: one that does not modify its terms by their relationship. Despite 
its common-sense plausibility, this view is at odds with the prevailing 
philosophical and psychological outlook, which interprets the knowing relation as 
a causal relation, which essentially changes its terms by their relationship. As 
Donna Orange (1995) puts her central thesis: “Whenever we experience, we do 
something–making sense or organizing –to something–the given, the partly 
unorganized, even the chaotic” (p. 88).  
The fact that some relationships modify their terms may well make such a 
position seem attractive. For example, when a father smacks his son in the face or 
an earthquake knocks the books off my bookcase, the terms of the relation are 
certainly modified. Such a view might seem especially attractive in a therapeutic 







within that relationship. We may be tempted to believe, therefore, that knowledge 
is a relationship that is modified by its terms. Thus, conceptions, one may argue, 
do not objectively represent or correspond to reality or things-in-themselves. How 
things appear is not how they really are. 
But for Husserl (1970), the mere fact that one can only know something in 
the act of knowing does not imply that one cannot know something as it is in itself 
independent or “apart from” the act of knowledge. It does not imply that 
knowledge is like a causal relation that modifies its terms by its relation to them. 
For example, in the case of mathematical relations, the form ‘15 + 10 = 25’ 
instantiates the relationship of addition. This relation certainly does not modify its 
terms. It does not turn the 15 into a 4. Or, to consider another case: If mere 
looking must change its objects then the letters on this computer, my desk and the 
bookcases in my room–even less tangible objects like my frustration about 
completing my dissertation a short time ago–must change their nature as I turn 
around. Perhaps if I turn around enough my dissertation will complete itself. 
There is, however, another sense in which this objection may seem more 
plausible. That is, a sense that lends support to views like Stolorow’s and 
Orange’s intersubjectivity approach, which emphasize the context dependence of 
meaning. For example, when we think of certain classes of objects–perhaps 







or even non-linguistic physical objects like a work of art, music, or the beauty of a 
sunrise or sunset, these objects seem inseparably colored by not only more 
commonly shared thoughts, intentions or meanings, but also by the fabric of our 
more subjective experiences. For example, as I hear a lecturer refer to 
“narcissism” it calls to my mind a form of selfishness that seems to me opposed to 
genuine self-interest; yet the lecturer also refers to a form of “healthy narcissism” 
that even if different from my own conception seems a bit closer on what one 
might call a narcissistic continuum. This seems especially the case when we think 
of objects like works of art or music. Physical objects, then, may not only seem 
clothed or colored by such thoughts or meanings, these meanings may appear to 
be literal parts of the objects apprehended. In other words, it may seem as if we 
cannot really know an object as it is in itself independently of our subjective 
experiences and/or social conventions. 
For Husserl (1970), however, the relevant point is not whether there are 
relationships–even essential relationships–between subjective ideas, objective 
meanings, and things-in-themselves, but that we must not confuse or conflate 
them with one another. For example, when a professor looks around the room to 
see who is attending class and who isn’t he may merely wish to refer to an object 
independently of any meanings that might be associated with it or any subjective 







context in which I am attempting to empathically understand my patient’s despair, 
the meaning associated with this despair, along with both my patient’s subjective 
experience of it and my own countertransference reactions to it may all constitute 
immanent parts of the objective reference as a whole. In short, we must 
distinguish the object of experience from its intentional coloring and both of these 
from the experience of the object (or its coloring).  
Such examples illustrate that it is not necessary for an object of thought to 
be colored by the thoughts or meanings we may associate with them. It illustrates 
that these objects are not essentially subjective or culturally relative. Indeed, the 
very fact that we can and do apprehend objects as colored or as subjective or 
culturally relative presupposes the capacity to apprehend objects with this 
coloring. For example, our recognition that a patient may project onto her 
therapist qualities that the therapist does not actually have, presupposes the 
capacity to apprehend objects without those qualities. Otherwise, we would be 
caught up in an infinite regress. Subjective experiences, objective meanings, and 
their correlative objects all can be, and commonly are, distinguished and these 
differences find expression in language. The fact that linguistic marks and sounds 
or even physical objects in general are generally associated with certain meanings 
or intentions or thoughts does not imply that these thoughts or meanings are literal 







transcendence or independence of the knowing act that apprehends them as they 
really are. 
As I said, I cannot take the time here to provide a more detailed 
elucidation of transcendence but perhaps a brief comparison of Hume’s (1902) 
manner of dealing with truth and Husserl’s (1970), view of transcendence in its 
application to truth might be helpful. In Husserl’s case, in the process of 
fulfillment of relatively empty thoughts or intentions by more epistemically filled 
intuitions, there comes a point where it is no longer possible to entertain doubt. 
Knowledge necessarily implies the existence of its object. If I know it is raining 
outside or that butchering a child is wrong, then it necessarily follows that it is 
raining outside and butchering a child is wrong. It is not the knowing relation, 
which makes these states of affairs true. They remain true from the side of the 
object or existing state of affairs whether or not anyone ever knows them. The 
point is simply that doubt given such a relation, is for Husserl, absurd. But in 
Hume’s case, there is always room for doubt. This is because belief is interpreted 
as a mere subjective feeling or passion contingently attaching to the concrete act 
of judgment the features we assess as true or false. Hence, we can never be certain 
that any concrete claim is true. Husserl’s view, therefore, shows not only how we 
can have non-sensuous knowledge of moral qualities not reducible to physical 







subjective feelings or passions. It shows how objective moral knowledge or 
awareness can be possible.  
 
Some clinical implications of Husserlian realism. 
 
 The clinical significance of such an approach for our purposes is that it 
provides a rational or objective foundation for diagnosing and treating collective 
moral trauma that is consistent with the most fundamental claims about the power 
of experiential knowledge by every culture in every age. Indeed, such an approach 
inherently points to a transcultural revelation or possibilities for knowledge akin 
to Maslow’s appeal to the Farther Reaches of Human Nature. It motivates a 
humble, good faith, “fallibilist” orientation that can position us to eschew the 
dogmatism of modernist tendencies to assume knowledge grounded merely in 
tradition and postmodernist tendencies that claim to know we can know nothing. 
In a collaborative spirit we may then fill in the gaps in our knowledge as we 
search for a more comprehensive vision of reality. From a clinical perspective it 
especially raises questions about what we mean by empathic understanding and 
its role in therapeutic cure. For the discussion part of this dissertation, then, my 
aim will be to rely on this realist epistemology as we briefly discuss the kind of 







our Holocaust witnesses bear witness to and which all of us in varying forms and 









CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION  
 
Like the Holocaust survivor who feels no one–perhaps not even other 
survivors–can understand, our patients may come to therapy feeling no one may 
understand their pain. But if no one can understand, what’s the point of even 
expressing it? Undoubtedly, they feel isolated, misunderstood or not heard at all–
as if their cries fell on deaf ears. But they are typically ambivalent. What do they 
most deeply want from us? What does understanding really mean?  
Yes, they want to be truly seen and heard by another who is not defensive 
or judgmental. They may want no active input at all. As one of my supervising 
analysts once put it, the therapist may need to initially “strap in” and simply listen 
as part of the process of coming to deeply understand this patient’s psychic 
reality. And catharsis alone may be good for the soul.  
But even writing one’s thoughts in a journal or crying one’s heart out 
while watching a sun set, may be cathartic, without anyone listening at all. 
Listening means active, attentive, empathic listening. A need that cannot be met 
by the caricature of an analyst falling asleep behind the couch as the patient talks. 
One typically needs a therapist actively engaged with us, like a fellow traveler 







story, along with attending to her own countertransference reactions to avoid 
imposing her own subjective vantage point on ours. We need someone willing to 
engage with us in a process or journey involving an increasingly clearer and more 
comprehensive experientially shared sense of where we are and what is blocking 
our way to growth.    
And so we listen to our patients’ stories like an anthropologist meeting 
those of a new culture for the first time. Like the story of Schreber or the poem by 
Jones Very our patients may see others like zombies or the walking dead, coldly 
indifferent to their suffering. They may insist they are called to fulfill some great 
mission–even have telekinetic abilities to stop a raging wind or wildfire by the 
power of their will alone. They may confide in us accounts of sadism, masochism, 
and forms of paraphilia we may never have even conceived of before. They may 
express insights about themselves, others, and our world more profound than we 
may presently be able to comprehend. In all these cases hidden beneath real or 
apparent distorted thinking and correlative feelings and behavior may lie truths or 
realities that provide the key to understanding them and helping them find their 
way in this world. Yes, the mere fact that we remember the details of what they 
tell us may in and of itself be therapeutic, but the fact that we do not treat them as 
warped or insane or unworthy of the respect of being heard and understood means 







them. First and foremost we want to hear their story. First and foremost we 
provide a place of safety or sanctuary where they can say what they truly think 
and feel.  
In coming to understand there is a part the patient plays in this, a part that 
the therapist plays, and a part we play together as the therapeutic relationship 
unfolds. More hidden, but all the more powerful is the role of a world permeated 
by values, good and bad. On one hand, there is the part we all play in feeding the 
spirit of selfish cold-indifference we inherit as we are born into and assimilated 
into this world. On the other hand, there is the part we play as we collaborate with 
a spirit of grace or goodness transcendent to us all. A fuller understanding of our 
patient, then, is inseparably connected with our own growth in understanding the 
complexity that emerges out of the interplay between each of these distinct roles.      
My patient, for example, must be willing to share her inner world with me. 
She must invite me in so I can see and understand the context in which she has 
suffered. And we must understand just how difficult this may be for her. For, she 
may have suffered not only relatively isolated violations of trust, but ongoing 
retraumatization in different forms over a lifetime by those closest to her. Her 
defensive walls may now be so thick that it may take quite a long time, if she is 
ever willing and/or able, to let me in as one she has good reason to believe she can 







God and even if I was the wisest of philosophers, this need not imply any willful 
or stubborn “resistance” by my patient to the truth or true goodness itself–even if 
she believes this herself.  For example, the mere fact that I am a man may erect an 
impervious barrier to trust for a woman who has been repeatedly raped by the 
men in her life who should have protected her from harm. The “right fit” between 
therapist and patient is essential in a way that implies no negative judgment of the 
therapist or the patient.  
 Like the relationship between a parent and a child, a teacher and a 
student, a guide and the traveller beginning one’s journey, the therapeutic 
relationship is an asymmetric one. There is mutuality of worth or dignity or 
respect but an inequality of power that should not be abused. The patient comes to 
therapy to be understood; while the therapist assumes the position of one 
responsible to understand. We are primarily concerned here, then, with the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for understanding our patients. As we have 
seen, active listening and a good fit are necessary conditions; and so is the relative 
willingness and ability of our patient to let us in. But compassionate empathy is 
also required. And within the continuum between altruistic love and narcissistic 
psychopathy where the therapist’s empathy lies will make the most profound 







As we have seen, despite the modern-day emphasis on feeling or affect 
above knowledge or reason, empathic understanding is certainly not a form of 
feeling without experiential knowledge or insight.  We struggle to experientially 
see their world; not ours, which implies no “vicarious introspection” much less 
one that moves from our world to theirs by any alleged “experience far” logical 
inference. And without this apprehension or perception we can hardly 
empathically share what they feel. An elderly patient may ask a young therapist, 
“How can you understand what it feels like for me to lose my son if you’ve never 
been a parent or even lost someone you loved?” The young therapist may appear 
to this patient as capable of understanding her suffering as a child. The present 
life experience of a therapist certainly has a bearing on whether or to what extent 
he she can understand this patient. 
Similarly, understanding our patients’ suffering–especially in cases of 
existential or moral/spiritual trauma–may have less to do with the more specific 
forms this suffering may take than with a more deeply felt lack of intimate human 
connection. One may feel completely isolated even in the midst of family and 
friends in a deeply felt sense that those around us may be oblivious to the 
shallowness of what they call love. Our patients may feel they must conform to 
just those ways of thinking that allow those around us to live comfortably in their 







they would wish. And so one feel like the prisoner in Plato’s Cave constrained by 
all those around him to conform to the shadows on the wall rather than be true to 
one’s self. And yet our patients may not have the clarity of perspective that comes 
from having travelled farther on the road to light to express the emptiness that 
they feel. Their eyes may be asking us, “Can you understand my loneliness and 
my despair?  
These considerations already take us far beyond the realm of subjectivity 
or cultural relativity of opinion or belief–far beyond what the philosophers call the 
narrow circle of subjective ideas. To know my patient’s psychic reality and/or our 
own is just as much an objective fact as any other. Our beliefs about our own or 
our patient’s psychic reality may be true or false; more or less able to comprehend 
the reality. There is a difference between belief and knowledge and understanding 
requires far more than mere belief. I must be able to help my patient distinguish 
what is real from what is merely apparent. Indeed, the demons that reside in the 
deeper recesses of her inner world may seem too terrifying for her to even 
acknowledge. She may desperately need someone who can see more clearly than 
she can now that they have no power over her. She is not walking alone and she 
will not be overwhelmed. 
Understanding, then, goes beyond merely understanding what a patient 







believe she is to blame for the neglect and abuse suffered in her childhood, we 
need to help her distinguish her beliefs from reality. We need to help her in the 
process of coming to see and see more clearly not merely the shipwreck in which 
she finds herself but the signposts that can lead her to a safe harbor. As we have 
seen, a Levi, Amery, or Celan may yearn to believe there is hope for us to become 
better than we are; yet the selfish cold-indifference they see all around them–
growing like weeds or polluted air–may increasingly undermine their last remnant 
of hope. If they really see this, how can we speak of understanding them if we 
cannot see it also; if we treat them as if their “testimony” is a warped projection of 
their deluded minds?  
As we have seen, in their case they see or bear witness to a pervasive 
moral problem with humanity today, but this tempts them to believe that this 
implies something wrong with reality itself and any God at its core. It tempts 
them to believe the entire human project has failed. That human history itself is 
without value or purpose or as Woody Allen once said, God must be on vacation. 
But this is not something they, in their good faith, see or even presume to bear 
witness to as opposed to merely believe. And if this is, as we have claimed, the ill 
begotten fruit of a foundation level prejudice–the great stumbling block in the 
way of a true vision and lasting peace–how can we help them if we do not see this 







unwilling to even walk with them as brothers and sisters in darkness? Yet, 
consider the clinical or practical consequences: for, in just the measure they 
believe there is no hope for humanity that belief in and of itself (no matter how 
false it may in reality be) will constrain them toward self-annihilation. For that is 
what belief does: it motivates a field of possibilities for confirmation and 
disconfirmation. And in the case of foundation level prejudices these may appear 
no different from an inviolable law that we no longer question. And so it has often 
seemed to me that Sartre’s  atheism is disingenuous in comparison with Levi’s. 
For Sartre (1964) seemed quite able to live in a world he claimed to know is 
radically evil, while Levi (1986a) seemed to so yearn for a good world that in the 
belief our world is being stripped of its conscience, he felt his own life could not 
be sustained.  
Understanding, in short, requires a vision of an objective moral reality 
worthy of the trust of any rationally discerning creature whether person, alien, 
angel, or God in spite of (indeed, because of) all the darkness we see around us. It 
requires an awakening to the fact that none of us can be indifferent to a faith 
commitment in response to what we have seen; nor even indifferent to the 
possibilities we may see if we dare to look. Even sitting on the fence is just 
another choice. We commonly speak of awakening to “the real world” and one 







reality so permeated by selfish cold-indifference that the idea of “changing the 
world” may appear increasingly impossible. Our youthful idealism may seem as 
naïve as a child’s belief in Santa Claus or an Easter Bunny. This is what our 
Holocaust witnesses bear witness to so it should not be surprising why we would 
feel constrained to run from it just as a person diagnosed with a terminally ill 
condition might run from such knowledge. And yet, is it true? Is our condition 
really terminal? Is there a true versus false or naïve hope for the redemption of 
humanity? Understanding requires the courage to look more deeply at this core 
existential problem. And as we do, we might ask: Is this problem essentially a 
problem of mere poor early attachments or the lack of “good enough” maternal, 
paternal, or parental caregivers? Is it merely this in conjunction with a problem 
with this or that particular group or majority culture with which we and/others 
identify? Undoubtedly it shares something in common with cross-cultural male 
gender prejudices; and even this projected onto a conception of a tyrannical male 
god that seems to include every religious culture in our world today. But we must 
ask, is it possible that the great barrier to hope is simply and yet profoundly a core 
prejudice about reality itself and any God at its core? Is it possible that this 
prejudice, like any other, may be overcome simply by our willingness to open our 
eyes? Doesn’t awakening to a coldly indifferent world mean we are already 







So the question these unavoidable philosophical or ontological and 
epistemological questions raises for us, like the question the biblical scriptures 
asked of our first parents, “Is there a God worthy of our trust?” The universal 
testimony of the most conscientious and enlightened in our history is that there is 
such a God and that each of us is called to enter into an “experience near” 
relationship with Her in a way that brings with it a form of moral power that no 
logical inference can. And so empathic understanding, if it is to be truly 
therapeutic, must also include the relative ability of the therapist to help our 
patients find their way through the labyrinth of this world just as Socrates/Plato 
(1875a) tried to do in their description of the journey out of the darkness of the 
Cave.  
In a word, understanding includes guidance–a constraining rather than 
compelling cause or influence–that respects the patient’s freedom. It means that 
the one thing a good parent, therapist or guide–even a God!–must never do is 
violate this freedom even if one can and sometimes must restrain one’s actions 
when they impede on the safety of others or even one’s own life. One cannot 
intrude into the world of our patients. We must be invited in, and this only so far 
as our patients feel safe enough to trust us. Moral guidance–and all the more 
anything that purports to be religious or spiritual guidance–means more than not 







means not imposing even in the clearest and fullest knowledge that we are right. 
For it is not knowledge that transforms. It is the incarnation of a purity of 
goodness greater than ourselves that speaks directly to our patient through us only 
if and as we function like transparent glass and put no barrier in its way. And in 
this we do well to reflect on the need to work out our own salvation in fear and 
trembling. Understanding means we collaboratively join with our patients where 
they are in their own search to see and see more clearly what is worthy of their 
trust and what is not. No one can live by another person’s conscience. 
Such a collaborative search will involve the growing realization that what 
initially may have appeared to be a problem with our patients is, more deeply, a 
problem with our world that includes us as therapists as well. Their problem is our 
problem. And as we undertake this journey together, each with our own respective 
roles, we may begin to realize that the extent to which we can help them will 
depend not only on where they are in their journey, but where we are in ours. In 
the spirit of Abraham, each of us must ask ourselves, “How far have I dared to 
leave my family, culture and other group identifications in the Cave to venture 
forth alone, if need be, on that road that leads out of darkness into light? To what 
extent can my own experience confirm the testimony of our Holocaust witnesses 
that their despair was not limited to the trauma they experienced in the microcosm 







But even more than this, to what extent can my experience confirm the 
vision of the great spiritual witnesses in our history concerning the way to hope? 
In the spirit of Buber’s confirmation, how can I fulfill the calling of a minister of 
souls to help my patient surpass his or her present limits of vision? Like Frankl’s 
appeal to finding meaning in any situation, or Maslow’s (1971) appeal to the 
Farther Reaches of Human Nature, we must be able to show our patients how 
they can become more than they are, better than we are, even transform human 
life as we now know it. They may not yet be able to see this hope for humanity. 
They may doubt their own unique capacity to implement this change in the fabric 
of this world. They may not yet be able to see their own small but real and 
incremental steps toward greater vision and power. They may say, “I haven’t 
changed.” And in this belief they may be tempted to say, “I can’t change.” And 
yet we need only draw their attention to the realization of any form of goal 
attainment in human life. The fact that one cannot yet stand on the summit of a 
mountain doesn’t mean one has made no progress in the climb. A senior in 
college who has completed every course in every year up to the last day is still not 
a graduate and in that respect no different from a freshman on his first day of 
school. Often our patients need to rely on our faith in them–not blind faith or any 
false optimism, but our vision of their real capacity for growth and the real 







themselves. It is still good faith because it is directed on and through someone 
they have come to know and see they can trust because our vision may be more 
reliable than their own. And yet, they cannot stand on that summit by our faith but 
only by their own. Each of us is called to undertake the journey ourselves and 
only the fullness of our own vision of reality as good and worthy of our trust can 
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